Neurocomputational models of corticostriatal interactions in action selection by Caso, Andrea
  
 
 
Neurocomputational Models of 
Corticostriatal Interactions in 
Action Selection 
 
 
Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the 
Department of Psychological Sciences 
 
Birkbeck, University of London 
 
Andrea Caso 
 
2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 
Declaration 
 
 
 
 
 
I declare that this thesis and the research contained herein is entirely my own work. All 
work and ideas on which this thesis has drawn which are not my own have been clearly 
attributed. 
 
 
Andrea Caso 
April 2019 
London 
 
  
 3 
Abstract 
Schema theory is a framework based on the idea that behaviour in many areas depends 
on abstractions over instances called schemas, which work in a cooperative or 
sequential fashion, but also compete with each other for activation. Cooper & Shallice 
(2000) provide an implementation of schema-theory with their model that simulates 
how routine actions works in healthy and neurologically-impaired populations. While 
schema theory is helpful in representing functional interactions in the action-perception 
cycle, it has no commitment to a specific neural implementation. Redgrave et al.’s 
(2001) model of the basal ganglia is, in principle, compatible with a device that 
regulates the competition among schemas, carrying out action selection. This thesis is 
mainly concerned with improving the neurobiological plausibility of the schema 
theoretic account of action selection without sacrificing its theoretical underpinning. We 
therefore start by combining an implementation of schema-theory with a reparametrised 
version of the original basal ganglia model, building the model from the ground up. The 
model simulates two widely used neuropsychological tasks, the Wisconsin Card Sorting 
Test (WCST), and the Brixton Task (BRX). 
 
In order to validate the model, we then present a study with 25 younger and 25 over-60 
individuals performing the WCST and BRX, and we simulate their performance using 
the schema-theoretic basal ganglia model. Experimental results indicate a dissociation 
between loss of representation (present in older adults) and perseveration of response 
(absent in older adults) in the WCST, and the model fits adequately simulate these 
findings while grounding the interpretation of parameters to the neurobiology of aging. 
We subsequently present a further study with 50 participants, 14 of whom have an 
ADHD diagnosis, performing the WCST under an untimed and a timed condition, and 
we then use our model to fit response time. Results indicate that impulsivity traits, but 
not inattention ones, predict a slower tail of responses in the untimed task and an 
increased number of missed responses and variability across subtasks. Using the model, 
we show that these results can be produced by variation of a combination of two 
parameters representing basal ganglia activity and top-down excitation. We conclude 
with recommendations on how to improve and extend the model. 
  
 4 
Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to start by thanking my supervisor, Prof Richard Cooper for his guidance, 
his patience, his encouragement, his impeccable sense of humour, and for always going 
beyond the call of duty in supporting my work. I am also indebted to him in terms of the 
way I approach problems and I believe some of this intellectual rigour will stay with me 
for the rest of my career. I would like to thank Tom Stafford and Max Garagnani for 
kindly agreeing to serve as examiners for the thesis and for providing very constructive 
and valuable feedback. 
 
I would also like to thank all of my friends at the BMA and outside, particularly Sam, 
Matt, Syreen, Gurmukh, Kathryn, Jen, Manu, Emily, Michael, Chiara, Anna, Elena, 
Viktoria, Isabel, Olivia, Suzanne, Nick, Wen, Ron, Aji, Emiel, Kayleigh, and Chris for 
their support, fun times, and inspiration. For the long-time friendship and support, I 
thank Shaheen and Alberto.  
 
For believing in me, I thank my mum and my sister. For teaching me how to program 
when I was little, I thank my late dad. I'm sure he would be proud of this.  
 
Last, but certainly not least, I thank my lovely Agnieszka, for putting up with me and 
for gently encouraging me. These challenging years were easier to endure with her by 
my side. 
 
 
 5 
Table of contents 
 
 Neural and psychological investigations of frontostriatal circuits ........... 12 
 Abstract .............................................................................................................................. 12 
 Gross neuroanatomy of frontostriatal circuits .................................................... 12 
 Neurobiology and neurophysiology of cortex and striatum ........................... 15 
 Neurology and Neuropsychology of frontostriatal circuits ............................. 17 
1.4.1 Lesion studies ............................................................................................................................ 17 
1.4.2 Parkinson’s Disease................................................................................................................. 18 
1.4.3 Huntington’s disease (HD) ................................................................................................... 21 
1.4.4 OCD and Tourette’s syndrome ........................................................................................... 23 
1.4.5 ADHD ............................................................................................................................................. 25 
 Summary of neurobiological findings ..................................................................... 26 
 Neurocomputational models of the basal ganglia ............................................... 28 
1.6.1 The box and arrow models .................................................................................................. 28 
1.6.2 The basal ganglia as a dimensionality reduction device .......................................... 29 
1.6.3 The basal ganglia as a sequence generator ................................................................... 30 
1.6.4 The basal ganglia as an actor critic mechanism .......................................................... 31 
1.6.5 The basal ganglia as an action selection mechanism ................................................ 32 
1.6.6 The basal ganglia as a gating mechanism ...................................................................... 36 
1.6.7 The basal ganglia as rule-selection mechanism .......................................................... 38 
1.6.8 The basal ganglia as a procedural module within the ACT-R cognitive 
architecture ................................................................................................................................................ 40 
1.6.9 The basal ganglia as a global inhibition system .......................................................... 41 
 Evaluation: The nature of dopamine signal ........................................................... 41 
 Summary ............................................................................................................................ 42 
 Research questions ........................................................................................................ 43 
 Basic action selection: simulating a multi-channel basal ganglia ............. 45 
 Abstract .............................................................................................................................. 45 
 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 45 
 Model description ........................................................................................................... 47 
 Simulation .......................................................................................................................... 52 
2.4.1 Effects of channel salience .................................................................................................... 52 
2.4.2 Simulating the effects of dopamine manipulation ...................................................... 54 
 Variation of parameters ............................................................................................... 55 
2.5.1 Parameter evaluation ............................................................................................................. 56 
2.5.2 Discussion ................................................................................................................................... 60 
 Extension to more channels ........................................................................................ 61 
 Non-deterministic action selection .......................................................................... 65 
 Summary ............................................................................................................................ 66 
 Simulation of corticothalamic loop ...................................................................... 68 
 Abstract .............................................................................................................................. 68 
 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 68 
 Model description ........................................................................................................... 70 
3.3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 70 
3.3.2 Computation in the cortical units ...................................................................................... 71 
3.3.3 Computation in the basal ganglia units ........................................................................... 72 
3.3.4 Computation in the thalamic units ................................................................................... 74 
 6 
 Simulations ........................................................................................................................ 75 
3.4.1 Introduction and Methods .................................................................................................... 75 
3.4.2 Results .......................................................................................................................................... 75 
3.4.3 Discussion ................................................................................................................................... 80 
 Reaction time distributions analysis ....................................................................... 81 
 Discussion and Summary ............................................................................................. 85 
3.6.1 The role of dopamine ............................................................................................................. 85 
3.6.2 Extension to the model .......................................................................................................... 86 
 Modelling the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test with the Extended Schema 
Theory ..................................................................................................................................... 88 
 Abstract .............................................................................................................................. 88 
 Model description ........................................................................................................... 88 
4.2.1 Task and model description ................................................................................................ 89 
4.2.2 Computation ............................................................................................................................... 91 
 Simulation .......................................................................................................................... 96 
4.3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 96 
4.3.2 Parameters .................................................................................................................................. 96 
4.3.3 Performance measures .......................................................................................................... 98 
4.3.4 Model fit ....................................................................................................................................... 99 
 Interim Discussion ....................................................................................................... 100 
4.4.1 Effect of alteration of saturation curves ...................................................................... 102 
 Analysis of grouped data ........................................................................................... 103 
4.5.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 103 
4.5.2 Simulation ................................................................................................................................ 104 
4.5.3 Discussion and model fit .................................................................................................... 105 
 General Discussion ...................................................................................................... 108 
4.6.1 General Analysis and cognitive endophenotypes .................................................... 108 
4.6.2 Parkinson's Disease cognitive impairments .............................................................. 110 
4.6.3 Expanding the model ........................................................................................................... 111 
4.6.4 Further directions ................................................................................................................. 112 
 A Neurocomputational model of action selection for the Wisconsin Card 
Sorting Test ......................................................................................................................... 114 
 Abstract ........................................................................................................................... 114 
 Core assumptions ......................................................................................................... 114 
 Model description ........................................................................................................ 116 
 Simulation ....................................................................................................................... 122 
 Discussion ....................................................................................................................... 125 
 Addressing the model's shortcomings ................................................................. 131 
5.6.1 Reward mechanism .............................................................................................................. 131 
5.6.2 Response time ........................................................................................................................ 132 
5.6.3 Encoding reward in the PFC ............................................................................................. 134 
 Simulating clustered data ......................................................................................... 135 
 General Discussion ...................................................................................................... 138 
 Modelling the Brixton Task with the Extended Schema Theory .............. 141 
 Abstract ........................................................................................................................... 141 
 Model description ........................................................................................................ 142 
6.2.1 Task description .................................................................................................................... 142 
6.2.2 General model description ................................................................................................ 144 
6.2.3 Feedback and bias mechanism ........................................................................................ 146 
6.2.4 Computation in individual units ..................................................................................... 147 
 Simulations ..................................................................................................................... 150 
6.3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 150 
6.3.2 Exploring the parameter space ....................................................................................... 150 
6.3.3 Exploring single parameters ............................................................................................ 152 
 7 
 Discussion ....................................................................................................................... 159 
 Simulating aging in the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test and Brixton Task
 162 
 Abstract ........................................................................................................................... 162 
 Experiment ..................................................................................................................... 163 
7.2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 163 
7.2.2 Methods ..................................................................................................................................... 166 
7.2.3 Procedure and performance measurements ............................................................. 167 
7.2.4 Results ....................................................................................................................................... 169 
7.2.5 Discussion ................................................................................................................................ 174 
 Simulation ....................................................................................................................... 176 
7.3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 176 
7.3.2 Model fitting ............................................................................................................................ 176 
7.3.3 Discussion ................................................................................................................................ 183 
 Model Comparison and Neurocognitive Compensation ................................. 185 
7.4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 185 
7.4.2 Discussion ................................................................................................................................ 191 
 General Discussion ...................................................................................................... 193 
 Wisconsin Card Sorting Test performance in ADHD traits: an experiment 
and a computational model of response times ....................................................... 196 
 Abstract ........................................................................................................................... 196 
 Neuropsychology of ADHD ........................................................................................ 197 
8.2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 197 
8.2.2 Executive Functioning ......................................................................................................... 198 
8.2.3 Reaction Time Studies ......................................................................................................... 198 
8.2.4 Reward Sensitivity ................................................................................................................ 199 
8.2.5 Cognitive Energetics ............................................................................................................ 200 
 Experiment ..................................................................................................................... 200 
8.3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 200 
8.3.2 Method ....................................................................................................................................... 203 
8.3.3 Results ....................................................................................................................................... 207 
8.3.4 Discussion ................................................................................................................................ 215 
 Simulations ..................................................................................................................... 218 
8.4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 218 
8.4.2 Model description ................................................................................................................. 219 
8.4.3 Simulation in the untimed task ....................................................................................... 220 
8.4.4 Simulation in the timed task ............................................................................................. 221 
8.4.5 Discussion ................................................................................................................................ 225 
 General Discussion ...................................................................................................... 226 
 General Discussion and Conclusion ................................................................... 229 
 Summary of findings ................................................................................................... 229 
 Research Questions ..................................................................................................... 231 
9.2.1 A neurobiological schema theory ................................................................................... 231 
9.2.2 The role of dopamine .......................................................................................................... 232 
9.2.3 The role of dynamical controllers .................................................................................. 232 
 Limitation and future research ............................................................................... 233 
 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 236 
 References ................................................................................................................... 237 
 Appendix...................................................................................................................... 264 
 Simulations Details ...................................................................................................... 264 
 Optimisations Details ................................................................................................. 264 
11.2.1 Genetic Algorithm (Chapter 4) ................................................................................... 264 
11.2.2 Neural Network for model fitting (Chapter 5) ..................................................... 264 
 8 
11.2.3 Simulated Annealing (Chapter 7) .............................................................................. 265 
 
  
 9 
 
List of figures 
 
Fig. 1.1 Colour-coded parts of the basal ganglia as seen in MRI view .......................... 13 
Fig. 1.2 Frontostriatal loops ............................................................................................ 14 
Fig. 1.3 Basal ganglia circuit with direct, indirect, and hyperdirect pathways ............... 15 
Fig. 1.4 Medium Spiny Neurons and main connections. ................................................ 16 
Fig. 1.5 Diagram of the original box-and-arrow model. ................................................. 29 
Fig. 1.6 Diagram of the dimensionality reduction model. .............................................. 30 
Fig. 1.7 Schematic of the Berns and Sejnowski model (1998) ....................................... 31 
Fig. 1.8 Actor-Critic model schematic. ........................................................................... 32 
Fig. 1.9 Schematic of the Redgrave, Prescott, and Gurney (1999) model (adapted) ...... 34 
Fig. 1.10 Schematic of Cohen's model (1990) ................................................................ 36 
Fig. 2.1 Schematic of the two channel network and legend............................................ 49 
Fig. 2.2 The plot shows the response of the basal ganglia output ................................... 54 
Fig. 2.3 Effects of dopamine manipulation for both the channels. ................................. 55 
Fig. 2.4 Effect of variation of the DA parameter ............................................................ 58 
Fig. 2.5 Effect of variation of  parameter in the striatum. ............................................. 58 
Fig. 2.6 Effects of manipulation of the  parameter in the striatum ............................... 58 
Fig. 2.7 Effects of manipulation of the α parameter in the striatum ............................... 59 
Fig. 2.8 Effect of manipulation of the ν parameter in the subthalamic nucleus. ............. 59 
Fig. 2.9 Effect of manipulation of the  parameter in the subthalamic nucleus. ............ 59 
Fig. 2.10 Schematic of the basal ganglia with vector input and output .......................... 61 
Fig. 2.11 The blue line represents the output of the basal ganglia (5 channels) ............. 62 
Fig. 2.12 Hard selectivity ratio against βstr, for three values of αstr ................................. 63 
Fig. 2.13 Soft selectivity ratio against βstr, for three values of αstr .................................. 64 
Fig. 2.14 Hard selectivity ratio against βstr, for three values of αstr, with a broader range 
of cortical stimuli .................................................................................................... 64 
Fig. 2.15 Soft selectivity ratio against βstr, for three values of αstr with a broader range of 
cortical stimuli ......................................................................................................... 65 
Fig. 2.16 Displaying the output of two channels changing the value of βstr only for the 
first channel. ............................................................................................................ 66 
Fig. 3.1 Different cortico-strio-thalamic loops. .............................................................. 70 
Fig. 3.2 Schematic of the corticothalamic circuit ........................................................... 71 
Fig. 3.3 Simulation of three channels with βstr = 0. ........................................................ 76 
Fig. 3.4 Simulation of three channels with βstr = 0.5.. .................................................... 77 
Fig. 3.5 Simulation of three channels with βstr = 1.5. ..................................................... 77 
Fig. 3.6 Plot of the mean difference (top) and the standard deviation (bottom) between 
cortical activation and external signal (octx-oext), against βstr. ............................. 79 
Fig. 3.7 Plot of the mean difference (top) and the standard deviation (bottom) between 
cortical activation and external signal (octx-oext) against βctx. .............................. 80 
Fig. 3.8 Instance of a histogram of the response time ..................................................... 81 
Fig. 3.9 βstr against the value of the ex-Gaussian parameters and accuracy, simulated for 
20 participants across 25 values of βstr .................................................................... 83 
Fig. 3.10 αstr  against the value of the ex-Gaussian parameters and accuracy, simulated 
for 20 participants across 25 values of αstr .............................................................. 84 
Fig. 4.1 Stimulus card in the bottom row has to be matched by the subject to one of the 
four cards above according to one changing rule.................................................... 90 
Fig. 4.2 Schematic of the model, not showing competition between schemas. .............. 91 
 10 
Fig. 4.3 Schematic of the competition between schemas. ............................................... 91 
Fig. 4.4 Schematic of the basal ganglia........................................................................... 93 
Fig. 4.5 Activation of cognitive schemas during a complete run (involving sorting all 64 
cards). ...................................................................................................................... 98 
Fig. 4.6 Comparison between Simulation and Data from neurologically healthy young 
participants. ........................................................................................................... 101 
Fig. 4.7 Correlations – Neuropsychological Data ......................................................... 101 
Fig. 4.8 Correlation – Simulation .................................................................................. 102 
Fig. 4.9 Contour plots of dependent variables (TE, PE, SL, NPE) against the thresholds 
of saturation curves ............................................................................................... 102 
Fig. 4.10 Clustering of experimental data ..................................................................... 104 
Fig. 4.11 Simulated data with five clusters ................................................................... 104 
Fig. 4.12 Correlation between performance errors aggregating the values from five 
different set of parameters. .................................................................................... 106 
Fig. 4.13 Correlation between performance errors aggregating the values from five 
different set of parameters. .................................................................................... 106 
Fig. 4.14 Histograms of bootstrapped distribution of SSE. ........................................... 107 
Fig. 5.1 The plot shows the computed value of αpfc given the entropy of the cognitive 
schemas and the amount of dopamine in the cortical circuit εpfc. ......................... 119 
Fig. 5.2 This plot displays three different sets of values for the cognitive schemas and 
shows how this affects the αpfc. ............................................................................. 119 
Fig. 5.3 The plot displays different performance errors evaluated  against values of 
gamma from 0 to 1 ................................................................................................ 121 
Fig. 5.4 The plot shows the four errors in the WCST against the parameter εstr. ......... 122 
Fig. 5.5 The plot shows the four errors in the WCST against the parameter εstr for a 
narrow area of values (0.05 to 0.4). ...................................................................... 123 
Fig. 5.6 The plot shows the four errors in the WCST against the parameter εpfc. ......... 124 
Fig. 5.7 The plot shows the four errors in the WCST against the parameter αstr. ......... 124 
Fig. 5.8 The plot shows the four errors in the WCST against the parameter εstr, ......... 133 
Fig. 5.9 The plot shows the number of categories achieved (CC), the mean response 
time for all trials (RT), the Set Loss error after 3 correct responses (SL3) as in 
Stuss et al. (2000) and the Non-Perseverative Errors (NPE) against the parameter 
εstr. ......................................................................................................................... 133 
Fig. 5.10 The elbow function for the data set from Cooper et al. (2012). .................... 136 
Fig. 5.11 The plot shows the empirical data points clustered in three groups by means of 
the k-means algorithm ........................................................................................... 137 
Fig. 5.12 The plot shows the results of three different simulations with three different 
set of parameters ................................................................................................... 138 
Fig. 6.1 Template of the original Brixton Task (Burgess & Shallice, 1996) ................ 142 
Fig. 6.2 Template of the variation of the Brixton Task used here ................................ 143 
Fig. 6.3 Schematic of the model without the basal ganglia arbitration device. ............ 145 
Fig. 6.4 Schematic of the basal ganglia......................................................................... 145 
Fig. 6.5 Fifteen subjects for each value of εstr and εpfc are simulated. Parameters have 
been uniformly sampled within the range sets above. .......................................... 152 
Fig. 6.6 The plot depicts all the performance errors against the parameter γ. .............. 154 
Fig. 6.7 The plot depicts all the considered performance errors against the parameter oext
 ............................................................................................................................... 155 
Fig. 6.8 The plot depicts the response time after correct (left) and incorrect (right) 
responses against the parameter oext ...................................................................... 155 
Fig. 6.9 The plot depicts all the performance errors against the parameter wstim ......... 156 
Fig. 6.10 The plot depicts all the performance errors against the parameter wstim,base .. 157 
 11 
Fig. 6.11 The plot depicts all performance errors against the parameter pairs wstim,base 
and wrule ................................................................................................................. 158 
Fig. 6.12 The plot depicts all the response time and completed trials against the 
parameter pairs wstim,base and wrule .......................................................................... 158 
Fig. 6.13The plot depicts all the performance errors against the parameter αsma .......... 159 
Fig. 7.1 Wisconsing Card Sorting Test (WCST): Mean response time on trials following 
correct and incorrect responses for young and older participants ......................... 171 
Fig. 7.2 Brixton Task (BRX): Mean response time on trials following correct and 
incorrect responses for young and older participants ............................................ 172 
Fig. 7.3 Comparison between all 50 experimental (blue) and 50 simulated (yellow) 
participants ............................................................................................................ 178 
Fig. 7.4 Comparison between 25 experimental (blue) and 25 simulated (yellow) older 
participants ............................................................................................................ 179 
Fig. 7.5 Comparison between 25 experimental (blue) and 25 simulated (yellow) younger 
participants ............................................................................................................ 179 
Fig. 7.6 Comparison between all 49 experimental (blue) and 49 simulated (yellow) 
participants ............................................................................................................ 181 
Fig. 7.7 Comparison between all 24 experimental (blue) and 24 simulated (yellow) 
older....................................................................................................................... 182 
Fig. 7.8 Comparison between all 25 experimental (blue) and 25 simulated (yellow) 
younger participants .............................................................................................. 183 
Fig. 7.9 Gap Value Plot for the WCST with the variables TE, PE, and SL .................. 186 
Fig. 7.10 The scatter plot shows the εstr, εpfc parameter space for the different 
models/groups described above.. .......................................................................... 190 
Fig. 8.1 CAARS Impulsivity scores and missed responses in the timed part (MISS) 
linear relationship plot........................................................................................... 213 
Fig. 8.2 CAARS Impulsivity scores and response time difference range (RTDR), linear 
relationship plot. .................................................................................................... 213 
Fig. 8.3 Histogram of the time distribution from a task.. .............................................. 219 
Fig. 8.4  Plot of oext against σ and τ ex-Gaussian parameters. ...................................... 220 
Fig. 8.5 Plot of εstr against σ and τ ex-Gaussian parameters, ........................................ 221 
Fig. 8.6 Plot of σθ against the number of missed responses. ......................................... 222 
Fig. 8.7 Plot of σθ against RTDR. ................................................................................... 222 
Fig. 8.8 Plot of oext against missed responses. .............................................................. 223 
Fig. 8.9 Plot of oext against RTDR. ................................................................................. 223 
Fig. 8.10 Plot of oext against RTD. ................................................................................. 223 
Fig. 8.11 Plot of oext against RTDR.. .............................................................................. 224 
Fig. 8.12 Plot of oext against RTDR................................................................................. 225 
Fig. 8.13 Plot of oext against RTDR................................................................................. 225 
Fig. 9.1 Approach-Avoidance behaviour model in schema-theory .............................. 234 
  
 12 
 
 
  
Neural and psychological investigations of 
frontostriatal circuits 
 
 Abstract 
This thesis is concerned with understanding, at a neural level, the mechanisms involved 
in human action selection. These mechanisms are generally be held to involve both 
frontal and striatal processes.  Here we therefore give a general overview of findings 
related to frontostriatal circuits, focusing on neurological, neuropsychological, 
neurobiological, and neurophysiological features. These findings should help constrain 
in both neural and psychological term. We start by analysing the gross anatomy of 
frontostriatal circuits, before briefly describing the neurobiological properties of those 
circuits, and examining how neuroimaging and neuropsychology join forces to explain 
how frontostriatal dysfunctions contribute to dysfunctional behaviour. The division of 
labour between cortex and basal ganglia in accomplishing higher order cognition is 
highlighted. We then proceed to illustrate several computational models of the basal 
ganglia, both as a neurophysiological set of nuclei, and as embedded in cognitive 
architectures that model, in addition, the contribution of the cortical areas.  
 
 Gross neuroanatomy of frontostriatal circuits 
The basal ganglia are a set of subcortical nuclei sitting underneath the cortical mantle. 
They comprise the caudate and the putamen (dorsal striatum), the globus pallidus 
(divided into external and internal segments), the nucleus accumbens (part of the ventral 
striatum), the subthalamic nucleus and substantia nigra further down in the midbrain 
(Fig. 1.1). 
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Fig. 1.1 Colour-coded parts of the basal ganglia as seen in axial MRI view (top left), 
coronal MRI view (bottom), and 3D view (top right) (from Borsook et al., 2010) 
 
The basal ganglia structures communicate in signal loops with cortical tissue and the 
thalamus (Alexander, DeLong, & Strick, 1986) called corticothalamic or frontostriatal 
loops. Afferent projections to the striatum come mainly from the cortex, where the 
somatopy of motor areas is preserved. Input from the thalamus and from the midbrain 
are also essential for the correct functioning of the circuit. Striatal structures receive 
input from interconnected cortical areas that are functionally related (e.g. they have 
been all implicated in controlling eye movements) and it is possible to distinguish 
between three or four main frontostriatal loops: the sensory-motor loop that connects 
the lateral striatum with the motor and premotor cortex, the associative loop that 
connects the central striatum with the associative cortical areas such as the orbitofrontal 
and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (given the functional difference between these two 
loops they appear sometimes as distinct loops), and the limbic loop that connects the 
ventral striatum with the limbic areas such as hippocampus, amygdala and cingulate 
cortex (Fig. 1.2). The basal ganglia receive input from a multitude of other non-frontal 
areas, including parietal areas, which might be especially relevant for planning and 
execution of actions.  
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Fig. 1.2 Frontostriatal loops (from O'Callaghan, Bertoux, & Hornberger, 2013). 
SMA stands for Supplementary Motor Area. DLPFC stands for Dorsolateral Prefrontal 
Cortex. OFC stands for Orbitofrontal Cortex. AC stands for Anterior Cingulate. 
DS and VS stand for dorsal and ventral striatum, respectively. 
SNr stands for Substantia Nigra Pars Reticulata.   
 
Another important empirical finding in the neuroanatomy of the frontostriatal circuits is 
the ‘funneling’ of connections: each cortical region projects topographically to the 
striatum with a many-to-one connection. This organisation of convergent circuits was 
once believed to be a way to activate individual motor programs that result from activity 
on many other cortical areas (Kemp & Powell, 1971), but discovery of segregated loops 
in the cortical associative areas and the fact they operate in parallel with all the other 
loops brought some authors to think of the basal ganglia as an information compression 
device (Morris, Nevet & Bergman, 2003) or as an arbitration system that solves the 
problem of multiple parallel accesses to limited physical resources by means of a 
“centralised” device (Redgrave, Prescott & Gurney, 1999), as opposed to a “peripheral” 
approach that would rely on mutual inhibition in the cortical areas. 
 
The basal ganglia are evolutionary ancient, and identical nuclei with the same 
neurotransmitters and the same connection to the pallium (the evolutionary precursor of 
the neocortex in mammals, see Suryanarayana et al., 2017) can be found in the lamprey, 
a jawless fish that diverged from the vertebrate evolutionary line approximately 560 
million years ago (Grillner & Robertson, 2010).  
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The preceding picture of the gross neuroanatomy and evolutionary history of these 
subcortical structures might give the impression that these systems have a well-defined 
structure and function, that the loops between cortex and basal ganglia are the only 
mechanism that generate sequential and purposeful action, and there is no redundancy 
in how the central nervous system is organised. Yet, this is not entirely truthful. While 
in adult humans the frontostriatal circuit can be considered the primary (but not the 
only) action selection circuit, this is not true for other animals and non-adult humans. 
Cats deprived of cerebral cortex from infancy, for instance, display a sophisticated 
repertoire of actions, especially those that affect survival and reproduction (Bjursten, 
Norrsell, & Norrsell, 1976). It has also been speculated that the first loops formed 
between the basal ganglia sensorimotor loops in simple vertebrates are likely to be 
present in the brainstem (McHaffie et al., 2005) and that simple action selection could 
be performed by a circuit in the medial reticular formation (Humphries, Gurney, & 
Prescott, 2007).  
 
 Neurobiology and neurophysiology of cortex and striatum 
The total action of the basal ganglia is produced by three main circuits that start in the 
cortical neurons and terminate again in the cortex: the direct pathway, the indirect 
pathway (that pass through the striatum), and the hyperdirect pathway that bypasses the 
striatum to project into the subthalamic nucleus (Fig. 1.3). 
 
 
Fig. 1.3 Basal ganglia circuit with direct, indirect, and hyperdirect pathways (Schroll & 
Hamker, 2013). STN: Subthalamic nucleus, GPe: Globus Pallidus (external segment), 
GPi: Globus Pallidus (internal segment), SNr: Substantia nigra pars reticulata 
 
 16 
The majority (95%) of the striatum consists of medium spiny neurons (MSN) (Fig. 1.4). 
These inhibitory neurons project to the globus pallidus and use the neurotransmitter 
gamma-aminobutyric acid (GABA), which is inhibitory by virtue of allowing 
negatively charged chloride ions inside the cell.   
 
 
Fig. 1.4 Medium Spiny Neurons and main connections (Loonen, & Ivanova, 2013). 
This striatal neuron receives connections from other Medium Spiny Neurons (MSN), 
Cholinergic Interneurons, Dopaminergic Neurons from the Substantia Nigra Pars 
Compacta (SNc) and the Ventral Tegmental Area (VTA), and the Cortex. 
 
There are two types of MSN. The first type expresses dopamine D1 excitatory 
receptors. These project directly to the internal segment of the globus pallidus (and the 
substantia nigra pars reticulata), which is the output of the basal ganglia. For this reason 
these neurons constitute what is known as the direct pathway. Since the overall effect of 
this pathway is to excite neurons in the thalamus, which in turn excites homologous 
neurons in the cortex, the pathway is also called the ‘Go’ pathway (Frank, Seeberger, & 
O'Reilly, 2004). The second type expresses dopamine D2 inhibitory receptors. They 
project indirectly to the internal globus pallidus but through the external segment of the 
globus pallidus and the subthalamic nucleus. For this reasons these neurons constitute 
what is known as the indirect pathway. Since the overall effect of this pathway is to 
inhibit neurons in the thalamus, which in turn excites homologous neurons in the cortex, 
the pathways is also called ‘NoGo’ pathway (Frank, Seeberger, & O'Reilly, 2004). 
 
The neurophysiology of the indirect and direct pathways is well-established. More 
recently a third pathway, the hyperdirect pathway, has been identified. This projects 
from the cortex directly to the subthalamic nucleus, bypassing the striatum. While the 
function of the other two pathways is somewhat less ambiguous, how the hyperdirect 
pathway affects the basal ganglia functionally is less clear, although Nambu et al. 
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(2002) propose a centre-surround model similar to the computation in the early visual 
areas such as the Lateral Geniculate Nucleus (LGN). This model should help inhibit 
further areas of the cortex that represent the competing motor programs. As we will see, 
all the properties of the microcircuits are an important element of contact between 
physiology and computational models.  
 
 
 Neurology and Neuropsychology of frontostriatal circuits 
Insights into the function of frontostriatal circuits can be gained through an examination 
of the behavioural impairments of patients with neurological damage affecting 
frontostriatal regions. These patients include those who have sustained lesions to the 
areas, as well as patients with selected neurodegenerative, psychiatric, or developmental 
disorders. This section surveys the results and the implications of studies of such 
patients for theories of frontostriatal function. 
 
1.4.1 Lesion studies  
Historically, the study of brain lesions has been the first important step in shedding a 
light on the relationship between mind and brain. Analysis of brain lesions has not been 
superseded by more recent techniques such as fMRI and PET, and there are reasons to 
believe that this approach is still valuable (Rorden & Karnath, 2004). Localised injury 
to a tissue is usually caused by anoxic encephalopathy or stroke. Lesions to the basal 
ganglia alone cause both behavioural and movement disorders. For example, Bathia and 
Marsden (1994) analysed a cohort of 240 patients with lesions in the caudate nucleus, 
putamen and globus pallidus. Lesions were circumscribed to the nuclei alone or 
involved the adjacent part of the internal capsule and periventricular white matter. The 
most common movement disorder detected was dystonia, while the most frequent 
behavioural problem detected was apathy, in the form of loss of initiative. Interestingly, 
parkinsonism was uncommon and more likely to appear in bilateral lesions. Even more 
strikingly, Laplene et al. (1989) observed that eight patients with bilateral basal ganglia 
lesions did not exhibit signs such as dystonia, tremor or rigidity. Rather, a few patient 
exhibited elaborate patterns of compulsive stereotyped activity (today this behaviour 
would be probably classified as ‘punding’, also common in amphetamine users and a 
side effect of PD medications).  
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Lesions in the prefrontal cortex alone can give rise to a great variety of deficits. 
Together with fMRI studies, lesion studies provide a great deal of insight into human 
cognition. While knowledge of gross neuroanatomy and cytoarchitecture of the PFC has 
made it into university textbooks, functional subdivisions are based on approximate 
locations in the brain and they are designed by combining the dorsal-ventral gradient 
with the lateral-medial gradient (plus the orbitofrontal location). A unitary theory of the 
PFC does not exist and there are numerous challenges to this project. One of the reason 
is that theories of PFC functioning, unlike theories of basal ganglia, seem to be only 
partially reconcilable (Badre & Nee, 2017). Progress could have also been hampered by 
the often atheoretical approach to experimental investigations of prefrontal function 
(Shallice & Cooper, 2011). Nevertheless, impairments in neuropsychological tasks 
following selective or cumulative lesions provide a good starting point for more 
elaborate theoretical work. 
 
Lesions to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), for instance, are usually associated 
with endogenous attention (Funderud et al., 2013), memory retrieval and manipulation 
of information in working memory (Barbey, Koenigs, Grafman, 2013), planning, rule 
learning, and task switching (Shallice & Burgess, 1991) impairment. Lesions to the 
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (vlPFC) have been historically associated with language 
impairment alone, but this view has been abandoned. Despite the prominent 
involvement in language, in the dominant hemisphere (Stone et al., 1992), vlPFC could 
be more generally specialised to process hierarchical structures irrespective of 
dimensions (Fiebach and Schubotz, 2006). What is common to all prefrontal circuits, 
and this is probably one of the few certainties in the field, is that they process 
somatosensory input multimodally (or amodally), in that input from all the modalities 
(auditory, tactile, visual, olfactory/gustative) is processed and bound together to produce 
thought or action. The implication for computational study can be seen in how models 
of cognitive tasks and brain structures are usually devised. Whereas basal ganglia 
models become increasingly more detailed at the neuroanatomical level, posited 
operations at the prefrontal cortex level are still too vague (or rather too complex) to be 
efficiently implemented in a biologically realistic model. 
 
1.4.2 Parkinson’s Disease 
When a disease affects signal transmission to the basal ganglia rather than the basal 
nuclei themselves, motor and behavioural results are distinct. With a prevalence of 
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approximately 1% of over-60 population, Parkinson’s Disease (PD) is one of the most 
common neurological diseases of the elderly that affect these circuits. While the 
aetiology is still not entirely clear, post-mortem neuropathological examinations in 
humans and animal studies that selectively destroy specific neurons clearly suggest that 
PD manifests itself when 60%-80% of dopaminergic neurons in the midbrain die, 
pointing to a mechanism of functional compensation. In particular, the loss of neurons 
seems to be localised in the substantia nigra pars compacta (SNpc), but some evidence 
suggests that the adjacent ventral tegmental area (VTA) is affected, too (Alberico, 
Cassell, & Narayanan, 2015). These areas constitute input to the striatum and the 
prefrontal areas, respectively. 
 
Criteria for the diagnosis of PD are exclusively motoric and consist of bradykinesia 
(slowness of movement), gait imbalances, limbs rigidity, and resting tremor. Recent 
work tends to also emphasize non-motor (but non-diagnostic) symptoms such as sleep 
problems and higher-order cognitive impairments (Marsili, Rizzo, Colosimo, 2018). 
Even before the motor presentation, subtle cognitive and behavioural symptoms might 
be present (Postuma et al., 2012) and understanding the trajectory of cognitive 
symptoms in PD has proved challenging and it is unresolved as yet (Biundo et al., 
2014). Neuropsychological studies established that cognitive symptoms in PD are 
similar to those present in patients with frontal lobe injury, and medication can interfere 
with these deficits in opposite directions (Cools et al., 2001). In general, PD patients 
seems to be impaired in executive function (EF) tasks such as the Tower of London 
(Owen et al., 1992), and in early patients this impairment does not seem to be driven by 
spatial short-term memory deficits. Abnormal responses in tasks such as the Trail 
Making Test B, Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, digit span backward, and Stroop are also 
present (Kudlicka et al., 2011). Although there is no consensus yet over whether EF can 
be identified as a unitary construct or not, it is generally observed that impairment 
across tasks are mild but reliably present in PD patients. It is unclear how these 
impairments affect patient daily lives. 
 
Cognitive neuroscience research provides a more nuanced way of thinking about 
differential impairments in learning tasks in PD (and by extension, EF tasks). Cools, 
Barker and Sahakian (2001) analyse the cognitive effect of dopamine by comparing PD 
patients on and off medication in a task-set switching task and a probabilistic reversal 
task. In the task-set switching task (Rogers et al., 1998), participants are first trained and 
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then tested on a simple recognition test with a classical task switching paradigm: an 
AABB design that is aimed to elicit task-switch costs, defined as the difference between 
the reaction times between the same type of task (A->A or B->B) and the reaction time 
between two different types of task (A->B or B->A).  A ‘cross-talk’ condition where 
types of stimuli (letters and numbers) are not associated with the relevant task is also 
counter-balanced between groups. In the probabilistic reversal task (Swainson et al., 
2000), subjects are required firstly to choose between two stimuli, the correct stimulus 
receives a positive feedback 80% of the times. Then, in the second part, contingencies 
are reversed without warning, with the same percentage of probabilistic feedback. 
 
Results reveal that L-dopa medication, a precursor of dopamine, affects the two tasks 
differently, even when patients are matched for intelligence, disease severity and 
medication dosage. Task-set switching response time performance, implicating the 
dorsolateral prefrontal-dorsal caudate circuit, is ameliorated by medication, whereas 
probabilistic reversal learning, thought to depend on the orbitofrontal-ventrostriatal 
circuit, is impaired. This bolsters the evidence for the ‘dopaminergic overdose 
hypothesis’ (Cools et al., 2001; Cools & D’Esposito, 2007), that posits that the 
differential cognitive profile in PD patients (compared to age-matched controls) is due 
to an uneven dopamine binding profile in the striatum (i.e. too little DA in the ventral 
striatum and too much DA in dorsal striatum) 
 
Besides affecting assessment and treatment of PD, this work sheds a light on the 
different contribution of frontostriatal loops to cognitive tasks, and therefore on the 
cognitive operations or representations in cortical areas. However, while this work 
focuses on the different loops in the striatum, it does not directly address the distinctive 
and different type of operation of the striatum and the prefrontal cortex. This is 
addressed more in detail in van Schounwenburg, Aarts, and Cools (2010). These 
authors review several psychopharmacologic and cognitive neuroscience studies 
through the theoretical lens of Frank, Laughly, O’Reilly (2001) regarding basal ganglia 
and prefrontal cortex complementary role. In this framework the prefrontal cortex 
provides active maintenance of representations that are necessary to pursue the agent’s 
current goal, and this occurs by biasing activation of representations in more caudal 
cortical areas. This work will be addressed in more detail in the computational section 
of this chapter.  
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Frontal lobe-like dysfunction is present in a substantial number of cases of Parkinson’s 
Disease, despite the relatively low presence of dopamine in the PFC compared to the 
striatum (Kish et al., 1988), and therefore dopamine depletion in the frontal circuit alone 
cannot account for those cognitive deficits. On the other hand, the putative neural 
substrate of a cognitive task can vary, and some tasks can more heavily rely on cortical 
functions (active maintenance) while some other tasks might rely more on striatal 
functions (task-switching). In conclusion, the Schounwenburg et al. (2010) show that L-
dopa medication normalises the blood flow in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(dlPFC), probably by increasing the efficiency of neural processing, and hence 
improves higher-order cognition that involves planning, spatial working memory, and 
visuomotor control. 
  
While the study of medicated patients reveals the different contribution of prefrontal 
cortex and striatum to various executive functions, many unmedicated patients do not 
display overt cognitive impairments, despite motor symptoms already being evident. In 
fact, neural compensatory mechanisms could be in place. Poston et al. (2016) showed, 
for instance, higher activation of the putamen in cognitively unimpaired patient 
performing a high workload numerical match-to-sample task. These compensatory 
mechanisms could occur quickly as a result of signals that counteract hypo or 
hyperfunctioning areas, or unfold slowly in time as a result of neural plasticity (Barulli 
& Stern, 2013)  
 
1.4.3 Huntington’s disease (HD)  
Another way to understand the functional significance of the frontostriatal circuit is by 
observing neurological and psychological changes in Huntington’s disease (HD). HD is 
a neurodegenerative condition with an autosomal dominant inheritance pattern due to an 
excessive number of CAG (cytosine-adenosine-guanine) repeats in the HTT gene 
(chromosome 4) that codes for the huntingtin protein that contains an abnormal number 
of glutamine aminoacids. Motor symptoms include chorea (dance-like movements), 
athethosis (slower writhing movements of the arms), and various abnormal eye 
movements (Walker, 2007). Psychological changes include depression and personality 
changes. Usually these are noticed during the first stage of the disease before motor 
symptoms develop. Later stages of the disease include dementia. 
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The main target of HD pathology is the putamen in the basal ganglia, but cortical 
changes are also detectable early on in the disease (Rosas, 2011). At present there is no 
therapy available to delay the onset of symptoms and pharmacological treatment is 
particularly challenging. Antipsychotics, drugs that act on dopamine, are used to relieve 
choreic symptoms but they can worsen Parkinson-like symptoms such as rigidity, which 
are also present.   
 
Since genetic testing can identify those who inherit the mutated HTT gene and the 
number of triple repeats that affect the onset of disease, it is possible to follow the 
progression of the disease before symptoms become overt and start affecting the lives of 
the people affected, and to understand how subtle structural changes in the brain 
progress and how psychological and neuropsychological impairments arise. For this 
reasons HD is considered to be an ‘ideal neuropsychiatric model of disease’, despite 
being studied less frequently than PD (understandably, as HD is much less prevalent). 
Although age of onset is inversely proportional to the number of CAG repeats 
(Langbehn et al., 2010), the relationship between motor symptoms, cognitive profiles, 
and CAG repeats is less obvious (Cummings et al., 2011) 
 
With regard to cognitive profiles, there is no codified battery for HD cognitive 
assessment and the cognitive phenotype can vary widely, but Stout et al. (2011) tested a 
large sample of prodromal HD patient at different stages before they received a 
diagnosis and showed that the only test that produced significantly worse performance 
in the group whose people would be diagnosed 15 years after or more was the Emotion 
Recognition Task (measuring only the ability to detect negative emotions), with a large 
effect size. Also, individuals tested nine years or less before the diagnosis did not show 
any significant impairment on the 3 Tower Task, a variation of the Tower of London 
(Shallice, 1982), the Serial Response Time Task (Willingham, Nissen, Bullemer, 1989), 
and the WASI Matrix Reasoning subtest. These aggregate data suggest that early 
prodromal HD is cognitively mainly characterised by emotional agnosia and that pre-
HD does not necessarily feature planning and intelligence impairment. This can shed 
some light on the relationship between psychological changes and neuropathological 
findings, especially given that HD pathology does not only affect basal ganglia. In fact, 
although HD has been long considered mainly caused by a pathology of the striatum, 
this view has considerably shifted during recent years to encompass cortical tissue.  
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Neuroimaging studies have shown that severity of symptoms is also predicted by 
neuroimaging and cellular findings in cortical areas connected to the striatum, such as 
motor and limbic cortices (Nana et al., 2014). The neurobiological mechanism by which 
cortical and striatal damage could reinforce each other is interesting and understanding 
it could yield a biological therapeutic target.  Loss of inhibitory interneurons in the 
cortex would cause the release of excessive glutamate in the cortex and damage to the 
medium spiny neurons (MSN) due to glutamate excitotoxicity would, in turn, cause 
excessive cortical activation (Hedreen & Roos, 2011). 
  
Studies where the pathology in the cortex is more or less advanced than pathology in the 
relevant part of the striatum are of psychological significance. If we assume that, in 
principle, there are distinctive roles of cortical and subcortical grey matter, we should 
observe different behavioural profiles in neuropsychological tasks in patients with an 
uneven distribution of pathology in the two areas. Nevertheless, compensatory 
mechanism could play a part in sustaining a below-average but adequate performance in 
some tasks that require either circuit (Feigin et al., 2006). In this respect, modelling can 
generally offer a way to explain compensatory mechanism and their relationship with 
complex tasks.  
 
1.4.4 OCD and Tourette’s syndrome  
While PD and HD are typical neurological disorders, Obsessive Compulsive Disorder 
(OCD) is instead classified as a psychiatric disorder in the DSM-V (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). As the name suggest, it is marked by obsessions, 
defined as recurrent and persistent intrusive thoughts that cause marked distress because 
they are perceived as inappropriate, and compulsions, defined as repetitive activities 
that are performed to reduce this distress.  
 
Neuropsychological testing of executive performance in OCD has produced conflicting 
results. Although it appears that deficits are globally present with large effect sizes, 
assessing set-shifting and verbal fluency has yielded mixed outcomes (Kuelz, Hohagen, 
& Voderholzer, 2004). In fact, individuals with OCD may have different performance 
depending on the specific OCD symptom presentations (e.g. fear of contamination vs 
obsessions), but work aimed at teasing out these differences is lacking (Abramovitch, 
Abramowitz, & Mittelman, 2013). 
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Neuroimaging combined with classical neuropsychological tests has slightly improved 
the overall picture. The extended model of fronto-striatal function (Melloni et al., 2012), 
for instance, suggests that two independent circuits can account for the heterogeneity of 
OCD symptoms. Globally, increased activation of orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC) and basal ganglia (BG) during extensive batteries of 
neuropsychological tasks is more correlated with the lack of inhibitory behaviours while 
decreased activation of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) / parietal cortex circuit is 
more correlated to working memory impairments. Domain-specific theories suggest 
instead that dissociable neural frontostriatal circuits mediate different OCD dimensions 
such as hoarding, checking, washing, etc. (Mataix-Cols et al., 2004). These two theories 
on OCD neural substrates mostly regard the role of the PFC and do not address the 
differential role of the basal ganglia. 
 
Tourette’s syndrome (TS) is a childhood-onset disorder that can be diagnosed in the 
presence of at least two stereotypical movements (motor tics) such as blinking or 
shoulder shrugging and at least one stereotypical vocalisations (vocal tics) such as 
grunting, whistling or throat clearing. Complexity and typology of these tics is 
heterogeneous. Individuals with TS can often describe a premonitory feeling before the 
tic appears. Tics happen in bouts, and their appearance is affected by the time of day 
and the level of general stress (or arousal) (Bloch & Leckman, 2009). Neuroimaging 
data suggest that tics are produced by excessive activity of motor pathways and 
diminished control of frontostriatal inhibitory circuits (Wang et al., 2011).  
 
The relationship between OCD and TS is an important one. Individuals with either 
disorder report a subjective feeling of having to perform unwanted actions and report 
that internal resistance is being overridden (Martino, Madhusudan, & Cavanna, 2013). 
TS tics are generally more stereotypical and brief while OCD compulsions are more 
elaborated and purposeful, but it is sometimes difficult to discern one from the other. 
Furthermore, OCD and TS are highly comorbid in children. Approximately a third of 
children with TS meet the diagnostic criteria of OCD (Lombroso & Scahill, 2008). 
  
In conclusion, OCD and TS have been both conceptualised as the inability of the central 
nervous system to suppress pre-potent responses or thoughts at different level of 
complexity, but the search for more specific endophenotypes is an area of ongoing 
research. Progress has been made by  defining the impulsivity-compulsivity spectrum as 
 25 
a candidate set of intermediate phenotype (Robbins et al., 2012). According to this 
framework, OCD is characterised by an over-reliance on habitual stimuli and relative 
insensitivity to outcome devaluation. This description is akin to how initial drug use 
appears to shift to addiction in drug users. Initial drug use would be mediated by 
impulsivity traits while successive drug consumption would be mediated by 
compulsivity traits, when drug-taking becomes unpleasant but ‘irresistible’. Also, there 
is evidence that self-reported level of impulsivity in OCD do not correlate with 
compulsivity (Ersche et al., 2010), suggesting a dissociation between the two 
constructs. This work constitutes a valuable way to bridge cognitive construct amenable 
to computational modelling with important trans-diagnostic clinical entities.  
 
1.4.5 ADHD  
Attention Deficit and Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) is classified as a 
neuropsychiatric disorder with childhood onset, since symptoms have to be present 
prior to the age of 12. Three primary subtypes are recognised: the predominantly 
inattentive, the predominantly hyperactive/impulsive, and a combination of both types) 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013).   
 
The neuropsychology of ADHD is very rich and has identified three main domains of 
analysis, namely executive dysfunctions, delay aversion, and timing impairments. 
Although impairments in these domains seem to be present in ADHD children and 
adults, none of these alone seem to be necessary or sufficient to explain behavioural 
profiles. Meta-analyses of neuropsychological batteries show that measures of delay 
aversion have a medium mean effect size (d ~ .6) (Wilcutt et al., 2008). The effect size 
of executive measurements also falls in the medium range (Wilcutt et al., 2005), with 
the exception of a few more sensitive tests. For instance, commission errors in the 
Continuous Performance Test (CPT) (Rosvold et al., 1956), a prototypical test of 
attention, yields one of the strongest effect sizes seen with ADHD (d ~ 1.1) and has 
good positive predicted value in distinguishing adults with ADHD and controls (Woods, 
Lovejoy & Ball, 2002). 
 
Neuroimaging work has attempted to link these three domains with three distinct 
frontostriatal circuits. The dorsal frontostriatal loop would be implicated in executive 
dysfunction, the orbitofrontostriatal loop would be implicated in delay aversion, and the 
frontocerebellar dysfunction would be responsible for timing impairments (Durston, 
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Belle, & de Zeuuw, 2011). The approach is very promising but, admittedly, it falls short 
of delineating distinctive properties of frontal versus striatal dysfunction. It is possible 
that besides this division into three subgroups, a further division between cortical and 
subcortical dysfunction could eventually produce six different subtypes.  
 
Further complexity arises when addressing the behavioural phenotypes in the 
impulsivity dimension of ADHD. Impulsivity found in ADHD fits very well with the 
endophenotype described earlier for OCD (Robbins et al., 2012) but its relationship 
with the delay aversion construct might be more complex and break down into further 
independent constructs. For instance, the choice for ‘short and smaller rewards’ over 
‘large but delayed rewards’ that characterises children with ADHD might be due to the 
independent contribution of impulse drive and delay aversion (Marco et al., 2009) and 
not impulsivity alone. Similarly, timing deficits that are considered a by-product of an 
impulsivity endophenotype could break down in the attention lapses and impulsive 
responses. While these attentional lapses would appear as a larger positive tail in the 
individual response time distribution, impulsive responses would shift the distribution 
to the left (faster median responses) (Hervey et al., 2006) while sacrificing overall 
accuracy (Mulder et al., 2010). 
 
 Summary of neurobiological findings 
We have provided a brief survey of the neural attributes of frontostriatal circuits and 
how they relate to the psychological performance of individuals and patients.  The joint 
effort of neuroimaging and neuropsychology research has provided a greater 
mechanistic understanding of behaviour following disease or dysfunction, but capturing 
behavioural complexity with psychologically meaningful constructs is a challenging 
task. Take, for instance, the description of the impairment following prefrontal lesions. 
Some of these descriptions of impairment seem to belong together and they seem to 
have reasonable face validity (e.g. working memory and endogenous attention in the 
dlPFC), while some others seem more difficult to reconcile (spatial attention and 
expressive language in the vlPFC). Whereas constructs such as ‘expressive language’ 
and ‘visual attention’ can be helpful in a clinical environment, they are in fact too broad 
and vague. The need for breaking down individual neuropsychological tasks into 
precise representations and operations or unifying apparently unrelated construct at any 
level can be fulfilled by computational modelling.  
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In the next section we provide an overview of the most relevant computational models 
of frontostriatal operation, with particular consideration of their operation with 
dysfunction. 
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 Neurocomputational models of the basal ganglia  
We now move our focus to computational modelling by providing an overview of the 
most relevant computational models of the basal ganglia, both as a neurophysiological 
set of nuclei, and as embedded in cognitive architectures that model, in addition, the 
contribution of the frontal areas.  
 
The history of frontostriatal models is rich and complex. Given the advancement in 
neurobiology and neuroimaging and the knowledge gathered through analysing lesions 
and subcortical pathologies, modelling basal ganglia function alone has become more 
prominent during the last decades, bucking the trend of ‘cortico-centrism’, which 
arguably undervalued the contribution of white matter and subcortical grey matter in 
higher-order cognition (Parvizi, 2009). Modellers have been seeking to characterise the 
unique cellular structure and modulatory connections of the basal ganglia in terms of 
function. Although this task has proven challenging, a number of hypotheses are 
recognised to be viable. All the models analysed below incorporate different 
neurobiological features, like the ones we examined in the previous section of the 
chapter, but they also take into account different types of behavioural data from healthy 
and diseased individuals. 
 
Relating basal ganglia functions and anatomy with prefrontal or, more generally, 
cortical structure has proven to be much more elusive, for several reasons. First, there is 
no established link within the cortex between algorithm and neurobiology as in the case 
of the basal ganglia. Secondly, higher cortical functions most likely require a more 
complex dynamic framework, where information is processed in the same areas 
multiple times and in multiple areas at the same time. For this reasons, many 
connectionists and symbolic models of neuropsychological tasks have used cortical 
representation enhanced with basal ganglia operations. 
 
1.6.1 The box and arrow models 
DeLong (1990) proposed a box-and-arrow model of the basal ganglia that became 
influential and inspired many of the following attempts to characterise basal ganglia 
functions (Fig. 1.5). The paper analysed the motor loop with simplicity and explanatory 
power. Even today neuroscience textbooks make use of this model to explain 
Parkinson’s and Huntington’s diseases, describing them as two extremes in the 
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spectrum of the damage of the basal ganglia circuitry (Purves et al., 2008). The model 
represents an attempt to explain the motor activity of the basal ganglia from a 
qualitative perspective.  
 
 
Fig. 1.5 Diagram of the original box-and-arrow model. Figure from Bronfeld, and Bar-
Gad (2011). 
  
1.6.2 The basal ganglia as a dimensionality reduction device 
Bar-Gad et al. (2000) substantially challenged the original information-processing 
model of DeLong (1990), postulating that the BG nuclei act as a dimensionality 
reduction device with a sparse distribution coding, and proposing that the degree of 
reduction was determined by reinforcement learning mechanisms (Fig. 1.6). The main 
argument was driven by the fact that the number of cortical projection to the striatum is 
approximately double the number of striatal neurons and a similar reduction occurs in 
the striatopallidal projections. The authors also suggested that the information flow is 
far too complicated to be captured by nested loops, that the D1 and D2 pathway 
distinction is spurious, and that there is no convincing evidence of lateral inhibition 
between the medium spiny neurons in the striatum (see also Bar-Gad and Bergman, 
2001). While it is true that D1 and D2 receptors are not anatomically distinguishable in 
parallel pathways (Aizman et al., 2000), it is likely that the two kind of modulatory 
neurons are functionally dissimilar and even complementary (Sano et al., 2003).  
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Fig. 1.6 Diagram of the dimensionality reduction model. Figure from Bronfeld, and 
Bar-Gad (2011). 
 
1.6.3 The basal ganglia as a sequence generator 
Another different approach to the basal ganglia function came from Berns and 
Sejnowski (1998), who showed how sequences in the striatum can be encoded in a 
neural network as long as the subthalamic nuclei project onto the globus pallidus with a 
temporal delay (Fig. 1.7). The model is particularly valuable for its simplicity and 
because it implements reinforcement learning through a decreasing error function. 
Furthermore, there is evidence that habitual actions differ from goal-oriented ones in 
that habitual sequences might be run irrespectively of the outcome of each single action 
(Dezfouli & Balleine, 2013). However, within the model the structure of the basal 
ganglia does not accommodate the difference between the two segments of the globus 
pallidus (external and internal) and the subthalamic nucleus has two units for each 
“action” in the sequence, with a different time delay. This speculation is not supported 
by anatomical evidence, and this is the greatest limitation of this model. This detail is 
nevertheless instructive for the design of computational modelling. If low-level details 
are instrumental in producing meaningful behaviour, empirical work can be directed 
towards finding whether these details are true. If there is no evidence, then the 
behaviour must be produced by some other algorithm, or by the cooperation of another 
set of brain structures. In the case of Berns and Sejnowski (1998), these statement are 
both likely to be correct: the subthalamic nucleus is unlikely to include any delaying 
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mechanism and sequence learning and production probably requires an active role of 
the prefrontal cortex (Pariyadath et al., 2012). 
 
 
Fig. 1.7 Schematic of the Berns and Sejnowski model (1998) 
 
1.6.4 The basal ganglia as an actor critic mechanism 
Model Description 
Schultz, Dayan, and Montague (1997) postulated that midbrain neurons could compute 
the equivalent of reward prediction error in the reinforcement learning (RL) literature, 
and this established what has become a long and fruitful collaboration between machine 
learning and neuroscience research. A model of the basal ganglia that applies RL 
algorithms in an explicit fashion is the actor critic model (Barto, 1995). At present, 
many actor critic models have been described, and they vary greatly in their details, 
such as the way knowledge is represented, and the way the temporal difference (TD) 
learning signal is processed and passed onto other structures. Joel, Niv, and Ruppin 
(2002) provided an extensive overview of all these models. One of the core common 
features of these models is the presence of two distinct functional subsystems: the critic 
and the actor. The critic evaluates the policy, that is the probability to select a specific 
action given a specific state, and uses a temporal difference learning signal to update the 
value function of a state. The actor selects a policy probabilistically as a function of a 
temperature parameter that alters the trade-off between exploration of the state space 
and exploitation of the best policy retrieved up to that point in the learning process. 
 
The basal ganglia structures have been mapped to the functional components of the 
actor-critic model (Fig. 1.8). The cortex estimates the current state of the agent, in 
addition to encoding the temporal properties of the state, while the striatum compresses 
information from the cortex, similarly to the function Bar-Gad and Bergman (2001) 
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proposed. The neural implementation of the actor, in particular, is associated with the 
matrix compartments of the striatum, which constitute 85-90% of the striatum 
(Brimblecombe & Cragg, 2016),  while the critic is associated with patch (striosome) 
compartments, which constitute the rest of the striatum. Neurons in the midbrain are 
associated with the dopamine signal that drives learning in the critic by providing a 
signal that resembles the TD signal. 
 
 
Fig. 1.8 Actor-Critic model schematic. Figure adapted from Bogacsz and Larsen (2011) 
 
Model Evaluation 
The actor-critic model has been rather successful in solving reinforcement learning 
problems in a very structured environment. Yet, the algorithm struggles to deal, among 
other things, with tasks where reward structure is dynamic, when irrelevant reward in 
the environment is conducive to a suboptimal policy, or when the 
exploration/exploitation trade-off is not optimised to escape shallow local minima 
(Szepesvari, 2010). A possible solution to this lack of flexibility is to make use of 
additional operations that would take place in the prefrontal cortex, which would exert 
cognitive control in a rapid, flexible, and context-sensitive fashion. In other words, 
basal ganglia units would still solve simple action selection, while prefrontal structure 
would shape the input to those units regarding correct rewards, the degree of 
exploration, and the features (states) to which the agent should attend given a specific 
context (Stolyarova, 2018). 
 
1.6.5 The basal ganglia as an action selection mechanism 
 
Model Description 
Redgrave, Prescott, and Gurney (1999) presented the basal ganglia as a set of structures 
selected during evolutionary processes to accomplish centralised action selection. The 
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need for centralised action selection, they argued, arose because of the increasing 
complexity of motor programs in vertebrates and, in particular, from the necessity to 
find a more efficient mechanism than lateral inhibition given the increasing number of 
many-to-many relationship between motor programs and effectors. Bogacz and Gurney 
(2007) claimed that specific nuclei of the basal ganglia instantiate the multi-hypothesis 
sequential probability ratio test (MSPRT) (Dragalin, Tartakovsky, & Veeravalli, 1999), 
an algorithm for choosing one or more hypotheses among other several competing ones. 
By virtue of its mathematical properties, the author argues that the MSPRT provides a 
solution for action selection in presence of noisy stimuli. In fact, while the most obvious 
solution to the problem of action selection would be to execute an action as soon as the 
integration over salience or activation value exceeds a fixed threshold, as in the 'race 
model' (Forstmann, Ratcliff & Wagenmakers, 2016), this process has been shown to be 
suboptimal and inconsistent with neurophysiological evidence, because it does not take 
into account the magnitude of conflict between alternative decisions (Bogacz, 2007).  
 
Gurney, Prescott, and Redgrave (2001) built a neuroanatomically detailed model of the 
basal ganglia nuclei that implements this algorithm using linearised computations in the 
individual units (Fig. 1.9). A very similar (but non-linear and therefore not analytically 
tractable) version of this model will be focus of part of this thesis, so we refer to the 
next chapters for a detailed explanation of structure, parameters, and behaviour of the 
model. In order to show the model abilities in action in a physical scenario, Prescott et 
al. (2006) embedded this model into a robotic architecture equipped with perceptual and 
motivational sub-systems that compute action salience, that it is then fed to the basal 
ganglia and output to the motor programs. The robot models animal foraging behaviour 
by performing simple operations such as collecting cylinders (equivalent to food) and 
carrying them back to the corner of a specified place in the scenario (equivalent to an 
animal’s nest). The input to the program that implements the basal ganglia operations 
represent the salience of individual actions, while the output represent the signal that 
inhibits unwanted motor acts (or, alternately, disinhibit relevant motor acts).  
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Fig. 1.9 Schematic of the Redgrave, Prescott, and Gurney (1999) model (adapted) 
 
Humphries, Stewart, and Gurney (2006) also showed how the algorithm implemented 
by the basal ganglia can be simulated by sets of spiking neurons that have different 
electrophysiological properties corresponding to the different nuclei of the basal 
ganglia. It is worth noticing that this thread of work attempts to bridge psychological 
features of decision making with lower-level neural dynamic by using an intermediate 
step that defines an optimal algorithm. 
 
Unlike most models that focus mainly on learning, Gurney, Prescott, and Redgrave’s 
(2001) work focused on the so-called 'proficient phase', as opposed to the 'learning 
phase'. Whereas the latter is associated with reinforcement learning algorithms, the 
former is associated with action selection, and assumes that stimulus-action associations 
have already been mapped. Focusing on this phase offers an explanation for various 
real-time symptomatology in pathologies of the basal ganglia (e.g. bradychardia or 
freezing in Parkinson’s disease, chorea in Huntington’s disease) that cannot be 
attributed to aberrant learning alone. 
 
However, reinforcement learning and action selection operations are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. Bogacsz and Larsen (2011), for instance, integrated an actor-critic 
model with the action selection mechanism by incorporating the latter in the actor 
segment. In order to implement optimal decision making, the weight update in the critic 
part had to be modified by restricting the range of weights between 0 and 1.  
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Model Evaluation 
These principles of action selection in a neuropsychological task were described in a 
computational model of the Stroop task by Stafford and Gurney (2007). The Stroop task 
is a well-known experimental paradigm of cognitive control. Subjects are presented 
with a word on screen each trial and they are asked to name the ink colour of the word 
they see (colour naming task) or the word itself (word reading task). In the colour 
naming task, if the word name and the ink colour conflict (conflict condition; e.g. RED 
written in green ink), errors become more frequent and reaction times are slowed. This 
is called the 'Stroop effect'. In the control condition only colours without words are 
shown. If word and ink are congruent (congruent condition), reaction times improve 
compared to the control condition. This is called a 'facilitation effect'. In the word 
reading task reaction times are unaffected, irrespective of the condition. The Stroop task 
is used as a selective attention task that primarily measures response inhibition (Miyake 
et al., 2000).  
 
The model presented by the authors was essentially an extension of the seminal work by 
Cohen et al. (1990). This early connectionist model consists of two ink-colour units, 
two word units, and four associated hidden units (Fig. 1.10). Additionally, two task 
units (colour naming and word reading) bias the hidden units. Two output units 
integrate across time and record the response when the difference between the two 
integrated values exceeds a threshold (diffusion model). The model is trained by 
presenting words input to the network ten times more often than colours input. This 
reflects the quicker response time to words that subjects usually exhibit. Cohen's model 
predicts Stroop and facilitation effects with an excellent degree of accuracy, but fails to 
replicate the reaction time data when the irrelevant dimension is presented before the 
relevant one (e.g. the word appears some milliseconds before the colour in the colour 
naming task, or the colour appears a some milliseconds before the word in the word 
reading task). Stafford and Gurney (2007) left Cohen's model structure as it is, but they 
added an action selection mechanism as the one described earlier (Gurney et al., 2001). 
Results showed that empirical data are better described by the enhanced model that 
makes use of an alternative evidence accumulation process using basal ganglia units. 
The incorrect behaviour arises, instead, from the inability of the diffusion model to 
produce action selection even with small saliencies and non-simultaneous inputs. The 
basal ganglia correct this issue by implementing a robust action selection mechanism, in 
addition to the original model of the Stroop task. 
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Fig. 1.10 Schematic of Cohen's model (1990) 
 
 
1.6.6 The basal ganglia as a gating mechanism 
Model Description 
Another influential model of the basal ganglia was presented by Frank, Loughry, and 
O’Reilly (2001) and updated in O'Reilly and Frank (2006). Their approach started from 
evolutionary considerations, like the action selection models we have just examined, 
and asked whether the basal ganglia nuclei represent an evolutionary precursor of the 
prefrontal cortex and therefore have similar functions on different psychological 
domains. As we have seen in the previous section, the basal ganglia and the cortex 
evolved in parallel in both non-mammals and mammals, so a good working hypothesis 
consists in considering these two systems as functionally separable. Specifically, the 
authors argued for a division of labour between the two sets of structures. According to 
the model, frontal cortex neurons continuously fire in order to maintain task 
representations at different levels, after receiving corresponding stimuli from posterior 
cortices. The basal ganglia, on the other hand, fire to allow the updating of frontal 
cortex representation and switching the information maintenance mechanism. This 
triggers the update of new states in working memory or in the more posterior frontal 
cortex (premotor and motor cortices), triggering motor actions. Dopamine plays a role 
in modulating the excitability of striatal neurons by altering their firing threshold. 
 
This model is unique in that it uses simple biophysical modelling of neurons to model 
higher order cognitive tasks without intermediate steps. In this way, the classic 
algorithmic and implementational level (Marr, 1982) becomes blurred. This can be 
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compared with the previously examined model by Gurney et al. (2001), in which 
algorithm and its implementation are instead distinct (Humphries, Stewart, and Gurney, 
2006). 
 
Model Evaluation 
In order to validate their model the author simulated an extended version of a version of 
the continuous performance task (CPT-AX; Cohen et al., 1997). Within the simulated 
task, virtual subjects were asked to push a button on their right if they detected a target 
sequence, otherwise they would push the button on their left. The target sequence was a 
consecutive set of letter that varies according to the last numerical digits displayed. If 
the last digit shown as 1, subjects had to look for the target sequence A,X. If the last 
digit shown was 2, subjects had to look for the target sequence B,Y. 
 
The task requires participants to register numbers and letters in their working memory, 
and to ignore letters and digits that are not relevant to the task at hand. In cognitive 
terms, the task requires three main operations on working memory. First, the ability to 
update the prefrontal representation of the correlated stimulus or set of stimuli (e.g. 
when the '1' is displayed). Secondly, the ability to update that representation whenever it 
becomes task-irrelevant (e.g. if '1' is displayed and 'A' appears, 'A' should be updated). 
Thirdly, the ability to maintain and protect the information from interference of similar, 
or similarly task-relevant stimuli.  Moreover, all these properties need to work for 
different subtasks, cued by different stimuli. The model is built in the Leabra framework 
(O'Reilly & Munakata, 2000), that uses units whose behaviour is regulated by equations 
modelled on electrophysiological data (O'Reilly, 1998), and layers use a k-winners-
take-all mechanism. Learning of representations and tasks use Hebbian, error-driven, 
and backpropagation algorithms. 
 
Compared to the earlier version of the model (Frank et al., 2001), the later version 
(O’Reilly & Frank, 2006) allows the PFC to learn its own representations. The model 
was used to simulate the differential effect of being on and off dopaminergic medication 
in patients with Parkinson's Disease performing two procedural learning tasks (one 
probabilistic, simply called the probabilistic stimulus selection (PSS) task, the other 
deterministic) (Frank, Seeberger, & O'Reilly, 2004). Both tasks use a set of two 
symbols of which one is associated with either the same feedback or associated 
correctly 80% of the time, in the case of probabilistic task. Subjects learn the paired 
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association between two symbol, and they are then presented with previously unseen 
combination of symbols. Errors from transitive inference are believed to show whether 
subjects learnt more accurately from negative or positive feedback. Data from patients 
off medication showed that learning for positive feedback is impaired, while learning 
from negative feedback is enhanced (higher than baseline). Patients on medication 
displayed the opposite learning pattern. 
 
1.6.7 The basal ganglia as rule-selection mechanism 
Model Description 
Amos (2000) presented a model of the interaction between frontal cortex, basal ganglia 
and the thalamus, grounded within a specific neuropsychological task – the Wisconsin 
Card Sorting Test (WCST). The model uses different computational principles to those 
discussed above, and does not fully belong to any of the paradigms examined so far.  
 
In the classic version of the WCST (Heaton, 1981) participants are presented with four 
target cards and they have to match the stimulus card to one of the four target cards 
according to a specific criterion. The only possible rules are: sort by colour, sort by 
number, or sort by shape. Participants are not instructed about the existence of these 
rules and therefore have to work them out during the task based only positive or 
negative feedback that is given in response to the subject's actions. After six consecutive 
correct answers in a row the rule is changed without warning the participant. 
Participants have then to infer the new rule and stick to it until the rule changes again. 
Stimulus cards may have more than one feature in common with target cards. 
Researchers mainly focus on counting performance errors such as the number of 
categories completed, the number of total errors, and the number of perseverative errors 
(counted each time a subject persists in using the same rule despite negative feedback). 
 
The architecture of the Amos (2000) model employs an information-processing 
approach in neuron-like units that mainly add or apply transfer functions to signal 
across the network, employing binary local representation of the stimulus feature. The 
input units set is comprised of four 12-units sets representing the target cards and one 
12-units set representing the constantly changing stimulus card. Striatal units are four 
12-units sets, and they integrate information from the frontal units and the target units 
card. Each set feeds into one nigropallidal units, for a total of four units, de facto 
compressing information. The signal finally flows into the thalamic units, which feature 
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a mutual inhibition mechanism, and the appropriate action is selected there through a 
winner-take-all mechanism. Frontal units are comprised of memory nodes, rule nodes, 
and inhibitory nodes. Reward mechanism acts directly on the inhibitory nodes. The 
effect of dopamine in the circuits were simulated by changing the slope of the activation 
function in the specified units. 
 
Model Evaluation 
The model aimed to simulate performance of patients with Parkinson's Disease (PD), 
Huntington's Disease (HD). Parkinson's Disease was simulated by reducing gain in the 
striatal units only. This is consistent with the reduced tonic input from the substantia 
nigra pars compacta, lesioned in Parkinson's pathology. Patterns observed in 
schizophrenic patients was reproduced by decreasing the slope and increasing the 
threshold in the frontal units’ activation function, and this is deemed to be consistent 
with the frontal pathology in schizophrenia. Huntington's Disease was simulated by 
reducing the activation of all striatal units and by decreasing the slope of activation 
function in the frontal units. This is consistent with the pattern of degeneration of the 
striatum, but also with the concomitant frontal pathology.  
 
The model has several issues that we address below. In the model there are 
corticothalamic connections, but there is no corticothalamic loop. Rather, the striatal 
units represent the stimulus card pattern modified by the frontal units (that allocate 
attention) and the target cards’ units. Information is compressed downstream between 
the striatal and nigropallidal layers, but the compression ratio is not comparable with the 
one observed in the neuroanatomical circuits (as in the dimensionality reduction 
models; Bar-Gad & Bergman, 2001). Response selection occurs at the thalamic level, 
and not at the motor/premotor level, and thalamic units mutually inhibit each other. If 
we ignore the fact that thalamic units do not project back to cortical ones, thalamic 
inhibition works in practice as cortical inhibition, defeating the purpose of having basal 
ganglia units as a device that arbitrates between actions. Also, the striatal units do not 
process any feedback signal, but reward occurs only through inhibition and excitation of 
frontal units. While reward processing might also occur in the frontal areas through the 
mesocortical pathway, a signal from the substantia nigra is known to feed into the 
striatal units, too. Finally, the model fitting is not as rigorous as it could be, as no 
variance in the scores is taken into account and there is no formal discussion of the 
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model fitting techniques utilised. However, the author compares different models of 
damage when fitting different patients’ data. 
 
The model is historically important, as it establishes the practice of linking 
neurobiology with information processing in a concrete task. Most importantly, it 
features a simple model fitting procedure to match data to patients' performance in the 
WCST, and therefore constitutes a general attempt to elucidate the relationship between 
behavioural and biological deficits in higher-order cognition. The issues that we 
addressed will be a starting point in the development of the work shown later on in the 
thesis. 
 
1.6.8 The basal ganglia as a procedural module within the ACT-R cognitive 
architecture 
Stocco (2018) presents a replication of the probabilistic stimulus selection model 
described in a previous section (Frank, Seeberger, & O'Reilly, 2004) in the cognitive 
architecture ACT-R (Anderson, 1996). In this architecture declarative knowledge such 
as perceptual inputs, semantic memory, and motor programs is stored in static data 
structures called "chunks", while procedural knowledge is stored in "production rules", 
that encode state-action associations. Production rules are associated with basal ganglia 
activity. Thus, in this architecture, basal ganglia activity has semantic content that 
depends on a specific procedure (e.g. "attend this stimulus"), and the conflict between 
procedures is handled by assigning to them a scalar quantity called "utility" whose value 
is updated every time the unit fires. Comparing the canonical model with one 
production for each action (‘Pick this choice’) and a version with two competing 
productions associated with one action (‘Pick this choice’ and ‘Do not pick this 
choice’), the author shows that only the latter version of the model correctly replicates 
the experimental data in PD patients, and these alterations to the architecture are 
compatible with the physiology of the basal ganglia structure. Although this work does 
not use any specific implementation of the basal ganglia action based on the collective 
activity of the nuclei, it demonstrates that the higher-order cognitive architectures can, 
in principle, accommodate lower-order neurobiological findings, by using bridge 
principles. 
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1.6.9 The basal ganglia as a global inhibition system 
At the neural level, cortical activity needs to be regulated in order to prevent over-
excitation, but also to avoid activity dying out prematurely and with subsequent early 
loss of representations. While local inhibitory cortical mechanisms play a role in global 
inhibition, Wickens (1993) suggests that cortical activity is regulated by the basal 
ganglia, through mutual inhibition in the striatum. Distributed neural populations in the 
cortex project into a smaller population of striatal neurons and the competition therefore 
occurs in the striatum only, and only neurons that belong to the same motor domain 
mutually inhibit each other and have a common set of cortical afferent. Each domain 
then projects to different neurons downstream in the pallidum. The anatomical and 
functional distinction between indirect and direct pathway is not present. This theory of 
the striatum is consistent with many aspects of neurophysiological data, especially of 
connectivity, and the information processing aspect can be implemented in artificial or 
spiking neural networks.  
 
 Evaluation: The nature of dopamine signal 
The role of the basal ganglia both in learning and behaviour is deeply related to the 
functional significance of dopamine. Its role is the central nervous system, and in 
particular in the basal ganglia nuclei and the cortex, is still contentious, but progress has 
been made during the last decades, as at least a few plausible theories have been 
identified and these have generated different research programmes. As mentioned 
above, Schultz et al. (1997) ascribes a precise algorithmic property to dopamine, such as 
the ability to signal the discrepancy between predicted and observed reward (reward 
prediction error, RPE). This computational framework is essential within actor-critic 
models, but its long-lasting influences can also be appreciated by its constant presence 
in other models.  
 
Redgrave, Gurney and Prescott (1999) offer a radically alternative theoretical 
framework. Dopamine signalling, they argue, would have too short a latency to be able 
to signal reward prediction error, and it is more plausible that short phasic burst of 
dopamine are elicited by novel stimuli (see also Schultz, 2016). Dopamine signal would 
be therefore instrumental in allocating mental resources to attend to a novel stimulus or 
set of stimuli. Other criticisms of the RPE hypothesis come from Pennartz (1996) and 
more recently from Salamone et al. (2005). They noticed that dopamine cells in striatal 
structures increase their firing rate in response to stimuli other than rewards or 
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predictions of primary or secondary rewards. In fact, novel stimuli and motivational 
states seem to be more predictive of dopaminergic activity.  Also, in order for the RPE 
to be valid, a stimulus needs to carry an additional temporal component that allows the 
explicit representation of time from stimulus to reward. It is unclear whether this is true 
or not of the dopamine signal. Recent work suggests that reward signals and temporal 
properties of cues are represented in the sensorimotor cortex (Ramakrishnan et al., 
2017).  
 
Berridge, Robinson, and Aldridge (2009) suggest yet another function for dopamine 
signals. Dopamine would rather mediate the 'incentive salience' of stimuli, altering their 
motivational value and increasing the probability of a reward to be approached by the 
agent. This motivational aspect would be dissociable from the hedonic aspect of a 
reward (pleasure) and from the learning component. 
 
At the algorithmic level, the temporal learning algorithm is still a valid learning 
mechanism, but all the presented computational and empirical work cast a doubt on 
whether the relationship with dopaminergic signalling is as straightforward as 
envisioned by Schultz et al. (1997).  
 
 Summary 
While computational models before the 1990s tended to focus on the neuroanatomy of 
the basal ganglia in relation to posited higher-order operations (sequencing) and on how 
to explain the fundamentals of pathology in neuropsychiatric population, a new 
approach, focussed on modelling neuropsychological data became increasingly more 
common in that decade. Simulating a neuropsychological task has a great advantage 
over simulating general processes, in that human and animal data can be compared 
against the model to an arbitrary degree of accuracy, and parameters can be fitted 
accordingly. Furthermore, the neuropsychological literature is very rich and can provide 
raw material for the computational modeller. Modelling neuropsychological tasks in 
clinical populations is also useful for capturing dysfunctions in cognitive and neural 
systems, thereby advancing the clinical neurosciences, and helping, in turn, to design 
better assessment and diagnostic instruments for specific populations.  
 
The models analysed above are some of the most influential in the field of 
neurocomputational modelling, but they represent only a fraction of the models 
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produced during the last decades. The collaboration between clinical centres, 
experimental facilities, and modellers has given rise to a multitude of variations of these 
models. What appears clear from examining them closely, is that models that use 
different architectures tend to successfully simulate specific results within a domain 
and, accordingly, although progress has been made during the last decades, these 
models have yet to be unified.  
 
 Research questions 
The broad question that we would like to explore in the present thesis is whether it is 
possible to reconcile top-down and bottom-up approaches to simulate higher-order 
neuropsychological tasks, integrating distinct and distinguishable level of analysis. 
 
More specifically, we model the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST; Heaton, 1981) 
and the Brixton Task (BRX; Burgess & Shallice, 1996), two tasks used in clinical 
neuropsychological practice to assess executive functions in a variety of clinical 
conditions. 
 
The structure of the two tasks comes from two compatible models: that of Cooper & 
Shallice (2000), that describes routine action selection, and that of Gurney et al. (2001) 
(outlined earlier in the chapter), that describes how a biologically accurate model of the 
basal ganglia implements action selection. The choice of adopting Gurney et al.’s model 
(2001) is motivated by several reasons. All the other models analysed have been either 
developed to work with a specific cognitive architecture (e.g. Stocco et al., 2018; Frank, 
Loughry & O'Reilly, 2001), do not have the adequate level of biological detail (e.g. 
Amos, 2000), or if a localist representation is used the required number of mutual 
inhibitory connections in the striatum would grow disproportionately (Wickens, 2003). 
Furthermore, Gurney et al.’s work seems to be unique in being able to distinguish 
between algorithmic and implementational levels (Marr, 1982), and in distinguishing 
between performance and learning components of the model. All these desirable 
properties indicate a high compatibility with Cooper and Shallice (2000). In the thesis, 
we start by replicating and then extending this basal ganglia model. We then embed it 
within a corticothalamic loop in a structure that simulates first the WCST, then the 
BRX. A further departure from the Cooper and Shallice (2000) model is an additional 
mechanism that controls the stability of representations, together with the basal ganglia 
section controlling their flexibility. We finally validate these models examining the 
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ability to simulate data collected in two experiments with older adults and adults with 
ADHD. A qualitative analysis of parameter space is presented in each case, in order to 
verify whether the intuitive meaning of parameter is coherent with the direction of 
changes (or the lack of thereof) in behavioural variables. Quantitative model fitting and 
model comparisons provide additional evidence for the model. It is worth noting that 
the model is not only assessed with respect to the ability to fit empirical data and to fit 
them better than any other model using the same magnitude of complexity (Rodgers & 
Rowe, 2002; but also see Roberts & Pashler, 2000), but also the ability to cut across 
domains and levels of understanding. Another important research question is therefore 
whether the model can generalise to executive tasks that can be constructed with 
hierarchical schemas, and to what extent stability and flexibility in behaviour are 
affected by control parameters and by the computational representations of dopamine 
signalling. 
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Basic action selection: simulating a multi-
channel basal ganglia 
 
 Abstract 
In this chapter we report the results of the reimplementation of the basal ganglia model 
of Gurney et al. (2001) in Simulink™ and Matlab™, and we introduce a variation in the 
way internal and external signals are controlled within that model, by associating a 
sigmoid function with variable bias (threshold), gain (slope), and skewness, to each 
output. We then analyse how the properties of the basal ganglia units change as a 
function of these parameters. We show that manipulating the bias in the striatal units is 
equivalent to adding a signal to them, and that the skewness parameter is redundant. We 
then extend the model from two to five channels, and examine the properties of this 
network in terms of channel selectivity. Finally, we explore the possibility of having 
channels expressing different parameters, to see how this affects selection. 
 
 Introduction 
Many basal ganglia models have been developed, but that of Gurney et al. (2001a) is 
important in two respects. First, the computational, algorithmic, and implementational 
level (Marr, 1982) are distinct, clearly identifiable and provided with bridge laws. The 
computational purpose of the basal ganglia, the authors argue, is to perform action 
selection when a simple stimulus-response association is not sufficient anymore to 
guarantee the effective use of motor program. This belief arises from evolutionary 
considerations. The algorithm that optimally process the salience of signals is the multi-
hypothesis sequential probability ratio test (MSPRT), as illustrated by Bogacz and 
Gurney (2007). This consideration mainly arise from the domain-general nature of the 
signals processed in the basal ganglia, and the limitations of decision-making 
mechanisms that employ diffusion or race models.  Finally, the implementational level, 
as illustrated in Humphries et al. (2006), links the basal ganglia nuclei and their 
electrophysiological properties. Second, the model is compatible with higher order 
cognitive operations that may take the implementational form of a production system or, 
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as we will see in future chapters, schema-activation based computation as described in 
Cooper and Shallice (2000). 
 
Although the MATLAB™ code was provided by the original authors, the model was 
reimplemented following the description in the papers by Gurney et al. (2001a) and 
Gurney et al. (2001b) with both Simulink™ and MATLAB™. This process was aimed 
at testing reproducibility by ensuring that the authors had provided not only a well-
documented analysis of all the processes, but also a set of principles and key findings 
that would hold irrespective of the programming language used for the implementation 
(Lane & Gobet, 2003). 
 
The model assumes that the computation of the basal ganglia consists in selection of 
motor plans. These motor plans might share motor resources or not. In the former case, 
the basal ganglia prevent the simultaneous execution of incompatible motor plans. The 
first theoretical assumption in this kind of models is the identification of an individual 
nucleus with a specific computational function. This is an approach typical of system 
neuroscience. 
 
The second theoretical assumption is related to the distinction between performance and 
learning. While other models of the basal ganglia are mostly concerned with the 
learning aspects (e.g. Montague, 1996), sensorimotor models like the one discussed here 
focus on the performance aspects. The dissociation between performance and learning 
seems to be necessary to undertake a more rigorous analysis of how action selection is 
carried out, independently of how the different rewards of the individual actions are 
processed. This distinction can be justified with neurophysiological and experimental 
evidence. As we saw in the previous chapter, evidence indicates that dopamine phasic 
firing rates encode the error between expected and current reward (Schultz, 1998). 
However, besides brief burst of high frequency spikes, dopaminergic neurons display a 
tonic firing pattern, firing spontaneously at a low rate (4-10Hz). We will assume, for the 
moment, that these two different patterns might have a differential effect on learning 
and performance, respectively. A piece of evidence for this distinction comes from 
Parkinson’s disease (PD) patients. Administration of levodopa yields an almost 
immediate improvement in motor functions, measured with the Short Duration 
Response (SDR). Also, the amount of drug injected positively correlates with the SDR. 
This could be related to the immediate increase in tonic dopamine in the basal ganglia 
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circuits. Conversely, a lasting motor improvement can be noticed after many drug 
administration sessions, even after levodopa elimination, measured with the Long 
Duration Response (LDR). This differential effect might in fact be due to the immediate 
dopamine modulation of synaptic plasticity (Nutt et al., 1997). These observations 
suggest that performance in action and motor selection could not solely arise from 
learning mechanisms but be computationally differentiable. In this chapter we simulate 
aspects related to action selection only, and in the next chapters we will gradually 
introduce the learning aspect and investigate how these two aspects can be interrelated 
in progressively complex models. 
 
 Model description 
The model is informed by the anatomical connections between the nuclei and by the 
presence of parallel and partially segregated pathways (Alexander et al., 1986). Each 
signal from the cortex is thought to encode an action or an action plan. 
 
The model has been implemented in Matlab™ and Simulink™. The time signal is 
assumed to be correlated with the average firing rate of the nuclei. In this chapter we 
show only the results obtained with Simulink™, but the Matlab™ implementation 
yields identical results and after this chapter only results from models coded in 
Matlab™ are reported. 
 
The diagram of the model and its parameters are shown in Fig. 2.1. (At this stage of 
simulation, only two channels compete for being selected. In principle, the network can 
be extended to an unlimited amount of channels, following the same principles of 
excitation and inhibition, because of the ability of the network to scale signals.) The 
cortical signal, which represents the salience of the signal, feeds into the three main 
nuclei of the basal ganglia: striatum controlled by D1 receptors (STRD1), subthalamic 
Nuclei (STN) and striatum controlled by D2 receptors (STRD2). It is assumed that all 
three groups of nuclei receive copies of the same signal. While this is not known with 
certainty it is plausible that these signals are highly correlated (Feger et al., 1991). 
 
Both the STR and STN outputs feed into the globus pallidus (internal segment) (GPi), 
which represents the basal ganglia output to the thalamic nuclei. This part of the circuit 
is what Gurney et al. (2001) named the “selection circuit”, in place of the more familiar 
“direct pathway”. This pathways is equivalent to a feedforward off-centre and on-
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surround network that disinhibit programs with higher salience and inhibit the weaker 
ones. From a purely algorithmic standpoint this part of the striatum instantiates a simple 
race model between the channels (Bogacz & Gurney, 2007) 
 
The GPi also receives projections from the globus pallidus external segment (GPe), 
which in turn feeds back to the STN through inhibitory projections. This part of the 
circuit is what Gurney et al. (2001) called the “control circuit”, in place of the more 
familiar “indirect pathway”. The algorithm instantiated by this section is a scaling 
process that reduces the minimum activation salience of each individual channel by an 
amount proportional to the sum over all the other saliences (Bogacz & Gurney, 2007). 
When this algorithmic solution is stacked up against a system of the striatal regulation 
of cortical activity (Miller & Wickens, 1991), it has the advantage of requiring many 
fewer connections, under a localist assumption.  
 
While the functionality of the striatum is not contingent on the presence of recurrent 
inhibitory connections, here a low level of mutual inhibition has been implemented in 
the form of the parameter winh, owing to the fact that a minimal amount of intrinsic 
inhibition in the striatum is still plausible (Brown & Sharp, 1995; Burke, Rotstein & 
Alvarez, 2017). Other simulations not shown here that the impact of this parameter does 
not affect the overall function of the basal ganglia, but it might mildly affect selection 
when multiple channels are on. 
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Fig. 2.1 Schematic of the two channel network and legend. The left and the right green 
box represent the internal and external segments of the Globus Pallidus, respectively. 
The dotted line represents the output of the BG nuclei to the thalamus. The arrow with 
the standard pointer represents excitatory projections and the arrow with the dot pointer 
represent inhibitory projections. The model is fed with two dopaminergic signals 
labelled D1 and D2. The system outputs the signals that feed the thalamic nuclei, and 
that are generally tonically active but inhibited by basal ganglia action. 
 
Internally, each nucleus has very similar features. This demonstrates that the functional 
qualities of the basal ganglia are not brought about by the diversity of processes in each 
individual nucleus, but by the architecture of the system. Dopamine control is exerted 
by an external signal from D1 and D2 channels, that we call DA when both of them are 
manipulated at the same time (D1 = 1 + DA and D2 = 1 - DA). Noise is added to both 
the cortical input and external dopamine signal. The input signal from the cortex is 
multiplied by the dopamine signal before entering the striatum. Decreasing the 
dopamine signal results in excessive input in the subthalamic nucleus, compared to the 
striatum. The dopamine control signal represents the tonic firing of the substantia nigra 
pars compacta (SNpc) and it is kept constant across all the nuclei in order to investigate 
the differential effect of the dopamine signal on the overall circuit.   
 
The globus pallidus (external segment) sends inhibitory projections back to the 
subthalamic nuclei, where they are subtracted from the main cortical signal and 
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therefore diminish the excitatory influence of the subthalamic nuclei over the globi 
pallidi.  
 
In Simulink™ the Leaky Integrator is simulated with a simple transfer function with a 
single pole: 
 
𝑻(𝒔) =  
𝑮𝑰
(𝒔 – 𝑷𝑰)
 
 
The gain is indicated as GI and PI is the pole, in this case negative. The pole is the root 
of the expression at the denominator. The transfer function T(s) maps input and output 
following the leaky integrate and fire model of the neuron, where v(t) is the membrane 
potential, I(t) is the sum of the input currents added up in the dendrites and τ is the time 
constant (product of the membrane resistance Rm and the membrane capacitance Cm): 
 
𝝉
𝒅𝒗
𝒅𝒕
= −(𝒗 − 𝒗𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒕) + 𝑹𝒎𝑰   
  
The leaky integrate and fire model is completed by the generation of spikes after 
reaching a threshold and a reset mechanism. Input x(t) and output y(t) represent the 
normalised mean firing rate of the population (spike/sec) and the resting activation is 
null. The injected current is the input signal x(t). 
 
𝝉
𝒅𝒚
𝒅𝒕
= −𝒚 + 𝑹𝒎𝒙 
 
Applying the Laplace transform to both the terms yields  
 
𝝉𝒔𝒀(𝒔) = −𝒀(𝒔)  + 𝑹𝒎𝑿(𝒔) 
 
And rearranging the term yields a transfer function: 
 
𝒀(𝒔)
𝑿(𝒔)
=
𝑮𝑰
𝒔 − 𝑷𝑰
 
 
Which is formally identical to the leaky integrator transfer function, where: 
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𝑮𝑰  =  
𝑹𝒎
𝝉
, 𝑷𝑰  = − 
𝟏
𝝉
 
 
Thus, the gain parameter is directly proportional to the resistance in the leaky integrator 
and the pole parameter is the opposite of the reciprocal of the time constant. In essence, 
here the leaky integrator acts as a simple low-pass filter that evens out fast-varying 
signals. All the nuclei use the same parameters for the leaky integrator. 
 
In Matlab™, the leaky integrator is implemented in the form of difference equation, 
where the solution to the differential equation of the integrator is approximated by 
breaking the time domain up into discrete steps. 
 
The squash function restricts the output to within 0 and 1 and maps input and output 
linearly within the limits, to include threshold and saturation for the neural signal. The 
sigmoid function is usually preferred for these applications, but Gurney et al. used this 
function because of its analytical tractability. At present, the reimplementation proposed 
here also makes use of the same squash function. The variable x represents the input, y 
the output, and the threshold value ε varies across the nuclei. 
 
𝒚(𝒙) =
{
 
 
 
 
 𝟎 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒙 < 𝜺
   𝒎(𝒙 − 𝜺) 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝝐 ≤ 𝒙 ≤
𝟏
𝒎
+ 𝜺
           𝟏 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒙 >
𝟏
𝒎
+ 𝜺
 
   
Mutual inhibition has been implemented in the striatum by subtracting the weighted 
sum of all the other units from each salience value of the channel. Since medium spiny 
neurons also synapse with each other in the striatum, this computation is biologically 
plausible. Mutual inhibition is not essential to perform a successful action selection but 
there is evidence that a small amount of it could be present in the striatal circuits (Jeager 
et al., 1994). In the equation, xi represents the input and yi the output for the channel i. 
The Kronecker delta (ij) has a unitary value if the indices are identical, otherwise it is 
zero. In the following simulations the value of winh has been set to a very low value. 
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𝐲𝐢 = 𝐱𝐢 −𝐰𝐢𝐧𝐡∑(𝟏− 𝛅𝐢𝐣)𝐱𝐣
𝐍
𝐣
 
 
The signal processing in the two segments of the globus pallidus has an identical kind 
of processing units: after a gain control, external excitatory and inhibitory signals are 
added up together and they are then filtered in a leaky integrator and a squash function. 
 
 Simulation 
2.4.1 Effects of channel salience 
The values of parameters used in the simulation in this section are shown in Table 2.1.  
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Table 2.1 Parameters Value 
Symbol Value Meaning 
𝑮𝒊 5 Transfer function gain 
𝑷𝒊 -5 Transfer function pole 
𝑫𝟏 0.5 Dopamine signal to STR D1 
D2 0.5 Dopamine signal to STR D2 
𝜺𝒔𝒕𝒓 0.2 Threshold for saturation fnc. in STR 
𝜺𝒔𝒕𝒏 -0.25 Threshold for saturation fnc. in STN 
𝜺𝒈𝒑𝒊  -0.2 Threshold for saturation fnc. in GPi 
𝜺𝒈𝒑𝒆 -0.2 Threshold for saturation fnc. in GPe 
𝝃𝒄𝒉  10
-4 Noise signal to all channels 
𝒘𝒆 1.00 Weight GPe to GPi  
𝒘𝒈 1.00 Weight GPe to STN 
 𝒘𝒕 1.00 Pre-gain to STN 
𝒘𝒔 1.00 Pre-gain to STR 
𝒘+ 1.00 Weight STR to GP 
𝒘_ 1.05 Weight STN to GP 
𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒉 0.10 Mutual channels inhibition in STR 
 
Parameter ξch represents the noise added to all channel inputs, it has been drawn from a 
uniform distribution, and it is set to a very low value.  
 
A simulation was run to examine the effects of cortical excitation in the basal ganglia 
circuit. Fig. 2.2 shows the basal ganglia circuit response to stepwise increasingly higher 
cortical excitation (dashed line) that partially overlaps for a few seconds. The cortical 
activation is also called salience to indicate the perceptual quality of a stimulus. A 
greater cortical signal correspond to a greater salience (importance) of the stimulus.   
 
The simulation is divided in 8 segments, each one lasting 5 time units. Assuming that a 
value below 0.5 means that the channel is activated, both channels becomes disinhibited 
only when salience exceeds 0.8 and they are not activated simultaneously. 
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Fig. 2.2 The plot shows the response of the basal ganglia output (solid line) caused by 
cortical excitation (dashed line), associated with the signal salience. A higher output 
signal corresponds to greater inhibition of the thalamic structures.  
 
2.4.2 Simulating the effects of dopamine manipulation 
We briefly examine the effect of the parameter DA (Fig. 2.3). DA determines the value 
of both D1 and D2 parameters shown in Table 1. When dopamine signal is too low (DA 
= 0), both channels do not reach the threshold and are therefore inhibited, irrespective of 
the cortical input. Increasing dopamine (DA = 1) yields a channel selection compatible 
with just the higher saliences. A further increased (DA = 1.5) allows multiple selections. 
In other words, increasing global tonic dopamine “flattens out” the channel response 
allowing thalamic disinhibition, while lower values inhibit the channels. This is 
compatible with what is seen in Parkinson's Disease, although the interpretation for 
higher values of dopamine is at the moment unclear. 
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Fig. 2.3 Effects of dopamine manipulation for both the channels.  
 
 Variation of parameters 
At this point, we alter the mechanism of control by replacing the linear saturation 
function with a generalized sigmoid function with a “skewing parameter” ν that can 
simulate the asymmetric behaviour of a neural substrate near threshold and near 
saturation.   
 
[
𝟏
𝟏 + 𝒆−𝜶(𝒙−𝜷)
]
𝟏/𝝂
 
 
This allows a more fine-tuned control of parameters. This addition is justified by the 
kind of behaviour visible at the level of single neurons and accurately described by the 
current-frequency curves. For instance, after a certain threshold is reached, Type II 
neurons start firing at a fixed frequency much greater than zero, while Type I neurons 
increase their firing rate from zero to the maximum. Parameter ν mimics this tendency 
to an asymmetric response close to threshold and saturation that is not reproducible with 
a symmetric sigmoid (ν = 1). This parameter might turn out to be useful to simulate 
temporal asymmetric behaviours. The smaller the value of ν, the flatter in the lowest 
part of the domain the sigmoid curve looks. In other words, the neural substrate needs a 
higher firing rate to produce minimal output. The new values of the parameters used in 
the simulation, unless otherwise specified, are shown in Table 2.2 
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Table 2.2 Parameters value (variation) 
Symbol Value Meaning 
𝑮𝒊 5 Transfer function gain 
𝑷𝒊 5 Transfer function pole 
𝑫𝟏 1.00 Dopamine signal to striatum D1 
D2 1.00 Dopamine signal to striatum D2 
𝒗𝒔𝒕𝒓 1.00 Skewness for saturation fnc. in striatum 
𝒗𝒔𝒕𝒏 1.00 Skewness for saturation fnc. in STN 
𝒗𝒈𝒑𝒊  1.00 Skewness for saturation fnc. in GP (internal) 
𝒗𝒈𝒑𝒆 1.00 Skewness for saturation fnc. in GP (external) 
𝝃𝒄𝒉  10
-4 Noise signal to all channels 
𝒘𝒆 1.00 Weight GPe to GPi  
𝒘𝒈 1.00 Weight GPe to STN 
𝒘𝒕 1.00 Pre-gain to STN 
𝒘+ 0.8 Pre-gain to STR 
𝒘− 1 Weight STR to GP 
 𝜷𝒔𝒕𝒓 0.7 Threshold for saturation fnc. in striatum 
𝜷𝒔𝒕𝒏 0.25 Threshold for saturation fnc. in STN 
𝜷𝒈𝒑𝒊 0.3 Threshold for saturation fnc. in GP (internal) 
𝜷𝒈𝒑𝒆 0.3 Threshold for saturation fnc. in GP (external) 
𝜶𝒔𝒕𝒓 5.33 Slope for saturation fnc. in striatum 
𝜶𝒔𝒕𝒏 5.33 Slope for saturation fnc. in STN 
𝜶𝒈𝒑𝒆 5.33 Slope for saturation fnc. in GP (internal) 
𝜶𝒈𝒑𝒊 5.33 Slope for saturation fnc. in GP (external) 
𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒉 0.03 Mutual channels inhibition in striatum 
 
With these carefully chosen new values, the plots of the simulation are essentially 
analogous to the ones depicted in the previous paragraph. 
 
2.5.1 Parameter evaluation 
This version of the model allows more control on parameters and partially ties them to 
specific neurobiological interpretation. However, it is important to realise that all the 
parameters that control the sigmoid function are closely interlinked. Figs. 2.4 to 2.7 
show the effects of manipulation of the input tonic dopamine signal and saturation 
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parameters in the striatum only, while Figs. 2.8 and 2.9 show the effects of 
manipulating parameters of the subthalamic nucleus. Each relevant parameter has been 
mapped onto the total possible disinhibition of the channel, calculated by counting the 
total time in the simulation where the selected channels exceed an arbitrary threshold of 
0.5 and then normalised by dividing all values by the maximum. The choice of a 
threshold is motivated by the binary nature of an action: despite the use of continuous 
signal by the brain (and by the model), an action can be either selected or not. Also, 
specifying a threshold makes a qualitative comparison between the parameters possible 
and enables the identification of transition points.  
 
Manipulation of the amount of tonic dopamine DA, parameters νstr and βstr yields a very 
similar qualitative result: the total percentage of inhibition increases or decreases in a 
step-wise fashion. However, in the case of νstr, the amount of disinhibition is stationary 
from νstr ≈ 0.3 to νstr ≈ 1.2, and then it steadily grows until the maximum is reached 
within 0.5 units. Fig. 2.6 shows the effect of the variation of the βstr parameter, which 
manipulates the threshold of the saturation curve, effectively translating it to the right.  
The βstr plot in Fig. 2.6 is the mirrored image of the DA plot in Fig. 2.4. In other words, 
increasing dopamine input and decreasing the β parameter cause an almost identical 
step-wise increment of the overall channel disinhibition. This result is not surprising 
given our implementation, but it is common practice to simulate the computational 
action of dopamine by changing the gain of the sigmoid function (Li & Sikström, 2002) 
rather than the threshold. The gain corresponds in the present model to αstr. Fig. 2.7 
shows how the value of αstr affects the total channel disinhibition. The function is 
increasing in a sigmoid fashion and between αstr ≈ 7 and αstr ≈ 9.5 it can be considered 
quasi-linear, and quasi-constant outside those values. The effects of manipulation of the 
ν parameter in the subthalamic nucleus (νstn) are negligible, as long as the value is far 
enough from the null value (Fig. 2.8), and the effects of manipulation of the β parameter 
in the subthalamic nucleus (βstn) are very close to those of βstr (Fig. 2.9). 
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Fig. 2.4 Effect of variation of the DA parameter 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.5 Effect of variation of  parameter in the striatum. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.6 Effects of manipulation of the  parameter in the striatum. 
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Fig. 2.7 Effects of manipulation of the α parameter in the striatum. A higher α in the 
saturation function shifts the function into a translated step function. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.8 Effect of manipulation of the ν parameter in the subthalamic nucleus. If the ν in 
the saturation function is far enough from the null value the parameter has almost a 
negligible effect with respect to the total inhibition. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.9 Effect of manipulation of the  parameter in the subthalamic nucleus.   
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In order to discern the contribution of different internal variables to mimicking the 
amount of external dopamine signal, we supplement the above qualitative analysis with 
a quantitative one. Multiple correlation analysis of the total possible disinhibition is 
used to test if the external dopamine signal and the parameters of the saturation function 
were significantly inter-correlated across the simulation time. All the values displayed 
in the matrix (Table 2.3) are significant at p < .05 excluding that marked with ∎. 
Results indicate that the external dopamine signal and manipulation of the parameters of 
the saturation function in the striatum (even the translation parameter βstn in the 
subthalamic nucleus) produce almost analogous results. Parameter αstr correlates with 
all the β parameters. Also, νstr  moderately correlates with the all the variables but νstn  
does not. 
 
Table 2.3 Correlation matrix of the total possible disinhibition 
 DA αstr βstr βstn υstr υstn 
DA 1 0.92 −0.92 0.91 0.77 −0.42 
αstr  1 −0.86 0.91 0.70 −0.36∎ 
βstr   1 −0.96 −0.75 0.54 
βstn    1 0.74 −0.55 
υstr     1 −0.51 
υstn      1 
 
2.5.2 Discussion 
We increased the model complexity by introducing a saturation function in the form of 
a sigmoid function instead of the linear and analytically tractable one used in the 
previous section. This analysis gave us the opportunity to consider whether parameters 
are useful to characterise an algorithm and link to putative neurobiological function, or 
whether specific parameters are simply redundant. Manipulating parameter βstr is, for 
instance, equivalent to altering the DA signal. Increasing αstr is also somewhat similar to 
increasing the DA signal, but the since the shape of the transformation is qualitatively 
different, it is not advisable to drop the parameter just yet. Parameter νstr works also 
very similarly to βstr, and the similar shape of the curve suggests that this parameter 
should be dropped. If, for instance, the plot produced a U-shaped form, there would be a 
reason to keep the parameter. Altering parameter νstn does not affect inhibition 
properties if not at extremely small values.  
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In the following simulations the model will be extended to more channels, to observe 
whether the properties of the model examined so far still hold for more than two 
channels. Tonic dopaminergic input will be simulated by altering βstr, and parameters 
νstr and νstn will be set to 1, effectively changing the generalised saturation function into 
a simple saturation function. 
 
 Extension to more channels 
A new version of the model with 5 channels was implemented. The Simulink™ 
diagram is shown in Fig. 2.10. The nuclei are connected in a fashion identical to the 
two-channel version, but this time there is only one five-component vector input 
representing the saliences of each individual channel. A further extension to more 
channels is therefore possible and relatively easy to implement. Changes in striatum 
dopaminergic tonic input from the substantia nigra have been replaced by the 
manipulation the βstr parameter, since they have been shown to be functionally 
equivalent in the previous section.  
 
Fig. 2.10 Schematic of the basal ganglia with vector input and output, represented by 
one single black line. The light violet structure is the D1 Striatum (D1 STR), the dark 
violet is the D2 Striatum (D2 STR). The red structure is the subthalamic nucleus (STN). 
The dark green structure is the GP external segment (GPe) and the light green one is the 
GP internal segment (GPi). The grey structure computes the cumulative sum of the 
outputs from the subthalamic nucleus. This structure is identical to the one shown in 
Fig. 2.1, but this is the Simulink™ schematic extended to 5 channels. 
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Fig. 2.11 shows an example of the output given a series of step signals that sometimes 
overlap. The dashed green line indicates the input to the basal ganglia while the blue 
line represents the output level of inhibition to the thalamus (the thalamic units are not 
shown here). The five-channel structure behaves similarly to the two-channel version. 
Manipulation of parameters of the striatum changes the level of total inhibition and, 
allowing single or multiple action selection. 
 
Fig. 2.11 The blue line represents the output of the basal ganglia (5 channels). The 
dashed green line represents the cortical input. Parameters in this simulation are 
identical to those in Table 2.2. The areas highlighted in pink show when the signal is 
going below the threshold (0.5), and the channel becomes disinhibited. 
 
In order to investigate how the selection of multiple channels is affected by βstr and αstr , 
we define the hard selectivity ratio as:  
 
𝝋𝒉  =  𝟏 −
𝑺
𝑿
 
 
Where S is the number of basal ganglia outputs that are below the threshold (0.5) and 
therefore input to the thalamus, while X is the number of channel inputs (cortical signal) 
whose activation values is above the threshold. The selectivity ratio essentially 
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measures how many channels would be selected if their activation was strong enough to 
be selected. The selectivity ratio was averaged across time for the input in Fig. 11, 
which features very strong signals (maximum activation) for a fixed time duration, 
some of them overlapping.  Similarly, we define the soft selectivity ratio as: 
 
𝝋𝒔 = 𝒎𝒂𝒙
𝒊
𝒄𝒊
𝟏 − 𝒐𝒊
 
 
where ci is the cortical input and oi is the basal ganglia output. In practice, this index 
gives a more graded view of what happens to the channels, given that the numerator is 
almost always smaller than or equal to the denominator, a smaller value of the index 
indicates a greater disinhibition, and a larger index indicate a greater inhibition of the 
channel.  
 
 
Fig. 2.12 Hard selectivity ratio against βstr, for three values of αstr  
(values are normalised to the maximum value) 
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Fig. 2.13 Soft selectivity ratio against βstr, for three values of αstr 
(values are normalised to the maximum value) 
 
Fig. 2.12 shows that both parameters βstr and αstr have little effect on the 'hard' 
selectivity ratio measure, apart from the extremes of the parameters. Fig. 2.13 shows a 
different picture, and suggests that the basal ganglia work in a fairly graded fashion. 
Also, a higher value of αstr seems to have an amplifying effect, but more so in the value 
of βstr around 0.5, and at extreme values. 
 
If we repeat the same analysis for a random set of inputs that covers the whole range of 
cortical activations (from 0 to 1) instead of being just a step function at the maximum 
level, results are substantially different. Fig. 2.14 and Fig. 2.15 illustrate the hard and 
soft selectivity measures for these new inputs. 
 
 
Fig. 2.14 Hard selectivity ratio against βstr, for three values of αstr, with a broader range 
of cortical stimuli (values are normalised to the maximum value) 
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Fig. 2.15 Soft selectivity ratio against βstr, for three values of αstr with a broader range of 
cortical stimuli (values are normalised to the maximum value) 
 
As we see, both the hard and soft selectivity measures become very sensitive to the 
variation of βstr. This demonstrates that the mechanism of the basal ganglia structure is 
fit for the purpose of general channel inhibition and disinhibition, and the threshold 
(bias) of the striatal function, conceptualised as the dopamine signal, smoothly controls 
this mechanism. Also, parameter αstr affect the process to a much small extent. 
However, the higher the cortical salience, the less sensitive to hard-switching the 
mechanism is. In other words, when actions are maximally salient, manipulation of the 
equivalent of the dopamine signal should affect basal ganglia output amplitude, but not 
selection. This is also psychologically plausible considering that multiple extremely 
salient sensory stimuli cannot be attended simultaneously (Miller & Buschman, 2013) 
 
The structure requires an additional system to select actions and allow action 
exploration in a probabilistic fashion, and this is examined in the next section. 
 
 Non-deterministic action selection 
The next step is to expand the structure to accommodate the fact that selection is not 
always deterministic. So far we saw what happens when we change βstr and αstr when 
the values for all the channels are identical. Learning mechanisms (not yet specified) 
could alter the parameters differentially. Fig. 2.14 shows how varying the threshold βstr 
only for the first channel leaves the other one unvaried. The areas highlighted in red are 
those for which the signal drops below the threshold (0.5). For βstr = 0.3 the first 
channel is always selected despite not being excited by the cortical signal, with the 
exclusion of 5 time units where the second channel is excited. This excessive channel 
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disinhibition caused by the low βstr ceases to work abruptly only when the other channel 
is entirely activated. A soft-switch (multiple channels activated) occurs between 30 and 
40 time units, when the cortical signal is 0.8 and both channels are then activated. 
Similarly, a soft-switch occurs when βstr are both 0.5. When βstr in channel one increases 
to 1, a hard-switch occurs. Only channel two is selected when the cortical activations 
are strong (but not at the maximum value). Finally, when βstr is equal to 1.3, the first 
channel is totally inactivated.  
 
 
Fig. 2.16 Displaying the output of two channels changing the value of βstr only for the 
first channel. Since the other channels are permanently not excited, only channel one 
and two are shown. 
 
This shows that hard and soft switching (that is to say, the activation of single or 
multiple channels) or biasing the channel to allow its selection can be done by 
manipulating βstr differentially. This will be relevant when we introduce a learning 
mechanism in a cognitive model that makes use of this action selection mechanism. 
 
 Summary 
The reimplementation of a variation of Gurney et al. (2001a,b) model in Matlab™ and 
Simulink™ yields results very close to those outlined in the original paper. The overall 
purpose of the original computational model was to show that the basal ganglia nuclei 
in the brain instantiate a channel selection mechanism that is compatible with 
evolutionary constraints, algorithmic constraints, and the differential neurobiological 
role of dopamine signalling to the striatum in the form of D1 and D2. We succeeded in 
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re-implementing the model, following exclusively the outline described in the original 
paper and without resorting to the online code. Since this cannot be said of many 
computational models discussed in research papers (even with code made available) 
(Cooper & Guest, 2014), we can consider the model successful with respect to 
replicability standards, among other things. 
 
In addition to re-implementing the model, we replaced the mechanism that controls 
striatal inputs via dopaminergic channels with a general sigmoid saturation curve and 
we studied how parameters affect the channel disinhibition process. Qualitative and 
quantitative simulations showed that the exponential parameter υ was redundant 
because it did not display any novel property in relation to the inhibition, despite being 
neurobiologically justified. The only important parameters that affect the model 
significantly are βstr and αstr. The model was then extended to five channels and we 
showed how the model naturally scales to a different number of channels without the 
need for changing parameters. 
 
Finally, we briefly ventured into what may be called 'learning' aspect of the model, 
showing that a differential manipulation of the βstr parameters allows the transition from 
a complete disinhibition of the channel, to a hard-switch, then to a soft-switch 
behaviour, and finally to a complete channel inhibition. This will be relevant in future 
chapters, when we will explore the relationship between dopamine control, action 
selection, and learning. 
 
The model is now ready to be implemented in a larger scale circuit, namely the 
corticothalamic loop, with the final purpose of simulating at significant aspects of 
higher order cognition. Therefore, in the next chapter this model of the basal ganglia 
will be embedded in a corticothalamic loop with three channels, and we will see for the 
first time a distinction between striatal processes and cortical processes, which was not 
present in this chapter. From the next chapter onwards we will exclusively employ the 
Matlab™ code equivalent to run each model, instead of the more cumbersome 
Simulink™ processes.   
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Simulation of corticothalamic loop 
 
 Abstract 
This chapter embeds the extended basal ganglia model presented in the previous in a 
corticothalamic loop. For the first time we introduce a differentiation between the basal 
ganglia units and the cortical units, in an attempt to simulate frontostriatal connections. 
The model is characterised as a loop since the cortical units receive an external signal, 
but also an additional one from the basal ganglia units that project back to that unit. We 
build a three-channel loop and study how basal ganglia parameters affect action 
selection, how reaction times distributions are produced, and how they relate to the ex-
Gaussian distribution. We discuss the role of dopamine in the circuit and possible 
extensions of the model. 
 
 Introduction 
As we examined in more detail, in the brain there are at least three of the corticostriatal 
loops that have been identified: motor, associative, and limbic (Fig. 3.1). These loops 
seem to be organised in a parallel fashion, with a remarkable degree of segregation 
among pathways (Purves et al., 2008), although a slight degree of overlap across all the 
basal ganglia nuclei is possible. In this chapter we aim to build a computational model 
of three corticostriatal loops bearing in mind these neuroanatomical constraints.  
 
In the brain, sensorimotor areas, including motor, sensory and parietal cortices, project 
into the putamen, which is located lateral to the caudate nucleus. The fibres then 
maintain their segregation into the lateral globus pallidus and then project onto the 
ventrolateral and anteroventral (VL and VA) nuclei of the thalamus, where they are 
relayed back to cortex. Associative areas such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC) but also the temporal and parietal association cortices project onto the anterior 
caudate and the medial putamen, and then they are relayed back to cortex via the 
anteroventral (VA) and mediodorsal (MD) nuclei of the thalamus. Hippocampus, 
amygdala, orbitofrontal (OFC) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), known as the 
limbic and paralimbic cortices, project onto the ventral striatum (pallidus and caudate, 
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part of the nucleus accumbens) and they are sent back to the cortex via the mediodorsal 
(MD) nucleus of the thalamus. Computationally, this can be realised by creating a set of 
cortical units that project into basal ganglia units, then thalamic units, and then back to 
the same cortical units.  
 
At this point a question regarding the meaning of the signal that individual units process 
can be asked. The firing rate of pools of neurons that process the same information is a 
possible answer but a more psychologically oriented term is salience (Gonzalez et al., 
2000). The relationship between firing rate and salience is unclear but attempts to link 
the two in a more rigorous fashion have been made (Humphries et al., 2006). Salience is 
computed from perceptual and motivational sub-system, that resembles top-down and 
bottom-up influences to the schemas in the Contention Scheduling framework (Norman 
& Shallice, 1986). The model presented in this chapter contains three main overarching 
structures: cortex, basal ganglia and thalamus: the first component can assume various 
“meanings” and for the purpose of the simulations in this chapter they can mean any 
action or thought, at any level of a hierarchy. However, in the following chapters an 
explicit association between motor/cognitive schemas and computational 
implementation in the cortical tissue will be made.  
 
In the present architecture, the purpose of the basal ganglia will be to facilitate or 
resolve the competition among the various channels that are part of the same 
corticothalamic loop (Alexander et al., 1986). The focus is on corticobasal circuits 
(cortex – basal ganglia – thalamus) – nothing will be said about the absence of other 
brain structures such as cerebellum and amygdala. The information processing 
happening in those circuits is known to influence cognitive control (Etkin et al., 2006; 
Middleton & Strick, 2000) and should not be neglected, in principle. However, for the 
present purposes, this computation can be ignored. The architecture of the present 
model leaves room for additional signal processing, where structures can mutually bias 
each other, resulting in theoretically justifiable differences in simulated 
neuropsychological data.  
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Fig. 3.1 Different cortico-strio-thalamic loops. From Aronson, Katnani, and Eskandar 
(2014) 
 
 Model description 
3.3.1 Introduction 
Here, we show an extension of the model presented in the previous chapter, embedded 
in a corticothalamic loop for three channels. A cortical unit processes both external 
input and a looped signal from the thalamus. Signals are processed by the basal ganglia 
unit, which perform a computation across all the other channels, to inhibit the less 
salient ones. Cortical units are isolated from the other cortical units, but at this stage a 
mild self-inhibition is applied as well. This should simulate the decay of working 
memory in neural circuits, where the signal is reverberated. The thalamus applies the 
inhibition computed by the basal ganglia back to the cortical channel (Fig. 3.2) 
 
At present, the model does not have any learning capabilities, but gives room for 
implementing them in the future in the form of simple reinforcement learning algorithm 
modulated by dopamine signals, as we will see in future chapters. So each state of the 
model depends on the current and the immediately previous one but not on the history 
of its responses to input and output signals. 
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Fig. 3.2 Schematic of the corticothalamic circuit 
 
3.3.2 Computation in the cortical units 
Computation in the cortex is described below. Letter ui  represent the input of the 
channel i and letter oi represents the output of the channel i. If time is not indicated, the 
function is calculated at the current time t. The letter oext,i represents the external signal 
applied to the cortical unit (and it can be considered an output from an external source), 
while othal,i  represents the external feedback signal from the thalamus. The fixed 
parameter ∂ is used to simulate discrete integration of the signal, and it should not be 
confused with the partial derivative sign. The parameters used for the sigmoid function 
σ (defined in paragraph 2.5, with υ = 1) in the cortex are αctx and βctx. The symbol ⟸ 
indicates an assignment of value. The meaning and the value of the constants are plotted 
in Table 3.1. 
 
ui ⟸ ∑wi,juj
j
+ oext,i + othal,i 
 
ai(t) ⇐ ∂ ∙ ai(t − 1) + (1 − ∂)ui(t − 1) 
 
oi ⟸ σ (ai) 
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3.3.3 Computation in the basal ganglia units 
Computation in the Basal Ganglia (BG) is more detailed than that outlined in the 
previous chapter. Drawing from the previous simulations, the joint activity of the basal 
ganglia nuclei register the activity in all the channels and suppress the activation of 
most of them, leaving just one or a few to “win the competition”. In the present model, 
computation happens in the caudate and putamen (str subscript), the subthalamic 
nucleus (stn subscript), the globus pallidus external segment (gpe subscript) and the 
globus pallidus internal segment (gpi subscript). As in the Gurney et al. (2001) model, 
the basal ganglia resolve competition between channels. However, unlike in Gurney et 
al. (2001), the loop signal is fed back to the cortex and units do not process the signal 
linearly, but through saturation functions. Parameters in these saturation curves in 
cortical and striatal units can be independently manipulated to achieve a dynamic 
channel selection. The parameters used for the sigmoid function in the cortex are αstr 
and βstr  for the striatum, αstn and βstn  for the subthalamic nuclei, αgpe and βgpe  for the 
globus pallidus (external segment), and αgpi and βgpi  for the globus pallidus (internal 
segment). All the unit ai are initialised at a null value. 
 
Striatum (D1) 
 
ui ⟸ octx,i 
 
ai(t) ⇐ ∂ ∙ ai(t − 1) + (1 − ∂)ui(t − 1) 
 
oi ⟸ σ(ai) 
 
Striatum (D2) 
 
ui ⟸ octx,i 
 
ai(t) ⇐ ∂ ∙ ai(t − 1) + (1 − ∂)ui(t − 1) 
 
oi ⟸ σ(astrD2,i) 
 
 
Subthalamic nucleus 
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ustn,i(t) ⟸ wstnoctx,i + wgpe_stnogpe,i (t − 1) 
 
astn,i(t) ⇐ ∂ ∙ astn,i(t − 1) + (1 − ∂)ustn,i(t − 1) 
 
ostn,i ⟸ σ (astn,i) 
 
Globus Pallidus External Segment 
 
ugpe,i ⟸ wstn_gpe∑ostn,i 
i
+ wstrD2_gpeostrD2,i  
 
agpe,i(t) ⇐ ∂ ∙ agpe,i(t − 1) + (1 − ∂)ugpe,i(t − 1) 
 
ogpe,i ⟸ σ (agpe,i) 
 
Globus Pallidus Internal Segment  
 
ugpi,i(t) ⟸ wstn_gpi∑ostn,i 
i
+ wgpe_gpiogpe,i (t − 1) + wstrD1_gpiostrD1,i (t − 1) 
 
agpi,i(t) ⇐ ∂ ∙ agpi,i(t − 1) + (1 − ∂)ugpi,i(t − 1) 
 
ogpi,i ⟸ σ (agpi,i) 
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3.3.4 Computation in the thalamic units 
Computation in the thalamus (thal subscript) is very elementary. Despite the thalamus 
being a subcortical structure with a wide range of electrophysiological data (Sherman & 
Guillery, 2006), its computation is thought to be fairly simple, at least when it has the 
functional role of relaying cortical signals. Although the thalamus is tonically active and 
its disinhibition increases channel activity, here the thalamus acts as a direct signal 
suppressor. This is computationally equivalent to having a constant excitation from the 
thalamus suppressed by the globus pallidus, if the thalamus does not receive any other 
external excitation. As a whole, a corticothalamic loop suppresses the salience of a 
signal as a function of how many signals there are, what signal gained importance 
earlier (early comers tend to win, all other things being equal) and the striatal saturation 
threshold (βstr) of the channel. (Low βstr facilitates selection and high βstr facilitates 
suppression.)  
 
ui ⟸ ogpi,i 
ai(t) ⇐ ∂ ∙ ai(t − 1) + (1 − ∂)ui(t − 1) 
oi ⟸−σ (ai) 
 
 
Table 3.1Model parameters 
Symbol Value Meaning 
𝛛 0.6 Integration constant, acting as a low-pass filter 
𝛂𝐬𝐭𝐫 4 Slope sat. func. in the striatum 
𝛃𝐬𝐭𝐫 0.5 Threshold sat. func in the striatum 
𝛂𝐬𝐭𝐧 5 Slope sat. func in the subthalamic n. 
𝛃𝐬𝐭𝐧 0.3 Threshold sat. func in the subthalamic n. 
𝛂𝐭𝐡𝐚𝐥 6 Slope sat. func in the thalamic n. 
𝛃𝐭𝐡𝐚𝐥 0.4 Threshold sat. func in the thalamic n. 
𝛂𝐠𝐩𝐞 5 Slope sat. func in the globus pallidus (ext. seg.) 
𝛃𝐠𝐩𝐞 0.2 Threshold sat. func in the globus pallidus (ext. seg.) 
𝛂𝐠𝐩𝐢 5 Slope sat. func in the globus pallidus (int. seg.) 
𝛃𝐠𝐩𝐢 0.2 Threshold sat. func in the globus pallidus (int. seg.) 
𝛂𝐜𝐭𝐱 8 Slope sat. func. in the cortex 
𝛃𝐜𝐭𝐱 0.5 Threshold sat. func. in the cortex 
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𝐰𝐠𝐩𝐞_𝐠𝐩𝐢 -0.3 Fixed weight from globus pallidus ext. to int. 
𝐰𝐬𝐭𝐫𝐃𝟏_𝐠𝐩𝐢 -1 Fixed weight from striatum D1 to int. pallidus 
𝐰𝐬𝐭𝐫𝐃𝟐_𝐠𝐩𝐞 -1 Fixed weight from striatum D2 to ext. pallidus 
𝐰𝐬𝐭𝐧 1 Fixed weight from cortex to subthalamic n. 
𝐰𝐬𝐭𝐧_𝐠𝐩𝐢 0.9 Fixed weight from subthalamic n. to int. pallidus 
𝐰𝐠𝐩𝐞_𝐬𝐭𝐧 -1 Fixed weight from ext. pallidus to subthalamic n. 
𝐰𝐬𝐭𝐧_𝐠𝐩𝐞 0.9 Fixed weight from subthalamic n. to ext. pallidus 
𝐰𝐬𝐦𝐚,𝐢,𝐣 
-0.2 for i = j 
0 for i ≠ j 
Fixed weight from cortex to cortex (here a mild 
auto-inhibition is implemented) 
 
 Simulations 
3.4.1 Introduction and Methods 
After introducing the details of the model, we run a simulation of an individual 
corticothalamic loop with three channels. All the channels receive an external signal, 
which is meant to originate from other adjacent cortical or associated subcortical 
structures, or directly from the representation of the environment in the more primary 
cortices. Channels are isolated from each other in the cortical and thalamic units, but 
their inputs converge in the basal ganglia circuit, as schematically shown in Fig. 3.2. 
The purpose of these simulations is to determine the qualitative behaviour of the model 
and to examine whether the theoretical intuitions behind the parameters explored in the 
previous model still hold.  
 
3.4.2 Results 
Figs. 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 show the output (octx,i) of three channels following external 
excitation (red dashed line) with three different βstr. All three channels have the same 
βstr = 0, 0.5, 1.5, respectively. External excitation (oext,i) increases stepwise and takes 
on values 0.5, 0.7, 0.9, and 1 at different times. Irrespective of the power of external 
excitation, channels that have already a level of excitation tend to remain excited (as 
visible in Fig. 3.4). While the relative value of βstr between the channel is important to 
decide which channels will be more likely to be selected, its absolute value also 
determines how channels become sensitive or insensitive to the input from cortical 
units. Low absolute values of βstr for all channels allows multiple channels to be active 
simultaneously provided that their input is powerful enough. Thus, this constitutes a 
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suboptimal mechanism. High absolute values of βstr for all channels produce a scaled-
down version of the channel, suppressing all the channel outputs equally. This also 
constitutes a suboptimal mechanism.  
 
 
Fig. 3.3 Simulation of the activation of three channels, given a varying external signal 
(red dashed lines). Parameter βstr is set to 0 for all the three channels. Time Units is on 
the X-axis and Activation value is on the Y axis. All the other variables are fixed as 
above. Pink areas highlight values of cortical excitation above 0.5. Note that picking 
this value of threshold allow multiple channels to be active simultaneously if their input 
is powerful enough, failing to do what is required by the circuit. 
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Fig. 3.4 Simulation of the activation of three channels, given a varying external signal 
(red dashed lines). Parameter βstr is set to 0.5 for all the three channels. Time Units is on 
the X-axis and Activation value is on the Y axis. All the other variables are fixed as 
above. Pink areas highlight values of cortical excitation above 0.5. This value of βstr is 
optimal for the required computation. 
 
 
Fig. 3.5 Simulation of the activation of three channels, given a varying external signal 
(red dashed lines). Parameter βstr is set to 1.5 for all the three channels. Time Units is on 
the X-axis and Activation value is on the Y axis. All the other variables are fixed as 
above. Pink areas highlight values of cortical excitation above 0.5. The red dashed line 
represents the external signal. Note that in this case the output of the channel is almost a 
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scaled down version of the input, without much interaction between the channels. In 
other words, picking a high threshold for the basal ganglia saturation function only 
depresses the output. Note that picking this value of threshold allow multiple channels 
to be active simultaneously if their input is powerful enough and it is fed to the channels 
at the same time, failing to do what is required by the computation. 
 
In order to study further this behaviour, we vary βstr for all three channels and plot the 
absolute difference between the external excitation to the cortical units and the cortical 
activation (|octx − oext|)  averaged across all three channels, keeping all the other 
parameters (Table 3.1) constant. Values below 0.1 have been trimmed by the mean, to 
avoid cluttering up the plot. This difference increases monotonically (top Fig. 3.6), 
displaying a global inhibition effect of the basal ganglia, which decreases the cortical 
activation up to 20% of its original value. The standard deviation of this difference 
(bottom Fig. 3.6) shows a maximum at βstr = 0.5, indicating that around that value the 
basal ganglia units produce hard-switching between the channels. Systematically, the 
plot can be roughly subdivided in three continuous areas, each displaying smoothly 
changing behaviour. For βstr > 0.8 the difference between cortical activation and input is 
greater than 0.4. The output of an individual channel seems to be poorly sensitive to the 
input to the other channels. In other words, the cortical activation looks like an 
attenuated version of the cortical input. Too high values of βstr correspond to an 
excessive activation of the basal ganglia, where all channel are equally depressed. For 
βstr < 0.3 cortical activation tends to match the input. In other words, outputs looks like 
the inputs for all channels. Too low values of βstr correspond to the inactivation of the 
basal ganglia (excessive disinhibition). For 0.3 < βstr  < 0.8 an optimum is reached (at 
βstr = 0.5), and the basal ganglia exerts its functional role of suppressing the inputs of 
the other channels. It is important to notice that the suppression is only partial here, 
since all the channels have the same βstr. The maximum of the standard deviation in Fig. 
3.6 (bottom) indicates that signals almost match their cortical input when a threshold is 
reached, while the other signals are almost totally suppressed. This is all consistent with 
the previous qualitative observations.  
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Fig. 3.6 Plot of the mean difference (top) and the standard deviation (bottom) between 
cortical activation and external signal (|octx − oext|), against βstr.  
 
This existence of an optimal value (or range) of βstr, which can be interpreted as the 
external dopamine signal, is consistent with the inverted-U correlation between 
concentration of dopamine and working memory performance (Cools & D’Esposito, 
2011), albeit the phenomenon is usually referred to the prefrontal cortex and not the 
basal ganglia functions. 
 
Fig. 3.7 shows the plot of the threshold of the cortical saturation function βctx against 
|octx − oext| for the same cortical input used in Fig. 3.3 - 3.5, averaged across time . As 
expected, decreasing βctx in all channels yields to a gradual overall disinhibition, 
irrespective of the input to channel. The oscillating value of mean and standard 
deviation for the difference is due to the combined effect of mutual inhibition exerted 
by the basal ganglia and the presence of the absolute value of the difference. The impact 
of decreasing βctx is by and large an overall disinhibiting effect. Since βctx appears to 
have an optimal value too, it is possible to interpret the βctx parameter as related to the 
dopamine in the cortical circuits.  
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Fig. 3.7 Plot of the mean difference (top) and the standard deviation (bottom) between 
cortical activation and external signal (|octx − oext|) against βctx. 
 
3.4.3 Discussion 
Although the model built and analysed in the chapter is not yet embedded in a cognitive 
model and the conclusions are therefore limited to the current arrangement, it appears 
that under this theoretical framework there exists an optimum range of values for the 
threshold of the saturation function (βstr) in the striatum units, where the basal ganglia 
units perform their function optimally. Outside this range, channels behave either 
independently of each other or seem to be increasingly sensitive only to their individual 
inputs. This is consistent with what has been observed in the previous chapter when 
channels were not embedded in a corticothalamic loop. Similarly, manipulation of βctx 
exerts inhibitory and excitatory effect on the channels. Ultimately, the effect on cortical 
output depends on the interaction between these two thresholds (βstr and βctx). 
 
A substantial difference with the previous model of the basal ganglia alone is the 
presence of a compensatory effect. If, for instance, a channel decreases its output, basal 
ganglia activity will decrease too, facilitating channel disinhibition. How this effect will 
translate on simulations of cognitive tasks will depend on the system architecture, that is 
to say, how the channels are arranged. 
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 Reaction time distributions analysis 
We analyse now how the equivalent of dopamine depletion in the basal ganglia units 
qualitatively affects how signals are processed and, before using individual channels to 
simulate a specific psychological task, investigate the shape of the distributions of 
reaction times (RT) in relation to the dopamine signalling in the basal ganglia. This will 
serve to draw comparisons between more simple processes (stimulus-response) and 
emergent ones, and to identify, more specifically, how the computational labour 
between prefrontal cortex and basal ganglia is divided. 
 
We ran the current model of corticothalamic loop as described above, but instead of 
using step functions as inputs, we feed all six cortical units with random uniform noise 
between 0 and 0.5: 
 
𝑜𝑖  ~ 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚(0, .5) 
 
A randomly chosen cortical unit was then chosen to be the 'correct one', and its βctx is set 
to 0.4 from the original value of 0.5, while the βctx of the other cortical units is left to 
0.5. The random input was then integrated over time with a threshold of θd = 9. In other 
words, the channel whose area under the activation curve first exceed θd was selected 
and the associated RT registered. In this respect, this system is an accumulator where 
continuous evidence is accumulated in a continuous time-scale. This can be extended to 
multiple channels (see also Smith & Ratcliff, 2004). If the selected channel was the one 
with the lower βctx the choice was considered accurate. An example of resulting RT 
distribution is shown in Fig. 3.8. 
 
 
Fig. 3.8 Instance of a histogram of the response time  
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One of the most common distributions used to fit data from reaction times is the 
Exponential Gaussian distribution, also known as ex-Gaussian, that results from the 
convolution of a normal and an exponential distribution. The distribution is described 
by three parameters, the mean μ, the standard deviation σ, and τ, commonly associated 
to the shape of the tail.  
 
Fits were evaluated with a MATLAB™ function as outlined in Lacouture and Cousineau 
(2008). An ordinary maximum likelihood method (MLE) was used, whereby the 
opposite of a log-likelihood function is minimised as a function of the three parameters 
μ, σ, and τ. Since the parameter space can become sizable, a Simplex algorithm was 
used to minimise this quantity. This algorithm determines the direction of change for 
the parameters by calculating the steepest gradient of the negative log-likelihood and it 
terminates the search when a stopping criterion is met. The log-likelihood is generally a 
continuous and smooth function and this allows the algorithm to find a minimum. 
However, the parameter search can get stuck in local minimum. A way to prevent this 
from happening is to start the parameter search from a reasonable starting value, like μ 
as the mean of the data minus the skewness, τ as 80% of the standard deviation of the 
data, and σ2 as the variance of the data minus the τ2. Notice that these starting points are 
more meaningful for a positively skewed distribution, which is consistent with the 
shape of reaction times distributions. 
 
The ex-Gaussian was chosen not only for the good fit obtained, but for its more intuitive 
psychological properties and the considerable amount of prior research. Although the 
relationship between decision-making cognitive processes and parameters of this 
distribution is controversial (Matzke & Wagenmakers, 2009), a number of authors tend 
to interpret the μ parameter as being more related to stimulus properties and the τ 
parameter as being more related to higher cognitive functions (with the exception of 
Penner-Wilger, Leth-Steensen, & Lefevre, 2002, who argue that parameter μ is linked 
to retrieval processes). These characterisations are often vague because they attempt to 
capture general properties of these parameters without situating them in the context of a 
task. This model can, in principle, be extended from perceptual reaction times to 
response times that require more layers of cognitive operations, and this is not true for 
random walk models, which have been mostly studied for two forced choice rapid 
decision makings (Smith & Ratcliff, 2004) 
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The random input is the psychological equivalent of a noisy top-down influence, 
whereas the βctx represents a bias for an individual more salient stimulus. Since noise 
variance does not seem to change the qualitative trends of parameters, psychologically 
noise can be considered as representing an environment where stimuli saliences are 
fluctuating. This simulated process is meant to represent simple stimulus-driven 
responses.  The model can produce a reaction time (RT) distribution and a 
correct/incorrect response. Keeping all the other parameters fixed and changing either 
βstr or αstr of all channels yield results shown in Fig. 3.9 and Fig. 3.10, respectively.   
 
 
Fig. 3.9 βstr against each ex-Gaussian parameter, simulated for 20 participants across 25 
values of βstr 
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Fig. 3.10 αstr  against each ex-Gaussian parameter and accuracy, simulated for 20 
participants across 25 values of αstr 
 
All the values were normalised by dividing the values by the maximum value and 
multiplying by 100, so it is possible to appreciate the magnitude of change in the 
dependent variable instead of the absolute values. An increase in the βstr value from 0 to 
1.5 increases the μ up to approximately 30%, increases the σ parameter to a greater 
extent (approximately 50%) and a produces a reversed U-shaped effect for τ, altering up 
to 40% of the maximum value, and peaking at around 0.6. Accuracy behaves in a 
similar way, although the range is much smaller (approximately 15%), and it peaks 
around 0.5. A different picture was produced when αstr is varied from 2 to 20, with μ, σ, 
and accuracy decreasing by approximately 20%, 40% and 25%, respectively. Parameter 
τ increased by approximately 50% of the maximum value. 
 
As we observed in the previous simulations, higher values of βstr for all the channels 
produce a scaled-down version of the channel input, and lower values of βstr produce 
excessive disinhibition. However, here one specific channel’s βctx is lowered to allow 
one channel to prevail over the others. This indicates that when a channel is slightly 
more likely to be selected by design, there is a suboptimal value for βstr, but that value is 
still above the 33% that one would expect by chance, given the presence of three 
channels.  In other words, a lower value for accuracy corresponds to a higher degree of 
exploration of other channels. Importantly, no reward mechanism has been introduced 
in the circuit yet, in that if the correct channel is selected there is no subsequent 
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alteration in the saturation function. All these results are quite robust to the variation of 
other parameters in the model, excluded the manipulation of the accumulation 
threshold, which reduces the accuracy but leaves the qualitative shape of the ex-
Gaussian parameters unchanged. 
 
These simulation results confirm several important empirical results with respect to 
Parkinson’s disease pathology. First, increasing βstr increases the reaction time (higher 
μ) and also increases the width of the RT distribution (higher σ). This is consistent with 
the slowing and increased inter-trial variability of reaction times in Parkinson’s disease 
(Burton et al., 2006). The change in τ parameter value may appear baffling at first, but it 
indicates that the reaction time curve would not simply shift in case of basal ganglia 
malfunction, but it would be squashed to the right. Decisions would be, in other words, 
slower, more variable, but without the presence of attentional lapses. This can be 
experimentally verified by observing how basal ganglia pathology alters reaction times 
in purely perceptual tasks where top-down influence is minimised. To our knowledge 
no research has addressed such issues. Furthermore, the decrease in accuracy suggests a 
lesser degree of exploratory behaviour, although these results have to be interpreted 
with caution due to the absence of a reward system that reinforces correct actions.  
 
 Discussion and Summary 
3.6.1 The role of dopamine 
We saw in the previous chapter that dopamine in the striatum is associated with the 
modulation of the βstr parameter (threshold of activation function). We also saw that 
manipulating αstr in the striatum (slope of the activation function) had a similar but more 
gradual effect on channel inhibition. Findings in this chapter confirmed this to be case 
also in a corticothalamic loop. What is the relationship between dopamine and the 
processes we simulated in this chapter? Since phasic dopamine burst are usually 
associated with either learning or salience (more specifically stimuli detection, 
identification and valuation; for an integrative overview see Schultz, 2016), it is 
reasonable to associate βstr alteration for all channels to tonic dopamine action. 
Neuronal tonic firing refers, as we have already mentioned, to a dopaminergic 
background activity of 4-10 Hz that, unlike the phasic firing, is not related to any event, 
but it is thought to affect movement, motivation and attentional processes by regulating 
postsynaptic neuron activity in a slow timescale. Models involving manipulation of 
tonic dopamine are then compatible with the proficient phase (Gurney et al., 2001) as 
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opposed as the learning phase. However, decoupling these two might even at the level 
of one three-channel corticothalamic loop be challenging. Hamid et al. (2016), for 
instance, claim that the distinction between 'phasic' and 'tonic' action is spurious, and 
that mesolimbic dopamine signals represent a real-time estimate of future reward that 
animals use to calculate whether to work towards this reward (motivation). Reward 
prediction error would be coded in tandem with motivational signals to influence future 
and current behaviour. The parameter βstr is suitable for representing these processes 
because it can be altered by the same amount in all channels, by a different amount in 
one channel, or by an opposite amount in different channels so that the individual value 
of each channel is altered, but so is the average value of all the channels (if there are 
more than two channels). Notice that equally valid conclusions can be drawn for αstr and 
although the two parameters are not interchangeable, they might compute similar 
processes at different timescales. To complicate things even further, one should take 
into account dopamine activity in the prefrontal structures or, more generally, in 
neocortical areas. These processes are compatible with the modulation operated by βctx. 
This parameter simply biases a schema for selection. Equally, a parameter like αctx, that 
has not been examined in detail, might compute similar processes at different 
timescales.  
 
All these considerations lays the groundwork for the next chapters, where we will 
extend the corticostriatal loop framework in a structure that simulates a cognitive task, 
and examine to what extent the reasoning behind the meaning of the corticothalamic 
loop parameters extends to a bigger structure. In this thesis, the timeframe where 
cognitive operations occur is limited to seconds and minutes, and so we assume that 
there is no long-term change in learning. We focus therefore on on-line cognitive 
control. However, it is known that dopamine influences long-term plasticity (Otani et 
al., 2003) and this could potentially bear on the strength of association between cortical 
schemas.  
3.6.2 Extension to the model 
The model is structured in a way that allows several extensions to be appended and this 
can serve as an introduction for the additional features that will be added in future 
chapters. The first one has to do with the communication signals from cortical units to 
other cortical units, or even between sets of cortical units. Neuroanatomically, many 
connections between cortices are not mediated by the basal ganglia: layers I and III of 
the cortex receive projection from layers III across the two hemispheres, and layer IV 
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(present only in granular or dysgranular cortex) receives projections from the same 
hemispheres. In terms of cognition, learnt sensory and motor representations could shift 
from corticostriatal circuitry to corticocortical circuitry, without the mediation of the 
basal ganglia (Ashby et al., 2007). This implies a more automatic and faster 
actualisation of a motor schema following a sensory stimulus (habit formation) and the 
subsequent reduction of dopamine modulation from the substantia nigra pars compacta 
(SNpc). This can be computationally realised by letting cortical units communicate with 
each other and allowing increased communication of the signal by means of increased 
weights. This would result in partially bypassing basal ganglia operations. 
 
A second extension, stemming directly from the first, is related to the different 
hierarchies in the cortices that progress anteriorly to form more complex representations 
in the brain (Badre & D’Esposito, 2017). This hierarchy is believed to be reflected in 
the basal ganglia loops we have examined so far (McHaffie et al., 2005), where each 
loop would control different sets of cortical units separately. Lehericy et al. (2005), for 
instance, found that the associative basal ganglia structures are more active in early 
learning while the sensorimotor structures are more active in advanced learning of a 
motor task. This indicates that different loops are differentially involved in various 
stages of learning, and that the basal ganglia mediate structures for all the loops. 
Although the nigrostriatal pathway from the SNpc seems to be less involved in habitual 
actions (Wickens et al., 2007), the ventral tegmental area (VTA) projects onto the 
limbic system via the mesolimbic projections and onto the prefrontal areas via the 
mesocortical projections, and it might exert direct control on those structures (Miller, 
2000). This anatomical arrangement can be computationally realised by designing more 
than one layer of cortical units which, in turn, send signal to a segregated pathway to the 
basal ganglia and then feed back to the cortical units again. This type of structure will 
be utilised in the next chapter with the simulation of a cognitive task where 
corticothalamic loops are segregated in a hierarchical fashion, but a signal is also sent 
downstream from the higher order cortical units. 
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Modelling the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test 
with the Extended Schema Theory 
 
 Abstract 
In this chapter we present a model of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (WCST) where 
competition between motor and cognitive schemas is resolved using a variation of a 
neuroanatomically detailed model of the basal ganglia. We then use a genetic algorithm 
to search the model’s parameter space and obtain a good fit for the data.  
We proceed to show the relationship between dependent variables and threshold 
parameters, in order to observe how a theoretically justified alteration of parameters 
affect performance and whether this reflects empirical results.  
We then show that further analysis of correlations between error types, however, 
suggests the need to model participant data at a more fine-grained level. Yet for reasons 
of computational efficiency this is impractical and it is unclear how advantageous this 
type of analysis can be as opposed to the group clustering. We therefore cluster 
participant performance into five distinct groups and run separate genetic algorithms to 
fit the groups individually. The final results capture both group performance and 
correlations between error types across individuals. Model fits for individual groups are 
also analysed with bootstrapping sampling techniques. 
 
 Model description 
The corticothalamic loop analysed in the previous chapters will be now implemented in 
a meaningful cognitive structure, to perform a specific cognitive task, the Wisconsin 
Card Sorting Test. Here, the most important and most delicate assumption is to set the 
equivalence between a channel and a schema.  The definition of channel has been 
explored in the previous chapter as a segregated signal flow. In this section we assume 
that these channels can be interpreted as specific schemas that control specific rules of 
action selection and the salience of a channel is simply equivalent to the activation 
value of the corresponding schema. 
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Schema theory is a framework based on the idea that behaviour in many areas depends 
on abstractions over instances, i.e., schemas (Northway, 1940). In these abstract terms, 
schema theory is very general and it has been applied in domains ranging, for example, 
from event memory (Bartlett, 1932) to motor control (Schmidt, 1976). Here, we refer 
more specifically to the Norman and Shallice (1980) version, which is applied in the 
domain of routine sequential action. Their theory proposes that action schemas work in 
a cooperative or sequential fashion, but also compete with each other for activation. 
Schemas can be organised into hierarchical, heterarchical or sequential patterns. While 
schema theory is helpful in representing functional interactions in the action-perception 
cycle, it is not committed to a specific neural implementation. However, at the neural 
level the basal ganglia have been proposed as a good candidate for resolving 
competition between schemas in order to carry out action selection (Redgrave et al., 
1999). In part this is because of their recurrent connections with the cortex. Schemas 
can be implemented in a variety of ways, ranging from neural network to production 
systems. From this chapter on, we will assume that cortical schemas represent 
abstraction of actions, while the basal ganglia computes values based on those 
representations and inhibits those cortical schemas in a centralised fashion (rather than 
relying on mutual schema inhibition).  
 
4.2.1 Task and model description 
In the WCST, participants are required to sort a series of cards into four categories 
based on binary (i.e., correct /incorrect) feedback. Each card shows one, two three or 
four shapes, printed in one of four colours, and there are four shapes (triangle, star, 
cross, circle). (Fig. 4.1) It is therefore possible to sort cards according to colour, number 
or shape. To succeed, participants must match each successive card with one of four 
target cards (One Red Triangle, Two Green Stars, Three Yellow Crosses, Four Blue 
Circles), and use the subsequent feedback to discover the appropriate rule, but once they 
have discovered the rule (as indicated by a succession of 10 correct sorts), the 
experimenter changes the rule without notice. The task yields a number of dependent 
measures, including the number of rules obtained (with a deck of 64 cards), the number 
of cards correctly sorted, the number of perseverative errors (where negative feedback is 
ignored) and the number of set-loss errors (i.e. responses where the participant fails to 
stick with a successful rule).  
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Fig. 4.1 Stimulus card in the bottom row has to be matched by the subject to one of the 
four cards above according to one changing rule 
 
The model comprises three cognitive schemas and four motor schemas (see Fig. 4.2). 
Cognitive schemas represent the selection rules (Sort by Colour, Sort by Number, Sort 
by Shape) while the four motor schemas represent the acts of putting the stimulus card 
below each of the four target cards. Each schema has an activation level that varies over 
time as a function of input from various sources. Cognitive schemas are fed by an 
external channel that changes by a fixed amount according to external positive/negative 
feedback. Motor schemas are fed by cognitive schemas, and this signal is rule-
dependent. If, for instance, the stimulus card displays three red circles, the shape 
schema will excite the fourth motor schema (Four Blue Circles), the number schema 
will excite the third motor schema (Three Yellow Crosses), and the colour schema will 
excite the first motor schema (One Red Triangle). Motor schemas are also fed by 
environmental cues depending on the stimulus card feature. Thus, when cognitive 
schemas are not strong enough to influence motor schemas, action selection may be 
driven by stimulus features only. This simple model is complemented by a mechanism 
that implements and resolves competition between schemas within each hierarchical 
level: cognitive and motor schemas feed into two parallel computational mechanisms 
that each return a signal in the form of inhibition to the individual channels at each level 
(see Fig. 4.2 for an illustration at the cognitive level). In the brain, this competition 
between schemas is thought to be carried out by the basal ganglia (Gurney et al., 2001). 
Corticobasal loops are mostly segregated (Alexander et al., 1986) and this is reflected in 
the model through the independence of information processed in the basal ganglia units 
at the two levels (cognitive and motor). The model also implements a rudimental 
learning mechanism. This consists in a fixed change in signal to the cognitive schemas 
following a reward. Its purpose is to analyse how baseline levels of signal influence 
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schema selection and ultimately, performance on the WCST. Manipulation of the 
thresholds of saturation functions in cortical units and associated basal ganglia units 
represents dopamine signalling in the cortex and in the basal ganglia, respectively. 
Therefore, the mechanism underlying cognitive control is a feedback-driven signal to 
the cognitive schemas. 
 
 
Fig. 4.2 Schematic of the cortical schemas, not showing competition between schemas. 
Cognitive schemas (top row) send signals to the motor schemas (bottom row) 
 
 
Fig. 4.3 Schematic of the competition between schemas. The basal ganglia units 
compute the amount of inhibition that each schema receives given the activation of the 
others. 
 
4.2.2 Computation 
The model consists of 7 cortical units, 3 of which control cognitive operations and 4 of 
which control motor operations (see Fig. 4.2). These units correspond to schemas. 
Cognitive and motor units send their signal to their respective striatal units (see Fig. 4.3) 
and in this chapter they are simply indicated with the sma (Supplementary Motor Area) 
subscript. Subthalamic units connect all units at the same hierarchical level (cognitive or 
motor), ensuring that the basal ganglia units act as a competitive suppressor of schemas 
as a function of the other schemas’ outputs. Individual units are connected as shown in 
Fig. 4.4. Their computations are shown below. In all cases, ui represents the entry signal 
to the unit, ai is the result of integration along the time domain. The parameter ∂ 
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represent the weight used to integrate the discrete function along this time domain. 
Lastly, oi represents the output of the individual units. The function σ computes the 
sigmoid function of the input, ensuring output values are bounded between 0 and 1. The 
analytic form of the sigmoid function is shown below.  
 
σ(x) =
1
1 + 𝑒−𝛼(𝑥−𝛽)
 
 
Parameter α  represent the slope of the sigmoid function and β is the threshold. These 
valus are not identical across all units and a subscript indicates the relevant unit. 
Varying the threshold of cortical or striatal units alters the way competition between 
units is carried out, and can be considered a function of tonic dopamine present in the 
circuit. In the previous chapters it has been shown that the level of external dopamine 
from the substantia nigra pars compacta (SNpc) unit can be simulated by varying the 
threshold of the saturation curve in the striatum (βstr), without making use of an 
additional unit. 
 
Feedback takes place after each trial. If the selected response is correct, the external 
signals oext,i to the cognitive units that correspond to the matched features are increased 
by a fixed amount bl. If the selected response is incorrect, inputs to those units that 
correspond to the matched features are decreased by a fixed amount bl. 
 
A schema is selected if three conditions are satisfied. First, the area below the activation 
curve of a schema must be greater than the 'area-threshold' θA. This ensure that schema 
selection mimics the accumulation-to-threshold  mechanism in the brain (Bogacz et al., 
2006). The other condition specifies that the current activation must be greater than a 
'decision-threshold' θS, usually set to 0.4. This prevents action selection when schemas 
are not active enough.  In addition, a cortical schema auto-excitation threshold (θT, set 
to 0.7), implemented with a step function h, that enables quicker schema selection. The 
use of three thresholds is purely for implementation purposes and it is not intended to 
account for reaction times. This schema selection is equivalent to the ‘race model’, 
where the evidence for each alternative is accumulated separately (Forstmann, Ratcliff 
& Wagenmakers, 2016). When one of the accumulators reaches a threshold (θA in this 
case, expressed as an area), the decision is made. This contrasts with the more studied 
‘drift diffusion model’, where the evidence would be represented by the difference 
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between the areas under the curve of the activation value across time. 
 
 
Fig. 4.4 Schematic of the basal ganglia. Legend: Cortex-Thalamic complex (CTX-
THAL), Striatum (STR), Subthalamic nucleus (STN), Globus Pallidus Internal/External 
Segment (GPi and GPe) 
 
Cortical (cognitive schema) 
 
ui ⟸ ∑wi,j ∙ uj
j
+ oext,i + othal,i + h(ui − θT) 
 
ai(t) ⇐ δ ∙ ai(t − 1) + (1 − δ) ∙ ui(t − 1) 
 
oi ⟸ σ (ai) 
 
 
Cortical (motor schema) 
 
ui ⟸ ∑wi,j ∙ uj
j
+ wcogocog,i +wenvoenv,i + othal,i + h(ui − θT) 
 
ai(t) ⇐ δ ∙ ai(t − 1) + (1 − δ) ∙ ui(t − 1) 
 
oi ⟸ σ (ai) 
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Striatum (StrD1) 
 
ui ⟸ osma,i 
 
ai(t) ⇐ δ ∙ ai(t − 1) + (1 − δ) ∙ ui(t − 1) 
 
oi ⟸ σ(ai) 
 
 
Striatum (StrD2) 
 
ui ⟸ osma,i 
 
ai(t) ⇐ δ ∙ ai(t − 1) + (1 − δ) ∙ ui(t − 1) 
 
oi ⟸ σ(astrD2,i) 
 
  
Subthalamic nucleus (STN) 
 
ustn,i(t) ⟸ wstn ∙ osma,i + wgpe_stn ∙ ogpe,i (t − 1) 
 
astn,i(t) ⇐ δ ∙ astn,i(t − 1) + (1 − δ) ∙ ustn,i(t − 1) 
 
ostn,i ⟸ σ (astn,i) 
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Globus Pallidus External Segment (GPe) 
 
ugpe,i ⟸ wstn_gpe∑ostn,i 
i
+ wstrD2_gpe ∙ ostrD2,i  
 
agpe,i(t) ⇐ δ ∙ agpe,i(t − 1) + (1 − δ) ∙ ugpe,i(t − 1) 
 
ogpe,i ⟸ σ (agpe,i) 
 
 
Globus Pallidus Internal Segment (GPi) 
 
ugpi,i(t) ⟸ wstn_gpi∑ostn,i 
i
+ wgpe_gpi ∙ ogpe,i (t − 1) + wstrD1_gpi ∙ ostrD1,i (t − 1) 
 
agpi,i(t) ⇐ δ ∙ agpi,i(t − 1) + (1 − δ)u ∙gpi,i (t − 1) 
 
ogpi,i ⟸ σ (agpi,i) 
 
 
Thalamus (Thal) 
 
ui ⟸ ogpi,i 
 
ai(t) ⇐ δ ∙ ai(t − 1) + (1 − δ) ∙ ui(t − 1) 
 
oi ⟸−σ (ai) 
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 Simulation 
4.3.1 Introduction 
To simulate the WCST, a virtual deck of 64 cards is produced, shuffled and presented to 
the model. All the units perform the computation outlined in the previous section. The 
first motor unit to reach a threshold (as described in the previous section) is selected. 
After the selection and feedback, a new card is presented. The resulting plot for 
activation of the cognitive units is shown in Fig. 4.5. As can be seen in the figure, when 
the first card is presented the system must work out that "colour" is the first correct 
sorting criterion. Feedback alone is not sufficient, as the selected card may match more 
than one feature. Basal ganglia units intervene by suppressing the inappropriate 
cognitive schemas, enabling the correct schema to be permanently selected. When the 
sorting criterion changes (after 10 correct responses) the system tends to perseverate for 
a short period of time, before selecting the correct criterion again. Feedback-dependent 
external activation and resolution of competition both play a role in activating the 
correct cognitive schemas. Whereas the activation of cognitive schemas is regulated by 
feedback, the activation of motor schemas is regulated by cognitive schemas and 
environmental cues. 
 
4.3.2 Parameters 
The model has a number of parameters whose values are shown in Table 4.1 
 
Table 4.1 Model Parameters 
Symbol Value Meaning 
𝛅 0.6 Integration constant, acting as a low-pass filter 
𝛂𝐬𝐭𝐫 4 Slope sat. func. in the striatum 
𝛃𝐬𝐭𝐫 0.5 Threshold sat. func in the striatum 
𝛂𝐬𝐭𝐧 5 Slope sat. func in the subthalamic n. 
𝛃𝐬𝐭𝐧 0.3 Threshold sat. func in the subthalamic n. 
𝛂𝐭𝐡𝐚𝐥 6 Slope sat. func in the thalamic n. 
𝛃𝐭𝐡𝐚𝐥 0.4 Threshold sat. func in the thalamic n. 
𝛂𝐠𝐩𝐞 5 Slope sat. func in the globus pallidus (ext. seg.) 
𝛃𝐠𝐩𝐞 0.2 Threshold sat. func in the globus pallidus (ext. 
seg.) 
𝛂𝐠𝐩𝐢 5 Slope sat. func in the globus pallidus (int. seg.) 
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𝛃𝐠𝐩𝐢 0.2 Threshold sat. func in the globus pallidus (int. 
seg.) 
𝛂𝐬𝐦𝐚 8 Slope sat. func. in the supplementary mot. cort. 
𝛃𝐬𝐦𝐚 0.5 Threshold sat. func. in the supplementary mot. 
cort. 
𝐰𝐠𝐩𝐞_𝐠𝐩𝐢 -0.3 Fixed weight from globus pallidus ext. to int. 
𝐰𝐬𝐭𝐫𝐃𝟏_𝐠𝐩𝐢 -1 Fixed weight from striatum D1 to int. pallidus 
𝐰𝐬𝐭𝐫𝐃𝟐_𝐠𝐩𝐞 -1 Fixed weight from striatum D2 to ext. pallidus 
𝐰𝐬𝐭𝐧 1 Fixed weight from cortex to subthalamic n. 
𝐰𝐬𝐭𝐧_𝐠𝐩𝐢 0.9 Fixed weight from subthalamic n. to int. pallidus 
𝐰𝐠𝐩𝐞_𝐬𝐭𝐧 -1 Fixed weight from ext. pallidus to subthalamic n. 
𝐰𝐬𝐭𝐧_𝐠𝐩𝐞 0.9 Fixed weight from subthalamic n. to ext. pallidus 
𝐰𝐬𝐦𝐚,𝐢,𝐣 +0.2 for i = j 
0 for i ≠ j 
Fixed weight from cortex to cortex  
(here a mild auto-excitation is implemented) 
𝐰𝐜𝐨𝐠 
𝐰′𝐜𝐨𝐠 
0.831 
0.230 
Weight for active cognitive schemas 
Weight for non-active cognitive schemas  
𝐰𝐞𝐧𝐯 
𝐰′𝐞𝐧𝐯 
0.635 
0.270 
Weight for active motor schemas 
Weight for non-active motor schemas 
θT 0.7 Threshold to schema auto-excitation. 
θA 3•105 Area-threshold 
θS 0.4 Threshold to activation (minimal necessary) 
bl 0.465 Signal added/subtracted to a schema following 
reward (altering oi) 
ζpfc  0.01 Noise added to the bl 
ζenv 0.01 Noise added to the lower schemas input 
(environment) 
 
Compared with the previous chapter, the number of parameters has slightly increased. 
This is predictable, as the model complexity has increased, too. Parameters can be 
clustered into a selected number of domains, with different significance. The most 
important parameters are βstr and βsma, which represent this threshold in the striatum and 
the schema, respectively. Extreme values (increasingly further away from 0.5, either 
towards 0 or towards 1) of this parameter disrupt the competition between schemas. 
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When the threshold is too high, schemas are driven by their input values and they 
undergo increasingly homogenous inhibition from the basal ganglia. This phenomenon 
is analogous to the Parkinson's Disease (PD) dopamine depletion in the SNpc (Cooper 
& Shallice, 2000). The effect is consistent to what has been observed in the previous 
chapter, where decreasing βstr produces a failure in instantiate a competition between 
the channels, while increasing it suppresses and yields undifferentiated output. Since in 
this model the final mechanism of schema selection is determined by a fixed 'area-
threshold', an altered βstr renders schemas more susceptible to be wrongly selected due 
to noise (ζpfc and ζenv).  
 
4.3.3 Performance measures 
Performance was scored according to a range of measures as indicated in Heaton 
(1981). Completed Categories (CC) and Total Errors (TE) measure the overall 
performance. A Set Loss Error (SL) is counted whenever an incorrect response 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.5 Activation of cognitive schemas during a complete run (involving sorting all 64 
cards). Activation value is on the Y axis and Time Units on the X axis.  
Solid blue lines represent the actual activation, while dashed red lines represent the 
external input due to positive/negative feedback. Here, βstr is set to 0.5 for all schemas. 
 
is selected after 5 or more correct responses, where at least one is unambiguous (i.e., the 
card matches only one feature). A Perseverative response (PR) is counted whenever a 
response would have been correct under the previous rule. (A subject can score a 
perseverative response even before completing the first category: if three consecutive 
 99 
responses are made selecting the same incorrect sorting rule, that rule will be the 
criterion that the subject can perseverate to.) Those perseverative responses that are also 
incorrect responses are counted as Perseverative Errors (PE). Non-perseverative errors 
(NPE) are calculated as the Total Errors (TE) minus Perseverative Errors (PE). 
 
4.3.4 Model fit 
Results for two sets of 48 participants (48 healthy young adults from Cooper, Wutke, & 
Davelaar and 48 simulated participants) are depicted in Fig. 4.6. The figure compares 
the aggregate results from the simulation (Sim) with the aggregate data from the human 
participants (Data). A genetic algorithm attempted to find the best parameters that 
produce low t statistics and low z statistics between data and simulation. Given the 
presence of a multitude of parameters that influence each other in a non-linear fashion, a 
perfect fit is unattainable. However, the model appears to do an excellent job in 
reproducing group means and standard errors. The worst performance is produced for 
the least important1  Perseverative Response (z = 0.56), but for the most important 
dependent variable score either perfect fit (Completed Categories and Set Loss Errors) 
or adequate in the other cases (PE: z = 0.10, TE: z = 0.07 , NPE: z = 0.29). 
 
Genetic Algorithm 
Genetic algorithm (GA) is a simple tool to solve optimisation problems (Whitley, 
1994). Here, we use a simplified and modified version of the genetic algorithm with 
only two iterations to identify the best set of parameters. Details can be found in the 
Appendix. 
 
Correlational Analysis 
Analysing aggregate data is not sufficient to assess model performance, since a model 
should also aim to dissociate between psychological constructs (Cassimatis et al., 2008). 
Therefore, correlational analysis between the most informative variables (TE, PE, SL) 
was also performed, using bootstrapping and sampling the mean value to obtain 1000 
points. Multiple runs of the sampling algorithm produce very similar results. Fig. 4.7 
and Fig. 4.8 show the correlation matrices for these variables in both the human data 
and the simulation. The correlation matrices show that the simulation correctly 
                                                 
1 Perseverative Responses reflect responses that would have been correct in the previous set and they are 
essential to calculate Perseverative Errors but they do not accurately reflect performance per se, because 
they depend on the card randomised sorting. Conversely, Perseverative Errors reflect the inability to 
change rule.  
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identifies that the mechanism that produces set loss error can be dissociated from the 
process that causes other types or errors. However, the simulation fails to reproduce the 
high correlation (r = .91, p < .01) between Total Errors and Perseverative Errors. In 
addition, it displays a weak but significant negative correlation (r = -.31, p < .01) that is 
not present in the empirical data. 
 
 Interim Discussion 
The model yields an adequate fit for young participants on the WCST. Computation in 
the model appears to be stable, in that minimal parameter variations do not disrupt 
functioning. The model also correctly reflects the independence between Set Loss 
Errors (SL) and Total Errors (TE) found in the human data, suggesting a dissociation in 
the cognitive processes that produce those errors. However, the model is subject to 
several limitations. The lack of positive correlation between PE and TE in the 
simulation is both puzzling and concerning. One possibility, however, is that this 
apparent failing reflects the implicit assumption that performance of the human 
participants can be modelled by a single set of parameter values (i.e., by a group of 48 
virtual participants with identical cognitive characteristics). We explore this possibility 
in the following section. 
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Fig. 4.6 Comparison between Simulation and Data from neurologically healthy young 
participants. Z values above each variable indicate the z score of the difference between 
human (Data) and simulated data (Sim) for each dependent measure. 
 
 
Fig. 4.7 Correlations – Neuropsychological Data 
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Fig. 4.8 Correlation – Simulation 
4.4.1 Effect of alteration of saturation curves 
Once the best set of parameters have been established and the model achieves a good fit 
for aggregate data across all participants we observe the differential effect of altering 
the threshold of the saturation curve βstr for the striatum and βctx for the cortical 
(cognitive and motor) schemas.  
 
 
Fig. 4.9 Countour plot of threshold of saturation curves βstr (striatum) and βsma (cortical) 
schemas against dependent variables (TE, PE, SL, NPE). 
 
 
 103 
As it can be seen in the contour plots in Fig. 4.9, altering βstr or βsma is not equivalent 
with regard to producing errors. The number of total errors and non-perseverative errors 
appears to be very stable across the variation of the parameters. Decreasing βsma 
increases the instability threshold for βstr, where the error gradient becomes very steep.  
While the model performs very well in fitting aggregate data for healthy young 
participants, altering saturation curve parameters alone does not produce the level of 
neuropsychological impairment seen in the elderly, in Parkinson's Disease and other 
neurodegenerative conditions (Paolo et al., 2006). This issue is discussed in detail in the 
General Discussion section.  
 
 Analysis of grouped data 
4.5.1 Introduction 
In the light of the failure of the model to reproduce the empirically observed 
correlations between TE and PE, we analyse how data from young participants can be 
clustered into a small number of groups based on the three critical dependent variables 
reflecting errors (TE, PE, SL). These three types of errors have been specifically chosen 
because they are most representative of performance failures. Data clustering was 
calculated using a k-means algorithm with k = 5 (purely for reasons of computational 
efficiency). Two points were excluded because they were outliers. The k-means is an 
unsupervised learning algorithm (MacQueen, 1967) that requires the number of 
centroids (points in the sample space with the same dimension of the dependent 
variable, in our case 3) as an initial condition. The number is equivalent to the number 
of groups chosen (5, in our case). The algorithm was initialised based on the 
observation of the spatial 3D distribution of point. The Manhattan (city block) distance 
was used instead of the more common Euclidean, because of the discrete character of 
the data.  
 
The most distinctive features are the accumulation of points around the origin, the 
sparseness of points as total and perseverative errors increase, and an isolated cluster of 
points with SL equal to 1. Fig. 4.10 shows how the clustering of the groups looks like 
on a three-dimensional plot and Table 4.2 shows mean and standard deviation of the 
dependent variables in the individual groups. 
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Fig. 4.10 Clustering of experimental data 
 
4.5.2 Simulation 
After clustering the groups we run five genetic algorithms separately to determine best-
fitting parameter values for each group. In each case, seven model parameters were 
initially randomised to values within their reasonable ranges, and model errors recorded. 
A t-value between the simulation’s and the original experimental data was computed 
and its mean used as the inverse of the GA’s fitness value. Table 4.3 shows performance 
errors of the simulation with the highest fitness and Fig. 4.11 shows a three-dimensional 
scatter plot of the individual values. 
 
 
Fig. 4.11 Simulated data with five clusters 
  
 105 
4.5.3 Discussion and model fit 
Results from the simulation are shown in Table 4.2. Outliers have been removed in each 
group if values are less than 0.5 times the minimum value of the corresponding 
empirical group and more than 1.5 times the maximum of the corresponding empirical 
group. This guarantees that errors due to model instability are excluded from the 
analysis. In total, 14 outliers have been excluded from the analysis (4, 3, 2, 5 from 
groups 1, 2, 3, 4, respectively). The extreme values of the outliers suggests that they 
may conceivably have been produced by the model’s unstable response to particular 
parameter values, but this could be avoided in the future by increasing noise in the input 
values. Clustering the participant data into a small number of more homogenous groups 
greatly increases the correlation between TE and PE (r increases from .04 to .50, 
compared with the observed value of .92) and decreases the correlation between SL and 
TE/PE, improving the fit of the model in both respects. Fig. 4.12 displays the new 
correlation plots worked out combining all of the five simulations together, and a 
bootstrapping of 200 points using the mean has been carried out within each individual 
group. In Fig.4.13 bootstrapping has been carried out across all the points.  
 
Empirical Data Groups 
 
G N TE PE SL 
1● 18 8.89 (SD = 2.03) 6.22 (SD = 2.03) 0 (SD = 0) 
2● 13 14.85 (SD = 1.77) 8.77 (SD = 1.92) 0 (SD = 0) 
3● 5 28.00 (SD = 1.73) 18.40 (SD = 2.30) 0 (SD = 0) 
4● 7 14.71 (SD = 2.63) 9.57 (SD = 0.53) 1 (SD = 0) 
5● 3 22.33 (SD = 2.08) 11.67 (SD = 1.15) 0 (SD = 0) 
 
Simulation of the five clusters 
 
G N TE PE SL 
1● 14 10.86 (SD = 3.16) 6.13 (SD = 1.70) 0.00 (SD = 0.00) 
2● 10 13.10 (SD = 6.10) 7.50 (SD = 3.15) 0.00 (SD = 0.00) 
3● 3 20.67 (SD = 7.37) 12.00 (SD = 1.00) 0.00 (SD = 0.00) 
4● 2 13.00 (SD = 1.41) 9.50 (SD = 0.71) 1.00 (SD = 0.00) 
5● 3 12.33 (SD = 2.52) 7.00 (SD = 1.73) 0.00 (SD = 0.00) 
 
Table 4.2 Empirical data groups and simulations 
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Fig. 4.12 Correlation between performance errors aggregating the values from five 
different set of parameters. Bootstrapping with the mean has been performed within the 
individual groups 
 
 
Fig. 4.13 Correlation between performance errors aggregating the values from five 
different set of parameters. Bootstrapping with the mean has been performed across all 
the five groups 
 
All the groups with their dependent variables (TE, PE, and SL) are then evaluated in 
terms of model fitting with a bootstrapping technique (Mooney et al., 1993) here 
described. For each dependent variable a sample of integer values from the simulation 
group of the same size of the group has been drawn 200'000 times with the probability 
of the value being chosen proportional to its frequency (Si). Results have been then 
normalised to a proportion value (by dividing by the total sum) and the same procedure 
have been carried out for the groups of empirical data (Ei). A squared error 
 
𝑆𝑆𝐸 = ∑(𝐸𝑖 − 𝑆𝑖  +  𝜁)
2
𝑖
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was then calculated each time and the distribution plotted. An extremely dim noise (𝜁) 
drawn from a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 0.0001 was 
inserted to smooth results and make the distribution plots more readable. Removing the 
noise does not significantly affect final results in any way. Finally, the actual value of 
the sum of the square (SSE) error for the two groups is calculated and the probability 
that the statistic SSE group being greater than that value is the p-value (areas under the 
curve are normalised).  
 
 
Fig. 4.14 Histograms of bootstrapped distribution of SSE.  Distributions are shown for 
the dependent variables Total Errors (TE), Perseverative Errors (PE), and Set Loss 
Errors (SL). The number in brackets represents the cluster (values not normalised).   
 
Using Perseverative Errors in Group 1 as an example we explain the technique step by 
step. The numbers below represent the tabulated frequencies for both the groups: 
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Empirical Data Simulated data 
Total: 18 
Value 5 6 7 8 
Frequency 5 6 5 2 
 
Total: 14 
Value 4 5 6 7 9 
Frequency 1 6 3 1 3 
 
 
Then we sample from these distributions. The probability to draw from that sample is 
proportional to the frequency of the element in the original distribution. Then, 
probabilities are converted to a proportion, as shown below.  
 
Empirical Data (Sample 1) Simulated data (Sample 1) 
Total: 18 
Value 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Frequency 0 4 8 5 1 0 
Prop. 0 0.22 0.44 0.28 0.06 0 
 
Total: 14 
Value 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Frequency 1 4 6 0 0 3 
Prop. 0.07 0.29 0.43 0 0 0.21 
 
 
These proportions are then substituted in the SSE formula (noise will not be shown 
being at least 4 orders of magnitude smaller than the actual proportions) .  
 
𝑆𝑆𝐸 = ∑(𝐸𝑖 − 𝑆𝑖)
2
𝑖
= (0 − 0.07)2 + (0.22 − 0.29)2 + (0.44 − 0.43)2 + (0.28 − 0)2
+ (0.06 − 0)2 + (0 − 0.21)2 =  0.136 
 
This procedure is repeated 200'000 times and results are stored in a vector that 
represents the final distributions shown in Fig.4.14. The actual value of SSE for the 
distribution is hence calculated in order to compute the p-value for that statistic. 
 
 General Discussion 
 
4.6.1 General Analysis and cognitive endophenotypes 
The model we presented combines a variation of the Cooper and Shallice (2000) model 
of action selection and a variation of the Gurney et al. (2001) model of the basal 
ganglia. One of the strengths of this combined model is the possibility to generalise it to 
other cognitive control tasks (e.g. Stroop task, Probabilistic Reversal Learning, Eriksen 
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Flanker Task, etc.) and to accommodate the presence of units representing other brain 
areas where different computation is performed (e.g., amygdala, cerebellum), enabling 
the simulation of cognitive tasks in broader contexts (e.g. Emotional Stroop Task, 
WCST in cerebellar patients). In principle, this enhances the contention scheduling 
theory with neuroanatomical detail, allowing a more precise localisation of processes in 
a particular task, and integration with functional neuroimaging data. In addition, this 
implementation allows for the inclusion of two distinct learning mechanisms in the 
cortex and the basal ganglia: the current model can potentially be updated to a learning-
based model by developing these mechanisms. With respect to cortical learning, in the 
model as it stands, the supervisory system that controls how subjects respond to positive 
and negative feedback is fixed and consequently performance tends to be too robust to 
basal unit dysfunctions. This might be addressed by incorporating dynamic learning that 
allows supervisory control to vary according to the schemas’ activations, resulting in 
low or high baseline levels of dopamine in the striatum having a greater impact on 
cognitive performance. The present chapter makes the case for modelling subgroup data 
(or, whenever possible, individual data), instead of aggregate results, and presents 
evidence of how data clustering improves the model overall fit. Clustering is especially 
advisable for models of higher-order cognition, where subjects tend to have variable 
attention and may use qualitatively different cognitive strategies. The choice of 5 groups 
was dictated by computational constraint but the trade-off between number of 
participants in a group and separate performance should be acknowledged.  
 
In fact, group 2, 3, and 4 contains very few participants and one wonders whether 
values could be aggregated in one single group. However, closer inspection of the data 
suggests that group 4 has a distinct pattern of errors: those subjects who commit one SL 
errors also tend to make a number of PE between 15 and 20. While this seems to be 
indicative of different cognitive processes, it also suggests that SL errors might not be 
the most appropriate way to capture a loss of representation. 
 
A final conclusion emerges from two joint observations: First, fitting clusters with 
increasingly extreme error values becomes increasingly more problematic. Second, 
another set of simulations (not reproduced here) shows that damaging the cortical and 
subcortical units threshold does not seem to produce the level of decline in performance 
found in Parkinson's disease patients without dementia (Paolo et al., 1996). Since 
healthy older controls have a different performance profile than the younger controls 
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against which the current model was assessed, the loss of dopaminergic cells in SNpc 
does not alone explain the inferior performance in the elderly and PD patients. These 
two joint findings suggest that the cognitive mechanisms producing perseverative and 
set loss errors might be independent only for a small number of errors. As that number 
increases, these two mechanisms might be correlated and possibly causally related. New 
experimental data to confirm this hypothesis is warranted.  
 
4.6.2 Parkinson's Disease cognitive impairments 
It is often posited that cognitive impairments in PD, not unlike the associated motor 
problems, have their genesis in the disruption of the information from and to the basal 
ganglia. The model shown in this chapter predicates on the same assumptions, and it 
shows that an alteration in the competition mechanism between cognitive schemas 
produces perseveration. However, cognitive impairments in PD are very heterogeneous 
and conflicting data on neuropsychological tests are common (Galtier, 2016).  
 
Robbins & Cools (2014) argue that non-motor impairment in PD arise from two distinct 
processes. The former is driven by the presence of Lewy bodies in the cortex, it is 
highly correlated with cognitive decline (Aarsland, 2005) and it is rooted in the 
neurobiology of dementia. The latter is driven by the differential effect of dopaminergic 
medication in different part of the brain, and it is attributable to impaired information 
processing. This impairment is more likely to be noticed in systematic 
neuropsychological testing, because it does not always translate in impairment in the 
activities of daily living (ADLs) for PD patients. To complicate things further, the two 
can significantly overlap, producing different clinical scenarios and computational 
conundrums. The model we presented divides the computational labour between basal 
ganglia and cortical structures, so that gradual damage can be applied to either structure 
(or both) and behavioural predictions can be tested. A radically different perspective 
comes from Matsui et al. (2007), who argue that PD non-motor impairments are not 
pure dysexecutive syndromes. Their Diffusion Tensori Imaging (DTI) study tests non-
demented PD patients and found a moderate positive correlation between the fractional 
anisotropy values and the categories completed and a moderate negative correlation 
between the fractional anisotropy value and perseverative errors. However, these errors 
have been measured according to the modified version of the test (Nelson, 1976). In this 
simplified version of the WCST an error is counted if the response and the immediately 
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preceding response are incorrect and of the same category, resembling the PPR score 
previously outlined.  
Swainston et al. (2000) attempt to explain all the different cognitive deficits in PD with 
the baseline level of dopamine receptor availability and the effect of dopamine 
medication in different brain areas. Those can account for the different profile of 
impairments seen not only in the WCST test, but also in visuospatial reasoning tests.  
At least in early PD, depletion of dopamine (DA) might be confined to the putamen and 
the dorsorostral aspect of the caudate, hence acting on the motor and dorsolateral loops, 
that supply supplementary motor area (SMA) and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC), respectively. Since dopaminergic medications act systemically, dopaminergic 
medications such as L-dopa re-establish close-to-optimal level of dopamine in motor 
and premotor loops, therefore improving motor symptoms and set-shifting. On the other 
hand, they 'overdose' dopamine in the pathways that are less affected by dopamine 
depletion, such as the lateral orbitofrontal and the inferotemporal loops, causing 
impairments on reversal tasks and visuospatial learning. 
 
While the model we presented does not model individual brain cortical areas, different 
schemas require different cognitive resources that are located in different cortical areas, 
so it is not possible in principle to test these hypothesis with our simulation. 
 
4.6.3 Expanding the model 
Within this particular theoretical framework, representation of an action and 
computation over that representation are merged together. Given this, the model can be 
extended to accommodate either other areas of the brain or sub-routines of the program. 
Whether those schemas or sub-schemas are activated or not depends on the activation of 
the other schemas and the properties of their saturation functions. This entails that 
various areas of the brain would perform a different computation on a signal that, in 
turn, would contribute to a different function (Doya, 2000). For instance, a motor 
schema could have a basal ganglia tail, a cerebellum tail, a motor cortex tail, a sensory 
tail, a limbic tail, etc. and damage to a different tail would impair the specific 
computation on that representation rather than directly damaging the representation. To 
illustrate this general concept we can use the emotional Stroop task as a more 
comprehensive example. In this task, subjects have to name the ink colour of emotional-
laden words (such as 'cancer', 'death', 'mayhem') and neutral words (such as 'chair', 
'phone', 'car'). Words related to the subject's area of clinical impairment tend to elicit 
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significantly slower response (Compton et al., 2003). This test is thought to measure 
inhibition of emotional attentional biases, particularly those associated with a perceived 
threat. In schema terms, uttering the different names (colours or words) could be 
represented by different schemas. The competition between these schemas is, 
speculatively, resolved by the basal ganglia. However, in this emotional task the limbic 
system is also involved, and the learning curves in limbic structures is different and it 
affects the information processing with projections to the prefrontal areas and to the 
basal ganglia.   
 
Extending the schema theory in this fashion could also address the problem of 
cerebellar involvement in higher-order cognition (Bellebaum & Daum, 2007). Until 
very recently, the cerebellum had been thought as a purely motor organ, with no 
significant involvement in higher order cognitive processes such as attention, working 
memory, emotions, etc. New data about the cerebellar cortex and nuclei needs to be 
accommodated in a theoretical framework that takes into account these functions at a 
much higher level of abstraction, bearing in mind that the cerebellum has a very 
homogenous histological properties that constrain its computational functions in a 
specific way. Doya (1999) argues that asking about the goal or the sensorimotor activity 
of a brain ‘organ’ might not be fruitful and we would rather ask what learning algorithm 
an ‘organ’ implements. Accordingly, the cerebellum seems more suited to perform a 
supervised learning algorithm that compares actual output with planned output. Schema 
theory could be extended with these specific computational requirements for the 
cerebellar units.  
 
In conclusion, such an extended schema theory could potentially capture the 
abstractions of habitual actions, the cognitive control mechanism, and the presence of 
emotional bias. Furthermore, it allows the modeller to be less agnostic with regards to 
the neural implementation, and to produce testable prediction in a variety of scenarios 
(neuropharmacology, neuropsychology, neuroimaging, etc.).  
 
4.6.4 Further directions 
Clustering and bootstrapping proved to be an excellent way to fit model data and they 
improved the overall model fit. However, it is unclear how many groups are needed, 
given that this does also require other theoretical assumptions, and what the minimum 
number of subjects in each group is. A general answer to this question is perhaps 
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difficult to answer without other specific constraints, since it may depend on the model 
and the available data.  
 
As for the parameters governing the model, they need to be more specifically grounded 
to a theoretical architecture. In particular, the division of roles between PFC and BG has 
to be more clearly defined, but given the complex computation in the frontal circuits, 
these processes needs to be better specified. The model uses a simple 'static' feedback, 
where negative and positive reward increase or decrease the cognitive schemas input by 
a fixed amount. This is successful in some respects, but a more dynamic Reinforcement 
Learning mechanism needs to be implemented to take into account the different 
learning mechanisms in PFC and BG in more accurate fashion. More specifically, 
prefrontal circuits use dopamine and possibly co-release of glutamate to stabilise 
representation necessary to pursue a goal (Durstewitz et al., 2000). On the other hand 
subcortical circuits are more likely to be involved in habit formation (Wickens et al., 
2007). In the next chapter we expand the model mechanisms so as to overcome these 
conceptual limitations and we observe how this also contributes to improve model 
fitting. 
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A Neurocomputational model of action 
selection for the Wisconsin Card Sorting 
Test 
 
 Abstract 
This chapter represents the natural extension of the previous one. First, we present an 
extended model of Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, based on the one presented in the 
previous chapter. This model features a dual mechanism for cognitive control, regulated 
by two new learning parameters. Compared to the previous model, it is also simplified 
in many ways by removing or grouping old parameters. We describe the core model 
omitting the details outlined in the previous chapters and then explain how cognitive 
control is conceptualised using two simple ideas from reinforcement learning and 
information theory. All the theoretical assumptions made in the previous chapters still 
hold here, unless specifically stated. Then, we report simulations and observe how they 
fit the available empirical evidence. As in the previous chapter, we then shift the focus 
from a qualitative analysis based on aggregate data to a more specific quantitative 
cluster analysis. The data obtained from a previous experiment is divided in three 
clusters, this time following a more rigorous procedure than the one we previously used. 
Then, we show how three different sets of parameters can simulate the various sets of 
performances. Finally, we analyse strengths and shortcomings of the approach in terms 
of neurobiological plausibility, parsimony, adaptability to other experiments, and model 
fit. 
 
 Core assumptions 
The model that underlies the work in this chapter is a development of that presented in 
the previous chapter. In particular, it consists of separate cognitive and motor schemas 
(conceptualised as localised in the frontal and premotor areas respectively), with 
competition within each set of schemas implemented within a subcortical loop centred 
on the basal ganglia. The model features a set of 3 cognitive schemas and 4 motor 
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schemas, and basal ganglia units that solve competition between the schemas at each 
level independently. From this chapter on, cognitive schemas units have a pfc subscript, 
and motor schemas properties have sma subscript. In the cortical computation 
(cognitive and motor schemas), the self-excitation and the extra excitation after 
threshold θT have been removed. Removal of these parameters did not significantly 
compromise the model performance and results have not been crucially altered. Several 
parameters have been changed as shown in Table 5.1. Changes are highlighted with an 
arrow.  
 
Table 5.1 The table shows the change of value of all the parameters from the previous 
model. Other changes in the learning mechanism have been outlined in the text 
 
Parameter Change from previous 
model 
βpfc 
 
0.4 → 0.5 
 
wcog 0.831 → 0.99 
w’cog 
 
0.230 → 0.3 
 
wenv 
 
0.635 → 0.6 
 
w’env 
 
0.270 → 0.35 
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 Model description 
The change to the feedback mechanisms is more substantial. In the previous model, 
positive or negative feedback simply resulted in increasing or decreasing external input 
to the cognitive schemas by a fixed amount according to which schemas matched the 
correct or incorrect response. This rudimentary mechanism has now been replaced by a 
dual mechanism that operates in the cortical cognitive units and basal ganglia units. 
 
We start by illustrating the mechanism acting in the cortical cognitive schemas. We 
assume that the slope in the activation function is a function of the uncertainty 
associated with the schema at the same level of abstraction. Higher uncertainty 
corresponds to a state where the activation values alone are closer to each other. In that 
case, noise can be drastically affect the selection when the activation function gain is 
high and the values are close to the selection threshold by forcing the system to resolve 
the uncertainty. Uncertainty is commonly conceptualised within cognitive models in 
terms of Shannon entropy (1948), that is obtained by calculating the expected value of 
the surprise (Eq. 2), defined simply as the logarithm of pX (x), that represents the 
probability (p) of the distribution values (x) of the random variable X (Eq. 1) 
 
𝐼(𝑝𝑋(𝑥)) = log(𝑝𝑋(𝑥)) 
 
Eq.1 
𝐻(𝑋) = 𝔼(𝐼(𝑝𝑋)) =∑𝑝𝑖 ∙ log(𝑝𝑖)
𝑖
 
 
Eq. 2 
Entropy has an immediate interpretation in terms of unpredictability and it has an 
important analytical property: it is maximised for uniform distributions. 
   
Cortical schemas are biased according to an entropy function H dependent on the trial T 
(from 1 to 64 in the WCST) according to the following equations: 
 
𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖(𝑡)  =  𝑜𝑝𝑓𝑐(𝑡) + 10
−3 Eq. 3 
  
𝑝𝑖(𝑡) =  
𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖(𝑡)
∑ 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑖 (𝑡)
 
Eq. 4 
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𝐻(𝑡) =
1
𝐻(𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠)
∑−𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑝𝑖)
𝑖
 
   Eq. 5 
 
The output of the cognitive schemas are increased by a minimum amount (Eq. 3), in 
order to lessen the effect of small variation in activation values. The activation at time t 
is normalised with all the other activation values (Eq. 4) so that the sum of all the values 
is 1, following the axioms of probability. In other words, the activation in the cognitive 
schemas becomes a random variable that associates to each schema a probability to be 
selected proportional to its activation. The entropy is then calculated using the natural 
logarithm2 and normalised by dividing by the maximum value possible, calculating by 
using the function H on a unitary vector (the value of H(ones) is 1.0986 for 3 schemas) 
(Eq. 5). The formula generalises to any number of schemas. 
 
For instance, a vector that contains all the same values (e.g. 0.9, 0.9, 0.9, 0.9 or 0.4, 0.4, 
0.4) has maximum entropy (1.0), since the instantaneous probability that each schema is 
selected is identical (0.33 for three schemas or 0.25 for four schemas). If a schema is 
maximally active and the others are de-activated (e.g. 0, 1, 0 or 1, 0, 0) the entropy is 
simply 0.  
 
This level of uncertainty drives the alteration of the slope of the saturation function in 
the cortical cognitive schemas: 
  
𝛼𝑝𝑓𝑐  =  𝜂5−25[5 −  20 ∙ 𝜖𝑝𝑓𝑐(1 + 𝜁𝑝𝑓𝑐) ∙ 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐻𝑇)] Eq. 6 
  
The logarithm function is chosen for implementation purpose, since it produces a 
negative value with an input between 0 and 1. Being dependent of HT, the value of αpfc 
is identical for all the cognitive schemas. The update of αpfc occurs after each trial. Also, 
the slope is limited between 5 and 25 by the hard-limit function η5-25 defined as: 
 
𝜂𝑎−𝑏(𝑥) = {
𝑎,                 𝑥 < 𝑎
 𝑥,        𝑎 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑏
𝑏,                 𝑥 > 𝑏
 
Eq. 7 
 
                                                 
2 The entropy formula usually features a base 2 logarithm. This is not relevant here, because any 
logarithm of the probability encodes the concept of 'surprising event' irrespective of the base used. 
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When the entropy is maximum the slope is kept to a minimum (5.0). Conversely, when 
the choice between the schemas is more predictable, because the probability of selecting 
one of them is much higher than the others, the entropy becomes closer to zero and the 
slope of the threshold function increases according to the parameter εpfc. This might 
appear paradoxical as, other parameters being equal, a higher value of αpfc occurs 
whenever a schema is much more active than others and lower value of αpfc occurs when 
schemas are more equally likely to be selected. This seems to drive the schemas towards 
a greater state of uncertainty, rather than the opposite. However, one should take into 
account the presence of noise in the signal: a higher slope in the cortical schemas is 
much more sensitive to noise and slight variations in the input can drive schemas to be 
deselected more easily. This is especially true considering that schemas are activated 
only if their threshold is greater than βpfc (0.5). Therefore a schema with an activation 
value fluttering around the threshold becomes unstable and when the sigmoid becomes 
a step function (αpfc→∞), a minimal amount of negative random noise can deactivate a 
previously active schema. Likewise, a minimal amount of positive random noise can 
activate a previously inactive schema. On the other hand, a schema that is generally 
very active is more easily stabilised towards its active state, and the opposite is true for 
an inactive schema. While 'active' means above the threshold, in the core version of the 
model the top-level schemas pass a signal to the low-level schema irrespective of their 
values.3 
 
Fig 5.1 shows the computed value of αpfc given the entropy of the cognitive schemas and 
the amount of dopamine in the cortical circuit εpfc, while Fig. 5.2 shows three different 
sets of values for the cognitive schemas and how this affects the cortical slope αpfc when 
the value of εpfc is fixed. If dopamine is barely present the saturation function is very 
relaxed, irrespective of the entropy of the schemas. If entropy is really low (for instance, 
a schema has been selected because the signal from the alternative schemas have been 
depressed by the basal ganglia) the saturation function has a very high slope, at least for 
a moderate amount of dopamine.  
 
                                                 
3 In a variation of the model at the end of the chapter we explore how activating/deactivating the schema 
by unblocking/blocking the signal to the low-level schemas affects the overall model behaviour. This 
computational behaviour is somewhat compatible with the process of active maintenance (O’Reilly & 
Frank, 2006) and with the idea that dopamine signal through the mesocortical pathway increases the 
signal-to-noise ratio by inhibiting cues that are not anymore relevant to the current goal (currently active 
schemas) (Arnsten, 2011).  
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Fig. 5.1 The plot shows the computed value of αpfc given the entropy of the cognitive 
schemas and the amount of dopamine in the cortical circuit εpfc. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.2 This left panel displays three different sets of activation values for the cognitive 
schemas and the right panel shows how each activation configuration affects the αpfc 
(resulting value above each plot). Learning parameter εpfc is set to 0.4 and the threshold 
βstr is set to 0.5. 
 
The basal ganglia units regulate the signal in a very different fashion from the cortical 
units. While cortical units are solely regulated by online state, regardless of history of 
activation and external stimuli, basal ganglia units change their characteristics with a 
history-based and reward-driven course. The units have a structure identical to the one 
illustrated in the previous chapter, where the level of striatal dopamine is assumed to be 
regulated by altering βstr, the threshold of the saturation function in striatal units. The 
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new element introduced in this chapter consists in a dynamic mechanism to vary this 
threshold as a function of current feedback and past history of activation in the 
respective cortical units.  
 
𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖(𝑡)  =  𝑜𝑝𝑓𝑐(𝑡) Eq.8 
  
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑_𝑎𝑐𝑡(𝑡)  =   ∑ 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖(𝑡) ∙ 2
−𝑇+𝑡−1
𝑇
𝑡 = 1
 
 
Eq.9 
  
𝛿(𝑡)  =  𝑟𝑖(𝑡) − 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖(𝑡) + 𝛾 ∙ 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑_𝑎𝑐𝑡(𝑡) Eq.10 
 
Eq. 9 shows the calculation of the predicted value at the trial T. In practice, the 
predicted value is proportional to a weighted mean of the activation values in the 
previous trials, with more weight assigned to the recent trials. Predictions of feedback 
are also taken into account. If all the recent trials have been rewarded positively, a 
reasonable prediction will be that the next one will be positively rewarded too. 
Feedback can also be internally generated, and this enables the extension of the model 
to tasks that involve internal monitoring of performance, such as the Brixton Task 
(Burgess & Shallice, 2000). The predicted activation is discounted by a factor γ, that 
expresses how much importance is given to future rewards compared to the current 
ones.  This requires a further assumption regarding the brain ability to keep track of the 
recent history of each schema. This hypothesis has been shown to be realistic at the 
algorithmic (Sutton & Barto, 1998) and the neuronal (Gerstner et al., 2018) level. 
 
Eq. 10 is the temporal difference learning equation commonly used in reinforcement 
learning literature, but predicted activation and current activation are compared with 
rewards to yield the prediction error δ (delta). Fig. 5.3 displays the different errors 
against values of γ from 0 to 1. Giving higher weight to a future predicted value tends to 
increase all the errors with a gradient mildly dependent on γ values (see Eq. 10). On 
account of the small linear variations for the majority of performance errors, this 
parameter can be used a fixed parameter, incorporated in the reward values or even 
dropped. In chapter 7 it will fixed to a small value. 
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Fig. 5.3 The plot displays different performance errors evaluated  
against values of gamma from 0 to 1. The black, red, and blue lines represents the data 
from Paolo et al. (1996) and Cooper, Wutke, & Davelaar (2012) for young adults, 
elderly subjects, and Parkinson's Disease patients, respectively. 25 subjects have been 
simulated for each set of values of  γ and εstr. 
 
The reward vector ith component ri  assumes a value of +1 whenever the matched feature 
is active when positive feedback is given. If the virtual subject matches a card by colour 
and by number and the feedback is positive, colour and number schemas ri are set to +1 
and the shape schema to -1.While this rule seems to be contrived, it achieves good 
performance and is relatively simple to understand and implement. This implementation 
has a number of built-in assumptions. First, the reward is fixed and does not vary in 
intensity. Second, it is assumed that the subject understands what the correct feedback 
is. Third, the correct feedback is not determined by the most currently active schema, 
but a general matching rule. This does not require any memory search. This is certainly 
the strongest assumption and one that requires further scrutiny. Later in this chapter the 
cognitive plausibility of this will be analysed and more plausible alternatives will be 
examined.  
 
The error value δ drives the variation of the threshold of saturation curve in the striatal 
units following Eq.11 
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𝛽𝑠𝑡𝑟,𝑖(𝑡 + 1)  =  𝜂𝑜−1[𝛽𝑠𝑡𝑟,𝑖(𝑡)  −  𝜖𝑠𝑡𝑟 ∙ 𝛿(𝑡) + 𝜁𝑠𝑡𝑟] Eq.11 
 
The alteration of the properties of striatal units tends to favour the activation of one of 
the three cognitive schemas, according to the reward received, the history of reward, the 
discount factor, and the learning parameter εstr.   
 
 Simulation 
As in the previous chapter, we run the model and observe how performance is affected 
by parameters. The first simulation (Fig. 5.4) shows the profile of the main errors (Total 
Errors, Perseverative Errors, Set Loss errors, Non Perseverative Errors) obtained by 
altering εstr.  
 
 
Fig. 5.4 The plot shows the four errors in the WCST against the parameter εstr. The 
black, red, and blue lines represents the data from Paolo et al. (1996) and Cooper, 
Wutke, & Davelaar (2012) for young adults, elderly subjects, and Parkinson's Disease 
patients, respectively. 25 subjects have been simulated for each set of values of  εstr and 
εpfc. 
  
After a value of εstr greater than 0.4, Set Loss errors become increasingly more frequent, 
exceeding the values normally produced by patient with dorsolateral lesions (Stuss et 
al., 2000), far beyond those observed even in PD patient performance. Conversely, 
lower values of εstr yield higher perseverative errors, showing a dissociation between the 
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mechanism that produces SL and PE. Non perseverative errors (NPE) increase also after 
0.4. Fig 5.5 shows a zoomed plot of SL errors with εstr  on the x-axis.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.5 The plot shows the four errors in the WCST against the parameter εstr for a 
narrow area of values (0.05 to 0.4).  
 
Figure 5.5 shows that there is an optimal value εstr that minimised SL errors, and that 
this value changes with different values of εpfc. The average minimum value seems to be 
around εpfc = 0.15-0.20 for the observed values of εpfc.  This result will be considered in 
term of the inverted-U performance functions (Cools & D’Esposito, 2007) in the 
discussion. 
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Fig. 5.6 The plot shows the four errors in the WCST against the parameter εpfc. The 
black, red, and blue lines represents the data from Paolo et al. (1996) and Cooper, 
Wutke, & Davelaar (2012) for young adults, elderly subjects, and Parkinson's Disease 
patients, respectively. 25 subjects have been simulated for each set of values of εstr and 
εpfc. 
 
 
Fig. 5.7 The plot shows the four errors in the WCST against the parameter αstr. The 
black, red, and blue lines represents the data from Paolo et al. (1996) and Cooper, 
Wutke, Davelaar (2012) for young adults, elderly subjects, and Parkinson's Disease 
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patients, respectively. 25 subjects have been simulated for each set of values of εstr and 
αpfc. 
 
Fig. 5.6 shows the four errors in the WCST against the parameter εpfc while Fig. 5.7 
shows the same four errors in the WCST against the parameter αstr. A comparison 
between the two figures demonstrate that for values of αpfc greater than 17, the model 
performs without any error anywhere. But this is simply due to a failure to start and 
those are the initialisation values of the variable.  In other words, performance is mostly 
unaffected for values of αpfc less than 17, but the simulation abruptly stops working after 
that, and only for a specific values of εstr. This very strongly indicates that choosing αpfc 
as free parameter representing the presence of dopamine or any other neurotransmitter 
in the cortical circuits is not appropriate. In reimplementing Gurney et al. (2001) model 
of basal ganglia, αstr and βstr have been shown to yield qualitatively equivalent 
behaviour, at least in a simple two-channel simulation. Taken together, these results 
suggest that the division of labour between basal ganglia and cortex is reflected in the 
computational action of their saturation curve parameters, too.  
 
 Discussion 
The model presents a dynamical system where the slope of the threshold αpfc is updated 
as a function of the uncertainty among the cortical schemas, regardless of previous 
history of any other variables, and the dopamine dependent parameter εpfc. In other 
words, the model features an ‘online’ mechanism that modulates aspects of cognitive 
control in real time. Here, it is implemented in the cognitive schemas only, but in 
principle it could be implemented in (sensori)motor schemas as well. The necessity for 
such a system that operates alongside the one in the basal ganglia units comes from 
several considerations. First, cognitive control requires both stability and flexibility as 
requirements for its correct functioning (van Schouwenburg, 2010). These two 
constructs have an optimal value and are conceptually dissociable. Stability can be 
defined as the ability to resist distractions or, in computational terms, the ability to 
sustain the activation of a goal-relevant schema. An excessively low stability makes the 
system more vulnerable to distractions, which is computationally comparable to 
susceptibility to noise or external signal. Conversely, a system that is too stable tends to 
ignore evidence coming from rewards, assumed to be computed in the basal ganglia 
units, and therefore coming to a correct decision too slowly. A system that is too stable 
also tends to be less sensitive to feedback and to environmental stimuli that require 
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immediate evaluation on account of their adaptive value or relevance to the overarching 
goal. Flexibility is a somewhat orthogonal concept to stability and it can be 
conceptualised as the speed to which the system adapts to newly rewarded 
representations. Too little flexible system affects the ability to respond to new feedback 
appropriately, while a too flexible system does not take into account the history of 
response and yield to an ineffectual inhibition of inappropriate schemas. Importantly, in 
this model reward is a fixed value the system computes irrespective of which schema is 
most active. This entails that, in the present model, rewards are exclusively processed in 
the basal ganglia units.  
 
In the previous chapters we showed that altering the threshold or the slope of saturation 
functions in the striatum yields very similar results, by affecting the competition 
between the channels very similarly. While changing slope and threshold are 
computationally similar, this is not necessarily true for structures other than the basal 
ganglia. Implementation details and simulations therefore suggest that modifying the 
slope is more appropriate. Furthermore, from the neurobiological point of view, it is 
possible to argue that slope and bias in a saturation function mimic the effect of tonic 
and phasic dopamine, respectively. However, this requires other simulations that are 
capable of teasing out these specific contributions of neurophysiological data. For now, 
the use of αpfc as a parameter that helps to link neuropsychological constructs such as 
working memory and attention with the neurobiological activity of dopamine 
neuromodulation in the prefrontal cortex, and therefore to avoid the definition of 
attention as an external central processor (Gibbs & Esposito, 2005). Rather, attention is 
conceptualised as the ability to switch set as a function of the cortical state. While the 
state of cortical representations is indirectly affected by reward and history of reward 
(as habitual actions are performed faster), we assume that its modulation does not 
depend only on those values. Biologically speaking, activity in the prefrontal cortex is 
known to be strongly modulated by dopamine. Computationally, we manipulate directly 
the amount of dopamine that act on the cortical circuits that are engaged in the 
execution of the schema by varying parameter εpfc (Eq. 6). Dopaminergic neurons 
ascend to the anterior cortex from the ventral tegmental area (VTA), where the DA 
nuclei sits, to form the mesocortical pathway. The activity of DA neurons affect 
prefrontal neurons, that show persistent activity when a task requires holding 
information in order to guide future action (Curtis & D’Esposito, 2003). This persistent 
activity could be caused by a combination of reverberatory activity within homogenous 
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cell assemblies, within chains of neuronal pools, or even by bistable properties of 
neurons (Durstewitz et al., 2000). Importantly, this activity is distinct from processes 
that involve short or long term plasticity (Dayan & Abbott, 2001). The tonic activity of 
dopaminergic neurons is thought to alter the signal-to-noise ratio in neuronal firing in 
the PFC, increasing or decreasing the stability of goal-relevant representations 
(Seamans & Yang, 2004). However, the functional role of tonic and phasic dopamine 
burst in the PFC is still open to debate. Some evidence suggests that these two 
mechanisms have different functional effects. Durstewitz et al. (2000) produced a 
biophysically accurate model of phasic and tonic DA actions and argued that, given the 
intrinsic properties of dopaminergic neurons, tonic action only is responsible for 
working memory functions in the PFC, namely stabilisation of representations. Despite 
the fact Shultz et al. (1993) showed that phasic action in DA is seen during the intervals 
between stimuli updating, the scale of phasic dopamine signal seems to be too slow for 
such fast processes. However, there is also evidence for DA neurons co-release 
glutamate (Seamans & Yang, 2004), which is a fast acting neurotransmitter. While it is 
fair to say that maintenance of representations is not a process driven by plasticity, at 
the moment it is unclear what role phasic or tonic dopamine play in this respect. We 
therefore assume that, in the present model, εpfc represents direct DA manipulation 
without making any commitment to the spike train modality. 
 
Parameter αpfc could be a free parameter but, in the model, it also depends on the state 
of the schemas (Eq. 6) (Collins et al., 1998). This is a theoretically sound choice for 
three reasons. First, the kind of task and the cognitive demand are crucial determinant 
for the optimal amount of DA, even when the brain areas involved are identical (Cools 
& Esposito, 2011). This is consistent with what happens in our model: adding another 
unit below the threshold slightly increases the entropy, relaxing the slope of the cortical 
saturation function. The effects of DA receptor stimulation also depend on the baseline 
WM capacity. In this respect, Kimberg et al. (1997) showed that bromocriptine (a 
dopamine agonist) interacts with the baseline working memory capacity of the subjects, 
as measured by the listening span task. The drug improved performance in subjects with 
lower baseline abilities but worsened it in the other subjects with higher abilities.  
 
Second, single neurons in the midbrain do not only reflect reward prediction error but 
distinct groups of neurons in the macaque monkey midbrain show a separate sustained 
and gradually increasing activity proportional to the uncertainty of being rewarded 
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(Schultz, 2008). In terms of information theory, this means that the gradient of firing 
rate of those neurons is proportional to the entropy of the system. These neurons are 
mainly found in some areas of the substantia nigra pars compacta (SNpc) and mainly in 
the ventral tegmental area (VTA). Functional MRI also reflects these findings in 
humans (Schultz, 2008). Third, in absence of a hierarchical higher schema bias, the 
system has to be able to exert top-down control without the aid of an external controller 
and be able to determine which schemas are needed for a task even in the absence of an 
external reward or surprising event.  
 
Crucially, simulations (Fig. 5.5) with αpfc as a free parameter show how the dependency 
on entropy is of paramount importance in producing sound results. Without this variable 
modulating the slope of saturation functions in the WCST, task errors become 
independent of the amount of dopamine in the PFC, Set Loss errors do not have a clear 
profile and values above a threshold result in a computational deadlock. In conclusion, 
theoretical considerations, empirical and simulation results shows that entropy plays an 
important role in controlling how parameters are altered in cortical areas. In spite of 
this, the specific implementation of this process is arguably still not optimal, and there 
is room for improvement with regard to the mathematically optimal form to use. A core 
theoretical commitment that can be made is that the process of altering αpfc work better 
when it is driven by internal variables, that is to say by activation values of the cortical 
schemas. This differs from the process in the basal ganglia units (Eq.8-10), that is 
driven by external rewards or sensory evidence.  
 
A cautionary note about associating DA manipulation and saturation curve should be 
made. In computational modelling altering the slope of the saturation function is a fairly 
common artifice to simulate neurotransmitter availability in a certain region of the 
brain. However, the implementation is not obvious, and different authors use this 
parameter in a very different manner. In fact, the relationship between the presence of a 
neurotransmitter in a brain circuit and the proposed function depends on the cognitive 
architecture and the chosen structure. For instance, Li et al. (2001) build a neural 
network to evaluate the effects of ageing on word learning interference. They associate 
the slope of the threshold function with the presence of dopamine in the cortical circuits. 
In this framework, mental representations become increasingly more distorted as the 
slope becomes flatter, hindering the encoding and the retrieval of word memories. 
Given that dopamine and many other neuromodulators are known to enhance long term 
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potentiation in local circuit, flattening the slope of activation function in connectionist 
networks can successfully explain impairments in encoding and retrieval on account of 
abnormal plasticity or neurodegenerative disorders. However, while this mechanism can 
constitute a compelling explanation for plasticity-driven processes, where age-driven 
loss of plasticity can be due to distortion in representation, this may not always work as 
a general paradigm in cognitive control. In fact, various forms of damage in a simple 
feed-forward neural network generally yield a monotonic relationship between type of 
damage and performance errors, irrespective of representation (Guest, Caso, & Cooper, 
submitted). This is in stark contrast with the inverted-U shape between DA receptor 
stimulation and working memory performance in executive control tasks (Seamans & 
Young, 2004). In other words, it appears that a simple feedforward neural network 
alone cannot account for a specific cognitive control phenomenon and that simulating 
neurotransmission in higher-order cognition is not exclusively achieved by 
manipulating a transfer function parameter, but is highly dependent on the level of 
explanation and the employed architecture. 
 
The implementation of the concept of entropy might appear very coarse at this stage of 
the simulation, considering the full space of possibilities, but some of the possible 
choices that stem from this theoretical reasoning have been more carefully scrutinised 
and compared with each other in terms of simplicity and model fit, and the current 
choice of function achieves adequate results. Therefore, for the time being, the main 
feature of this cognitive process is a quantity defined as entropy driving the variation in 
the slope of the saturation function in the cortical units.  
 
In contrast to the fast-acting mechanism that updates the αpfc, basal ganglia units are 
subject to a relatively slower and incremental learning, sensitive to reward in the form 
of temporal difference. These units control how ‘habitual’ schemas are, reducing the 
selection time of an habitually selected schema. Indeed, there is evidence that the basal 
ganglia are more active in the earlier phases of learning and their activation decreases 
once an action has been well learnt (Yin & Knowlton, 2006). In this framework, the 
basal ganglia acting on the cognitive schemas are part of the associated loop, 
corresponding to the more dorsomedial part of the striatum (caudate). In the core model 
presented here the motor units do not feature any learning parameter, since the stimuli 
are randomised and it is assumed that the subject do no habituate with regard to the 
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position of the pile on which the card has to be put. Still, the basal ganglia as a whole 
acts as a selection device by resolving competition between lower-level motor schemas.  
 
The choice of Eq. 11 to drive the learning mechanism in the basal ganglia unit is 
straightforward and it is in the form of Temporal Difference Learning (TDL). 
Essentially, TDL is a temporally extended version of the more basic Rescorla-Wagner 
(RW) model (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Sutton & Barto, 1998). Both postulate that 
learning occurs when experience violates expectations but the RW equation does not 
contain the discounted term. Rescorla-Wagner equation alone explains several simple 
animal behaviours such as blocking and overshadowing, but it fails to explain second-
order conditioning (or second order predictions) and it does not take into account the 
difference in time between rewards or, more specifically, neglects reward history 
(Miller et al., 1995). These limitations are partially overcome by the hierarchical 
structures of the schemas and the activation mechanism so, in principle, the discount 
parameter γ can be dropped. However, in Eq. 11 we chose to use the TDL rather than 
the simpler RW because of its widespread use in reinforcement learning and the close 
relationship with neuroscience data (Sutton & Barto, 1998) 
 
Form the cognitive point of view, basal ganglia units control the flexibility of cognitive 
control. A too flexible system does not process signals from hierarchically superior 
representation and it cannot ‘stick to the task’, while an inflexible system cannot adapt 
to new external data and will persist in the same behaviour despite negative feedback. 
This is shown in Fig. 5.2, where Perseverative Errors are negatively correlated with the 
parameter εstr and Set Loss errors show the opposite pattern before reaching a minimum. 
Flexibility is a therefore orthogonal to stability and it can be conceptualised as the speed 
to which the system adapts to newly rewarded representations. 
 
The choice of cognitive architecture and the two learning processes mainly stems from 
theoretical considerations, but in order to be validated the model has to be tested against 
the experimental evidence.  Fig. 5.3 and 5.4 shows that increasing parameter εstr 
decreases the number of Perseverative Errors and increasing εpfc  increases those same 
errors to a lesser extent. Remembering that these two parameters reflect the amount of 
dopamine in two different brain circuits, we can draw an analogy with experimental 
data and observe how this qualitative behaviour has been demonstrated in empirical 
studies. Roberts et al. (1994) showed that injecting a neurotoxic drug that selectively 
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destroys dopaminergic cells (6-ODHA) into the PFC of a monkey enhanced 
performance in a task that required attentional set shifting and concurrently impaired the 
ability to hold the necessary set in mind. In contrast, Collins et al. (2000) showed that 
lesioning a marmoset caudate impaired the animal’s response on a set that had been 
previously relevant to obtain reward. However, shifting from the first set does not seem 
to be affected by the lesion. Wanatabe (2005) shows that perseveration in stimulus-
response association in pigeons is not be due to memory loss by damaging the 
equivalent of the caudate and hippocampus in a discrimination task. Only basal ganglia 
lesions cause perseveration-like errors. 
 
The concept of instability in clinical population is captured instead by Mullane and 
Corkum (2007). They compared two small groups of children with and without a 
diagnosis of ADHD and observed that Set Loss (SL) errors are more frequent in ADHD 
children. ADHD children do commit more Perseverative Errors (PE), but group 
differences disappear upon controlling for IQ and age. Although divergent data exist, 
the majority of evidence points toward a different role of basal ganglia and prefrontal 
structures. These empirical data therefore fit generally well with simulations in this and 
in the previous chapter and provide good qualitative evidence for the model.  
 
 Addressing the model's shortcomings 
Despite the model performing adequately and reproducing the trade-off between 
stability and flexibility with some simple assumptions, it has several shortcomings. We 
analyse these in this section. A variation of the model is also presented which 
overcomes one limitation – the absence of response timing in the previous model. Three 
other limitations are discussed, with their resolution left to future research.  
 
5.6.1 Reward mechanism 
The most important limitation of the model described above is the absence of a realistic 
reward mechanism. As pointed out in the previous section, the reward mechanism in 
place is straightforward but it is an implausible optimal solution. While the model 
simply assigns positive or negative unitary values to actions, the subject should know 
which rule received positive or negative feedback, based on the degree of memory 
activation of that particular rule. Perhaps surprisingly, implementing a variable reward 
proportional to the activation value of that schema when feedback is given does not 
improve the model fit, but rather impairs model performance. Counting a 
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positive/negative reward whenever positive/negative feedback is given to a schema 
above a specific activation threshold fails, too. The most reasonable explanation for this 
is that, within this architecture, memory search process cannot be reliably simulated by 
simply altering the reward value as a function of schema activation values. Memory 
search seems to necessarily require adding other schemas representing rules. When the 
subject engages in evaluating which individual rule has been rewarded, the rule does not 
necessarily always correspond to the most active schema, especially whenever more 
than one rule could be potentially correct. If perceptual stimuli drive the evaluation, the 
more salient feature will receive the reward, whereas if top-down signals drive the 
evaluation, the most active cognitive schema should be rewarded.  
This unnecessarily complicates the model, and the question for future research is 
whether the addition of an extra mechanism help answer specific research questions or 
not. 
 
5.6.2 Response time 
A second shortcoming has to do with response time. Altering εpfc and εstr does not 
produce any significant variation in this dependent measure. This is somewhat 
unsurprising, because the signal is processed at the same time in all schemas. To 
overcome this limitation, we introduce a new simple process by programming the top 
schemas to work independently and then pass a signal down to the bottom schemas only 
whenever a certain area-threshold is reached and the signal is also greater than a static 
threshold (set to 0.5). Both static and area threshold are the same for higher and lower 
level schemas. Habitual actions and actions with strongly salient stimuli elicit short 
response times by the virtue of preferential activation. 
 
Simulating this variation preserves the pattern of errors (see Figs. 5.8 and 5.9) that was 
observed in the original simulation, but adds the response time component that was 
absent in that simulation. 
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Fig. 5.8 The plot shows the four errors in the WCST against the parameter εstr, for the 
new simulation. The black, red, and blue lines represents the data from Paolo et al. 
(1996) and Cooper et al. (2012) for young adults, elderly subjects, and Parkinson's 
Disease patients, respectively. 25 subjects have been simulated for each set of values of  
εstr and εpfc 
 
Fig. 5.9 The plot shows the number of categories achieved (CC), the mean response 
time for all trials (RT), the Set Loss error after 3 correct responses (SL3) as in Stuss et 
al. (2000) and the Non-Perseverative Errors (NPE) against the parameter εstr. Notice 
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how SL3 errors, which are generally more sensitive to the loss of information in 
working memory than their SL5 counterpart, display a clearer U-shaped function. The 
existence of an optimal point is consistent with studies that link dopamine in PFC and 
Working Memory. Twenty-five subjects have been simulated for each set of values of  
εstr and εpfc 
 
In this variation of the architecture, the aspect of cognitive control as such depends on 
the very structure of the architecture, and it is separate from the reward mechanism and 
from the timing aspect of the task. De Zeeuw et al. (2012) analysed a cohort of children 
with an ADHD diagnosis and showed that this aspect of cognitive control, reaction 
time, and reward sensitivity can be separated using Latent Class Analysis (LCA). This 
distinction emerges in our model, too. However, there are several important caveats to 
mention. First, the LCA shows that these results are detected in patients diagnosed with 
ADHD (any subtype) but as yet it is unclear how this generalises to controls or other 
populations. This statistical technique did not identify these deficits in healthier 
populations, but it is reasonable to expect that these dissociable features are in principle 
dependent on different brain networks and constitute a valid generalisation. Second, De 
Zeeuw et al. (2012) focused on reward sensitivity measured with a variation of the MID 
(Monetary Incentive Delay) task, where timing between rewarded and non-rewarded 
tasks are ranked and regressed against each other. While both ADHD subjects and 
control have faster reaction times when they anticipate reward, ADHD subjects show a 
significantly smaller difference. The basic reinforcement learning mechanism in our 
model is incapable of simulating these aspects of behaviour, although response times 
and the assigned value of rewards are intimately related to the reaction time. Third, 
reaction times are not the same as response time. While the former are quick and 
essentially stimulus-driven, the latter encompass a sequence of layered mental 
operations. A sizeable motor response time should be also taken into account. While it 
is reasonable to assume that response time increases with the number and the 
complexity of mental operations, the timing of these operations is essentially difficult to 
quantify. This last issue is probably the most relevant limitation in interpreting 
experimental data as a validation of the proposed model. 
 
5.6.3 Encoding reward in the PFC 
Not only neurons in the striatum respond to Reward Prediction Error (RPE). Neurons in 
the Ventral Tegmental Area (VTA), that projects to the prefrontal areas via the 
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mesocortical pathway, do too (Schultz, 2000). It seems that the model can easily 
accommodate another RPE equation that would drive changes in the threshold of the 
cortical schemas (motor or cognitive) but this has not been implemented for sake of 
simplicity. Facilitation of the activation of cortical schemas due to a prediction error 
should be much slower than the one occurring in the striatum, but in the long run it 
would essentially take over the striatum’s function, whose role would become less 
crucial. This would essentially be the computational implementation of the process by 
which habitual action are gradually transferred to the cortical tissue, where their 
activation becomes computationally less effortful (Ashby, 2010) but also less amenable 
to change. If the model was trying to predict how habitual actions develop or are 
unlearnt, this additional parameter would be necessary. However, the simulation only 
concerns events that unfold in seconds, when cognitive control is exerted, or in minutes, 
where additional schemas are unlikely to be learnt anew.   
 
 Simulating clustered data 
In the previous chapter we analysed the result from the simpler model simulation and 
we fitted the model to existing empirical data from Cooper et al. (2012). In this section, 
we repeat the clustering and the data fitting for the current model, but with some 
variations. Firstly, set loss errors were rescored as involving at least 3 correct sorts 
(rather than at least 5) before an error (see Stuss et al., 2000). Secondly, rather than 
arbitrarily choosing 5 clusters, we used the “elbow function” to determine the number 
of clusters. Thirdly, rather than using a genetic algorithm with many parameters to find 
best fitting parameter values for each cluster centroid, only two parameters were 
considered and a simple connectionist network was used to map between values of these 
parameters and the dependent values (performance errors).  
 
The elbow function, which can help establish a data set is amenable to the use of the k-
means algorithm (Hastie et al., 2001), shows how the minimum (dashed yellow line), 
the maximum (dashed blue line) and the mean (solid orange line) within-clusters sums 
of point-to-centroid distance against the number of clusters adopted. Evaluating the 
elbow function (Fig. 5.10) for the current dataset with increasingly higher number of 
clusters shows that the within-cluster sums of point-to-centroid plateaus out after 3 
clusters.  
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Fig. 5.10 The elbow function for the data set from Cooper et al. (2012).  
The light yellow and blue lines represent, respectively, the minimum and maximum 
values of the within-group sum of the distances. After 3 clusters the within-group sum 
does not appreciably diminish. 
 
Figure 5.10 was produced by an unsupervised learning algorithm applied to the data 
from Cooper et al. (2012). Each participant was scored on three dependent measures: 
PE, TE and SL3. SL3 refers to Set Loss Error calculated after 3 correct responses (as in 
Stuss et al., 2000) instead of 5 (as in Heaton, 1975). This ensures greater variability in 
the data. The algorithm was not given any initial centroid as a starting point. Rather, 
data points were sampled from a multivariate uniform distribution, and the algorithm 
was repeated 500 times to ensure replicability. Clusters with the least within-clusters 
sums of point-to-centroid were selected.  
 
The outcome for the empirical data, with three clusters, is shown in Fig. 5.11. Table 5.2 
shows the statistics for the clusters of empirical data. 
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Fig. 5.11 The plot shows the empirical data points clustered in three groups by means of 
the k-means algorithm 
 
 
Table 5.2 Clusters of empirical data 
G N TE PE SL3 
1● 5 24.40 (SD = 3.2) 13.60 (SD = 2.79) 1.80 (SD = 0.71) 
2● 39 12.08 (SD = 3.59) 7.69 (SD = 1.94) .72 (SD = 1.21) 
3● 4 29.25 (SD = 2.63) 2.75 (SD = 2.75) 1.00 (SD = 1.41) 
 
 
 
Whereas in the previous chapter corresponding, simulated clusters were produced with 
a genetic algorithm by varying a large number of parameters, here only parameters εstr 
and εpfc are varied. In order to fit the right set for each of the three clusters, a function 
that maps εstr and εpfc to the three dependent variables TE, PE, and SL3 was needed. For 
this purpose, we built a simple feedforward neural network and we fed it with all the 
data from the simulation run in the previous paragraph and depicted in Fig. 5.11. The fit 
to each cluster was then calculated for a large selection of εstr and εpfc.  Further details 
can be found in the Appendix and results are shown in Fig. 5.12. Table 5.3 shows how 
the three clusters were simulated with different set of parameters.  
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Fig. 5.12 The plot shows the results of three different simulations with three different 
set of parameters 
 
Table 5.3 Clusters of simulated data 
 
G N TE PE SL3 
1● 5 22.60 (SD = 3.64) 15.20 (SD = 3.27) .40(SD = .55) 
2● 39 10.51 (SD = 1.62) 8.12 (SD = 1.85) .64 (SD = .74) 
3● 4 29.00 (SD = 2.31) 20.75 (SD = 2.50) 1.00 (SD = 1.15) 
 
 
While this approach considerably improves on the previous clustering approach by 
‘letting the data talk’ without forcing any prior analysis, there are still limitations. Data 
distribution in each cluster cannot be quickly captured, especially on account of the 
paucity of empirical data and the difference in the number of participants that belong to 
different classes.  
 
In conclusion, simulation with different set of parameters produces different sets of 
performance that match different clusters of empirical data. Whether this can be 
extended to include the performance of neuropsychological impairment without 
including extra parameters and without altering the architecture is an object of future 
research. 
 
 General Discussion 
We began the chapter by analysing the stability-flexibility dilemma in general and we 
addressed how the model of the WCST presented in the previous chapter could be 
modified to explain this feature of cognitive control with a small number of meaningful 
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parameters that govern a few control mechanisms. We identified these mechanisms in 
the alteration of the slope of the saturation curve for the cortical units and the alteration 
of the threshold of the saturation curve for the basal ganglia units. These two 
mechanism are driven by two different principle. Basal ganglia unit parameters are 
altered by a simple Temporal Difference Learning equation, while cortical units 
parameters are altered by a function of the entropy of the schema activations. It has 
been shown that these two principles have clear neurobiological correlates and that 
employing them produces the U-shaped form observed in performance of animal tasks 
when lesion of dopamine depletion is applied to frontal or basal ganglia circuits. 
 
Importantly, we showed that the slope of the cortical saturation function αpfc cannot be a 
free parameter but must depend on a function of the current state of schemas and the 
dopaminergic state of the cortical area representing that schema. More precisely, the 
function has to be contingent on the probability of being selected and therefore exerting 
a top-down influence on lower level schemas. We then showed that entropy satisfies 
these constraints and therefore justifies the form of Eqs. 3-6 shown earlier when 
describing the model governing equations. By the same token, we proceed to described 
how the concept of flexibility can be well associated with the value of βstr, namely the 
threshold of the striatal units. We showed how βstr must vary to accommodate current, 
past, and future rewards in order to produce appropriate results in the task simulation. 
We analysed results and then examined limitation and possible extension of the model. 
 
The model produces quantitatively different results for different sets of parameters and 
it is tested against empirical data. Healthy young participants produce a variable set of 
performance within a single task, and suggests that a clustering algorithm can be used to 
identify different areas of performance and each one can be then simulated with a 
difference sets of parameters. This avoids comparisons between aggregate data, which 
can be misleading. While this technique can be very powerful, several problems arise. 
Future research must focus on understanding how to choose the right number of clusters 
for the analysis. This depends on both the variance of the model output given a fixed set 
of parameter and the separability of the empirical data. Another question worth asking 
is whether we can account for multiple performances in multiple tasks simulated with 
the same cognitive architecture with the same (or, more realistically, a similar) set of 
parameters.  This will be addressed in future chapters.  
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In conclusion, the model provides a possible and provisional answer to the stability-
flexibility dilemma in a specific executive task such as the Wisconsin Card Sorting 
Test, but it does so in a general cognitive architecture that extends the contention 
scheduling (Cooper & Shallice, 2000) with an anatomically detailed model of the basal 
ganglia (Gurney et al., 2001). The model postulates only two free parameters with a 
possible neurological interpretation, and it produces an acceptable fit with the empirical 
data, provided that these are clustered in different groups that are simulated separately. 
In the following chapter we will explore how the model can be extended to simulate a 
variation of the Brixton Task (Burgess & Shallice, 1997) 
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Modelling the Brixton Task with the 
Extended Schema Theory 
 
 Abstract 
In this chapter we present a model of a variation of the Brixton Task (the original test is 
described in Burgess & Shallice, 1996) developed from the extended schema theory. 
The BRX model consists of 5 higher-level schemas and 9 lower-level schemas. Low-
level schemas receive activation from their parent schemas as well as the stimulus. 
High-level schemas receive constant activation. Both are connected to basal ganglia unit 
that bias the selection of schemas.  The control mechanism is almost equivalent to the 
one in the WCST outlined in the previous chapters, including the presence of free 
parameters εstr and εctx. The only significant architectural differences are the number of 
schemas and the way reward is assigned. Like in the WCST, a dedicated mechanism 
provides positive reward in the form of a positive scalar if the rule matches target 
stimuli. However, whereas in the WCST each rule is matched separately, in the BRX a 
rule is activated as long as two successive stimuli match part of a rule.   
 
We describe the model and we simulate how changing learning parameters affect 
performance in a qualitative fashion and whether the model displays general trends in a 
uniformly distributed set of parameter space. We discuss the model in relation to the 
previously described WCST, and how specific parameters relate to mind and brain 
processes. This lays the groundwork for the next chapter, where quantitative model fit 
against data from experimental data are evaluated.  
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 Model description 
6.2.1 Task description 
The Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) has been shown to be useful for a variety of 
assessment, but it suffers from several shortcomings both as a clinical and research tool. 
First, stimuli such as colour, shape, and number do not have the same perceptual 
saliency. Secondly, WCST can often produce ambiguous responses when more than one 
feature matches the target card. The Brixton Task (BRX) (Burgess & Shallice, 1996) 
design circumvents these problems and similarly to the WCST it can be considered a 
cognitive set-shifting and concept attainment task. Unlike the WCST, BRX can be also 
viewed as a visuospatial sequencing task. In the BRX subjects are presented with a 
series of circle. One of these circles is always coloured in and it moves around 
according to a pattern, following subject’s response. The subject has to work out what 
pattern is described by the moving circle and select the next circle they believe will be 
coloured in. The response to the first circle is a guess. The pattern changes from time to 
time and the subject has to adapt to the new pattern. Stimuli in the original Brixton Task 
consists of a 2 by 5 matrix of circles. In the variation proposed here there are 9 circles 
arranged in a circular fashion. This arrangement is useful to obviate the potentially 
confusing passages from the first and the second row. In terms of computational 
architecture, the arrangement of circles in a 2x5 matrix (Fig. 6.1) as in the original test 
or in a circular shape as in our test (Fig. 6.2) is irrelevant. However from now on we 
will always refer to this variation of BRX as the BRX. An important difference with the 
WCST is that the BRX task does not have an explicit feedback signal. If the individual 
understand the instructions, and the new filled-in circle appears where the individual 
clicked, that should be processed as a positive feedback. 
 
 
Fig. 6.1 Template of the original Brixton Task (Burgess & Shallice, 1996) 
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Fig. 6.2 Template of the variation of the Brixton Task used here 
 
In our paradigm there are four possible rules that can be picked by the subject: 
clockwise, counter clockwise, alternate between circles 1 and 5, and counter clockwise 
skipping one circle each time. At the end of the task, several performance variables are 
computed. The most important performance error is the Total Error (TE) score, simply 
measured as the number of incorrect responses. There are three types of errors in the 
‘perseverative responses’ class. Perseverative Response Error (PRSRE) are computed 
whenever the subject presses the current circle, as it was driven by the stimulus only. 
These can be considered as errors due to ‘perseveration of stimulus’. Preceding 
Response Errors (PRE) are counted whenever participants select the same response of 
the immediately previous trial, as they considered the previous response to be correct, 
because of inability to process feedback, for instance. These can be considered 
‘perseveration of response’ error. Perseverative Rule (PRU) errors are counted 
whenever participants select a response that would be correct under the previous rule, as 
they did not switch from applying the old rule to the new one. A minimum of 4 PRU is 
recorded whenever the task is completed correctly, and a maximum of 12 PRU can be 
recorded (3 for each overlap with a new rule). PRSRE, PRE and PRU are merged 
together in Burgess and Shallice (1996) as perseverative errors, because of the inability 
to distinguish them correctly given the 2x4 matrix design and the specific choice of 
patterns in the study design. Here, we distinguish between these errors since they might 
indicate two distinct phenomena at the computational level such as an increased effect 
of the stimulus-response relationship and the inability to effectively and quickly adapt 
to changing contingencies. These errors are also analysed in combination to identify 
whether there is a general perseveration construct. 
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6.2.2 General model description 
The model consists of 5 high-level schemas. Each one represents one of the four 
possible rules that can be applied (clockwise, counter clockwise, alternate between 1-5, 
counter clockwise skipping one circle) and there is an additional schema that represents 
all the other rules. The rule represented by this last schema is randomised on each trial, 
and contributes to account for inter-subject variability in the simulation. Different 
subjects might have different concepts that are not necessarily triggered by the 
presented stimuli. For example, some individuals might overcomplicate rules and infer 
that clockwise motion of the circles is mirrored anticlockwise after a semi-circle is 
completed or, like in the case of patients with anterior frontal damage, infer bizarre 
responses (Burgess & Shallice, 1996) that do not reflect any of the most common rules 
that healthy individuals seem to employ. Adding this fifth schema is necessary to 
produce meaningful variations in responses, and one could potentially account frontal 
damage by damaging all the schemas except for the fifth. The present simulation is not 
concerned with any aspect of rule inference per se, since this probably happen higher up 
in the mental processing hierarchy, but it mainly focus on the cognitive control of these 
rules.  Psychologically, this assumes that individuals have memorised similar inference 
patterns in childhood and their concept attainment mechanism is not impaired by 
physical damage of the brain.   
 
All the high-level schemas are fed with a constant input and uniformly distributed noise. 
A high level schema is and then selected if satisfied two conditions: its activation must 
be greater than θS and the integration of its activation value over time must be greater 
than θA. When a high level schema is activated, activation values are passed onto the 
children schema that represent the action of pressing on a circle (Fig. 6.3). The weight 
between the high-level schemas and the low-level schemas are assigned based on the 
current stimulus. For example, if the third lower-level schema (third circle) is active and 
the second rule (counter clockwise) has also been selected, the second higher-level 
schema feeds the circle prior to the current stimulus, namely the second circle. 
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Fig. 6.3 Schematic of the model without the basal ganglia arbitration device. For 
instance, given that specific filled-in circle as an input, the +1 schema (clockwise) 
excites the following circle, whereas the -1 schema (counter-clockwise) excites the 
preceding one.  
 
The 9 lower-level schemas represent all the 9 possible selection choices, and they are 
also activated by environmental cues (stimuli). In this way, in absence of top-down 
control, environmental cues drive the choice of pattern. Higher and lower order schemas 
all feed into two parallel mechanism that resolve the competition within the same 
hierarchical level, exactly as in the WCST model. Basal ganglia units implement this 
arbitration device, feeding back all the schemas with inhibition signals, as described in 
the WCST chapter. The internal structure of the basal ganglia unit is shown in Fig. 6.4.  
 
Fig. 6.4 Schematic of the basal ganglia. Legend: Cortex-Thalamic complex (CTX-
THAL), Striatum (STR), Subthalamic nucleus (STN), Globus Pallidus Internal/External 
Segment (GPi and GPe) 
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6.2.3 Feedback and bias mechanism 
Feedback mechanism are similar to the ones operating in the WCST, but with some 
important differences. While in the WCST high level rules are reinforced according to 
their success (positive or negative feedback) through a basal ganglia mechanism only, 
BRX requires a different mechanism that matches the last stimulus with the available 
rule sets. A preliminary implementation (not reported here) with a simple reward 
mechanism identical to the one in WCST yields a higher number of total errors than 
individuals usually make. Although the amount is not much bigger, this shows that this 
process needs to be fine-tuned to produce at least a reasonable first approximation of 
human performance. This mechanism prescribes that if two consecutive circles appears 
in counter clockwise fashion, that particular schema will be activated. If this 
arrangement has some features in common with the random schema, the latter will also 
be activated. Computationally, this amounts to find the (ordered) intersection between 
the vector that represents the last two presented stimuli and one possible rule set. If the 
match is positive, the transfer function of the relevant rules are then biased to increase 
the likelihood of being selected. The reward value is generated via a simple reward 
prediction learning rule, with a discount factor: 
 
𝛿𝑖 =  𝑟𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖 + γ · 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑_𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖(𝑡) 
 
Where all terms are the ith component of a vector, and r is either 1 or 0, depending 
whether there is a match with any rule set and the previous one or two stimuli. The ith 
component a represents the activation of that specific higher-level schema.  
 
The discounted term is calculated like in the WCST model, using the memory of 
previous activations. 
 
 
𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖(𝑡)  =  𝑜𝑝𝑓𝑐(𝑡) Eq.8 
  
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑_𝑎𝑐𝑡(𝑡)  =   ∑ 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖(𝑡) ∙ 2
−𝑇+𝑡−1
𝑇
𝑡 = 1
 
 
Eq.9 
  
𝛿(𝑡)  =  𝑟𝑖(𝑡) − 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖(𝑡) + 𝛾 ∙ 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑_𝑎𝑐𝑡(𝑡) Eq.10 
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The reward prediction error δ then drives the change in the basal ganglia transfer 
function according to the previously outlined equation: 
 
𝛽𝑠𝑡𝑟,𝑖(𝑡 + 1) =  𝜂0−1[𝛽𝑠𝑡𝑟,𝑖(𝑡) − 𝜖𝑠𝑡𝑟 ∙ 𝛿(𝑡) + 𝜁𝑝𝑓𝑐,𝑖]   
 
where β represent the slope of the basal ganglia transfer function, εstr represent the 
learning coefficient (and more concretely, the amount of dopamine in the basal ganglia 
circuit), and ζ is noise sampled from a uniform distribution. The function η0-1 limits the 
output between 0 and 1:  
 
𝜂0−1(𝑥) = {
0, 𝑥 < 0
      𝑥,       0 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 1
1, 𝑥 > 1
 
 
In conclusion, the only two substantial differences between the WCST model and the 
BRX model are in the number of schemas that the basal ganglia unit process in each 
level and in the reward mechanism. In order to simulate the BRX the structure of the 
WCST has been adapted and expanded to accommodate a new task, without undergoing 
any major architectural changes. 
 
6.2.4 Computation in individual units 
Computation in the individual units is very similar to the one described for the first 
model of WCST, but, as in the complete WCST, the step function and the self-
excitation weights in the cortical cognitive schemas (higher-level schemas) has been 
removed. Since it has been shown that this did not significantly affect the WCST 
model’s behaviour, these unnecessary details have been left out. All the units (higher 
level cortical, lower level cortical, striatum, subthalamic nucleus, globus pallidus 
external segment, globus pallidus internal segment) process signal in a very similar 
fashion, as indicated by the equations below.  
 
Each cortical unit receives input from parent schemas and feedback from the associated 
basal ganglia units while the basal ganglia units receive input from the cortical units and 
it distributes the signal according to its circuit pathways. Signal is manipulated with 
three operation shown below:  
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ui ⟸ ∑on
N
 
 
ai(t) ⇐ δ ∙ ai(t − 1) + (1 − δ) ∙ ui(t − 1) 
 
oi ⟸ σ (ai) 
 
The thalamus unit has a different output function, because the thalamus is activated via 
disinhibition: 
  
oi ⟸−σ (ai) 
 
A sigmoid function that squashes the output values between 0 and 1 is applied to all the 
outputs. For completeness, the analytic form of the sigmoid function is again shown 
below.  
 
σ(x) =
1
1 + 𝑒−𝛼(𝑥−𝛽)
 
 
Importantly, parameters such as α (slope of the sigmoid function) and β (threshold of 
the saturation function) are not identical for all units. Table 6.1 below illustrates the 
value of the parameters, including α and β, that are kept constant during all simulations. 
  
Table 6.1 Brixton Model Parameter  
(the part delimited by red borders represent the parameters that are unchanged from the 
WCST model) 
 
Symbol Value Meaning 
δ 0.6 
Integration constant, acting as a 
low-pass filter 
αstr 4 Slope sat. func. in the striatum 
βstr 0.5 Threshold sat. func in the striatum 
αstn 5 Slope sat. func in the subthalamic n. 
βstn 0.3 
Threshold sat. func in the 
subthalamic n. 
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αthal 6 Slope sat. func in the thalamic n. 
βthal 0.4 
Threshold sat. func in the thalamic 
n. 
αgpe 5 
Slope sat. func in the globus pallidus 
(ext. seg.) 
βgpe 0.2 
Threshold sat. func in the globus 
pallidus (ext. seg.) 
αgpi 5 
Slope sat. func in the globus pallidus 
(int. seg.) 
βgpi 0.2 
Threshold sat. func in the globus 
pallidus (int. seg.) 
αsma 8 
Slope sat. func. in the 
supplementary mot. cort. 
βsma 0.5 
Threshold sat. func. in the 
supplementary mot. cort. 
wrule 
w′rule 
1 
0 
Weight for active cognitive schemas 
Weight for non-active cognitive 
schemas 
wstim 
wstim,base 
0.635 
0.270 
Weight for active motor schemas 
Weight for non-active motor 
schemas 
θA 3•105 Area-threshold 
θS 0.4 
Threshold to activation (minimal 
necessary) 
ζpfc 0.10 
Noise added to the update of b.g. 
transfer function 
ζenv 0.10 
Noise added to the lower schemas 
input (environment) 
wgpe_gpi -0.3 
Fixed weight from globus pallidus 
ext. to int. 
wstrD1_gpi -1 
Fixed weight from striatum D1 to 
int. pallidus 
wstrD2_gpe -1 Fixed weight from striatum D2 to 
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ext. pallidus 
wstn 1 
Fixed weight from cortex to 
subthalamic n. 
wstn_gpi 0.9 
Fixed weight from subthalamic n. to 
int. pallidus 
wgpe_stn -1 
Fixed weight from ext. pallidus to 
subthalamic n. 
wstn_gpe 0.9 
Fixed weight from subthalamic n. to 
ext. pallidus 
 
 Simulations 
6.3.1 Introduction 
In this section we aim to explore how parameters variation affect model behaviour 
rather than to find a good set of parameter that fits experimental data. This qualitative 
analysis will help reflect on the psychological meaning of our parameter set and help 
contrast qualitative results with those obtained for the WCST. This would ensure that 
the model is both robust, it can be relate to psychological and biological phenomena, 
and it lays the groundwork for a quantitative fit once experimental data are collected. 
 
6.3.2 Exploring the parameter space 
In this section we want to examine whether the value of a selected set of parameters is 
free to vary at the same time, and to what extent, without altering the qualitative trend 
of performance change when altering the main learning parameters εstr and εpfc. 
Observing a general trend would suggest that the qualitative outcome across εstr and εpfc 
is primarily due to the structure of the architecture itself and not solely to the parameter 
values. The qualitative behaviour of the model in relation to the learning parameters 
should not be overly sensitive interaction among all the parameters, but mainly to the 
architecture and the interaction between various elements of it. Variation in parameters 
within a viable range would rather express inter-individual or intra-individual 
differences in performance.  
 
In this first simulation we vary the set of parameter shown in Table 6.2 below, sampling 
from a uniform distribution in the range shown. The choice of parameters and range is 
not arbitrary, but here varying fewer relevant parameters within a slightly bigger range 
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is preferable to altering all parameters within a smaller range. Extreme variation or 
extreme values can give rise to deadlock or degenerate cases on account of the 
extremely non-linear behaviour of the model. For instance, if the lower schemas are fed 
a signal greater than the response threshold and higher-level schemas do not counter-act 
with a strong signal, a tiny variation in those parameters can produce exclusively one 
type of errors. While this happen unfrequently and only for extreme values of 
parameters, the system can potentially break down due to extremely unbalanced signal 
ratios.  
 
 
Table 6.2 Parameter space lower and upper bounds 
Parameter Lower bound Upper bound 
oext 0.8 1 
γ 0 0.25 
αsma 6 11 
αstr,ctx 10 15 
βthal 0.3 0.5 
wstim 0.4 0.6 
Wstim, base 0.2 0.3 
wrule 0.4 0.5 
 
 
We simulate 15 participants for each of the value of the free parameter εstr from 0 to 1 in 
6 equally spaced intervals and for four values of εpfc (0, 0.33, 0.67, and 1). For each 
participant the values of the set of parameters described in Table 6.2 (first column on 
the left) are drawn from a uniform distribution within the indicated range (middle and 
right columns of the table). Fig. 6.5 reveals general trends for all the performance errors 
except for PRSRE. TE negative trend with εstr is clear and consistent with what we 
expect to see and what we observed in the WCST. Furthermore, parameter εpfc seems to 
have an optimal value changing across εstr. PRSRE seem to be erratic and its average 
excessively high, indicating that the environment seem to drive responses unpredictably 
when the set of above parameters varies excessively. PRE, the ‘perseveration of 
response’ is increasing when εstr is decreased, and the trend is clear and consistent with 
the WCST results, albeit the errors plateaus out much more quickly than the TE. What 
seems to be counter-intuitive is the positive correlation between εstr and PRU errors due 
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to ‘perseverations of rule’. After all, the εstr learning mechanism is applied to the higher-
level schemas only. However, not enough PRU might be committed simply because 
other perseveration (stimulus or response) take place in the same 50 trials. 
 
 
 
Fig. 6.5 Fifteen subjects for each value of εstr and εpfc are simulated. Parameters have 
been uniformly sampled within the range sets above. 
 
6.3.3 Exploring single parameters 
Here we want to analyse the effect of individual parameters on errors, and especially 
compare it with what our intuition suggests, given the knowledge of the architecture. 
This help build a bridge between our intuitions and the real behaviour of the model. 
Moreover, we can study whether there are singular points for which the model breaks 
down. Here, we can also compare our results with those obtained by modelling the 
WCST. Table 6.3 displays the values parameters have been set to while only one of 
them is being altered. 
 
 
Table 6.3 Parameters of interest for the following simulations 
Parameter Values 
oext 0.85 
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γ 0.10 
αsma 10 
αstr,ctx 9.5 
βthal 0.40 
wstim 0.45 
Wstim, base 0.30 
wrule 1.10 
 
We start with the analysis of parameter γ. This parameter called discount factor appears 
in the Bellman’s Equation, and it is used to decrease the cumulative reward function 
exponentially in order to ensure convergence (Sutton & Barto, 1998).  Here, the 
discount factor is used in a significantly different way, namely to increase the 
magnitude of predicted activation in the prediction error, in accord with the behaviour 
of dopamine neurons in the striatum (Sutton & Barto, 1998). This, in turn, activate a 
mechanism that reinforces the correct rule. A discount factor of 0 neglects future 
prediction of activation while a discount factor of 1 takes into account only the feedback 
when the activation of the schema is predicted to be equal to the current activation. This 
suggests that a lower γ should decrease total errors and there should not be any singular 
point. While this hypothesis is correct, the impact of γ is very small, like in the WCST 
(Fig. 6.6). This common observation probably from those mechanisms that are triggered 
only after each feedback is administered, and not in discrete small steps. In addition, 
response time are unaffected by this manipulation. 
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Fig. 6.6 The plot depicts all the performance errors against the parameter γ. 
 
We examine now how the external parameter oext parameter affects the simulation. If the 
model had more parent schemas, oext would be essentially a top-down bias. 
The hypothesis is that the model would break down abruptly below a specific threshold 
and that decreasing this parameter should gradually increase response time, as well. As 
Fig. 6.7 shows, the model stops producing responses below a threshold, while response 
times peak very quickly after a value less than .85 and the model cannot start for a value 
less than .80 (Fig. 6.8). Importantly, there is no difference between response time after 
correct and incorrect responses. Contrary to our prediction, the variation of response 
time is very steep and almost abrupt. 
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Fig. 6.7 The plot depicts all the considered performance errors against the parameter oext 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6.8 The plot depicts the response time after correct (left) and incorrect (right) 
responses against the parameter oext 
 
 
In this model oext is static, but it can potentially be modulated by other higher-level 
schemas that are activated by stimuli and current or previous reward. Fig. 6.9 shows 
how the stimulus intensity wstim affects performance errors.  
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Fig. 6.9 The plot depicts all the performance errors against the parameter wstim 
 
When values are greater than 0.5 the model produces only stimulus errors (not shown 
here). This is predictable, as the static threshold for schema activation has been set to 
0.5. This transition point will be therefore excluded in the following simulations. Errors 
due to perseveration of rules (PRU) does not seem to be greatly affected by changes in 
the stimulus intensity, remaining approximately constant, while perseveration of 
stimulus is affected the most. This confirms that the two perseverative processes are 
somewhat independent, at least for a restricted range of parameters. Response times do 
not seem to be affected by this alteration, either. Altering wstim,base has minimal effects. 
 
 
 157 
 
Fig. 6.10 The plot depicts all the performance errors against the parameter wstim,base 
 
Analysing how errors (Fig. 6.11) and response times (Fig. 6.12) change when 
simultaneously altering wstim,base and wrule . Results show that a baseline external 
excitation of the lower order schemas has to be set below 0.5 for the model to work. 
Gradually decreasing excitation from the higher order schemas from 0.7 has an 
exponential effect on response time and therefore on the number of completed trials in 
fixed timeframe. Performance errors seem to be little affected by the ratio between 
wstim,base and wrule, in that the magnitude of changes does not seem to be able to 
reproduce the larger variance present in experimental samples.  
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Fig. 6.11 The plot depicts all performance errors against the parameter pairs wstim,base 
and wrule 
 
 
 
Fig. 6.12 The plot depicts all the response time and completed trials against the 
parameter pairs wstim,base and wrule 
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Lastly, we plot αsma against all the performance errors. Fig. 6.13 shows how αsma affects 
performance errors. For PRE and PRU noise seems to affect the outcome variables 
unpredictably, without a clear general trend. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6.13The plot depicts all the performance errors against the parameter αsma 
 
 Discussion 
Analysing qualitative model behaviour over a vast range of variables is an important 
preliminary step. Initially, a reasonable range of parameters that can be used in model 
fitting has to be established before proceeding to a more rigorous quantitative model fit. 
Exploring model behaviour with a set of random parameters helps the modeller to 
assess model robustness by evaluating general performance trends, and therefore 
provides a stronger theoretical account for the relevant properties of the model (Cooper 
and Guest, 2014). In our case, the model’s total errors steadily increase as εstr decreases, 
but the other errors also present recognisable trends provided that εpfc values are not too 
extreme. This suggests that the architecture plays a major role in determining behaviour, 
that within the designated parameter space it is possible to find optimal and suboptimal 
solution for particular groups in a reliable way, and that our intuition on the role of εstr 
and εpfc  is reasonable (although only a more precise quantitative fit can answer this 
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question) and mirrors the role of same parameters in the WCST. Had we observed a 
mostly random, unpredictable behaviour, we would have concluded that while within 
that parameter space an optimum might exist, the architecture does not play a causal 
role in determining it. Consequently, a quantitative fit would be misleading. 
 
After the analysis in the parameter space, systematic variation of individual parameters 
allows one to test their intuition on how the model should work and aids the modeller in 
evaluating for what values the model start producing random or no responses.  It is 
important to appreciate that in a complex model one could not possibly simulate the 
variation of all the combination of parameters for all the possible ranges. However, a 
reasoned choice of parameters helps, in principle, ruling out alternative explanation for 
specific behaviours.  
 
More concretely, here we varied the αsma parameters, representing the slopes of the 
transfer function in cortical and basal ganglia schemas, and we observed that although 
sometimes performance tends to fluctuate for extreme values of εpfc ganglia, the trend is 
generally stable and not approximately flat. This, together with the absence of a 
straightforward neurobiological interpretation for this parameter, suggests that αsma 
should not be varied in order to fit models to specific groups of participants (although it 
could adjusted when fitting the whole experimental sample). Also, the parameter is not 
an integral part of the theoretical argument we are trying to make, namely that two 
different learning mechanisms drive cortex and basal ganglia behaviour to produce 
different sets performances. 
 
Conversely, variation of parameter oext produces regular trends in all performances 
errors. When the value decreases below .85 model performance is destabilised, and for 
values below .80 the model stops running abruptly. This suggests that oext could be a 
suitable additional parameter if εstr and εpfc alone failed to capture intergroup variations, 
as long as it is its value is greater than .85. 
 
Altering wstim,base and wrule seem to have a robust but rather small effect on performance 
errors. Provided that excitation of lower order schemas does not exceed 0.4, and 
excitation of lower order schemas from higher order schemas does not fall below 0.5, 
response times seem to be affected in an exponential fashion, a cognitive analog to the 
Parkinson’s freezing of gait (Rahman et al., 2008).  
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Finally, it is important to notice that in the analysed parameter space perseveration of 
rule errors (PRU) does not seem to increase above the average of 4 errors (which is the 
value expected given perfect performance), suggesting that no parameter in this space is 
responsible for generating perseveration of rule errors. An additional simulation (not 
shown) demonstrates that the discrepancy between reward values for correct and 
incorrect responses does not affect PRU either. Notably, this does not happen in the 
WCST, where the manipulation of  εstr and εpfc and also the weights between higher and 
lower order schemas all affect rule perseveration behaviour (PE, in the case of the 
WCST). Reasoning by exclusion, the only mechanism capable of affecting PRU errors 
in a substantial way might be the rule matching mechanism. Although the model has not 
yet been compared to an actual dataset, this mechanism has been designed to produce 
gross aspects of expected human behaviour. One likely interpretation is that rule 
perseveration does not happen under general circumstances and, unlike what it is 
observed in the WCST, the continuous presence of the stimulus prevents the subject 
from committing PRU. Potentially, this can be empirically verified by observing the 
PRU errors in different populations.   
 
We have shown how qualitative analysis of model behaviour in the form of exploration 
of a parameter space and systematic variation of single or pair of parameters is essential 
to the success of the model, laying the groundwork for a more precise quantitative 
analysis against experimental data. 
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Simulating aging in the Wisconsin Card 
Sorting Test and Brixton Task 
 
 Abstract 
In this chapter we further explore the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) and Brixton 
Task BRX) models developed in the previous chapters, in relation to novel experimental 
data. We aim to give a computational account of these two tasks in younger and older 
individuals, and more generally to establish a computational framework to study the 
deterioration of executive functions in aging. We tested twenty-five young adults and 
twenty-five adults over the age of 60 who completed both WCST and BRX in the same 
session. Performance errors and response times were analysed and compared within and 
between tasks. Results show that when performing the WCST older adults do not 
persevere on the same responses more often than younger adults, but they tend to 
commit more set loss errors. The variability in performance is also analysed. When 
performing the BRX the difference in performance between younger and older adults is 
minimal. Response times are affected by positive or negative feedback and age in both 
tasks. We also analyse the construct of perseveration across both tasks. Subsequently, 
we introduce again the computational models of the two tasks presented in detail in the 
previous chapters and we search through the parameter space using the simulated 
annealing technique in order to find the best set of parameters for all the different 
groups. Clustering groups by performance for the WCST only and comparing different 
model fits yield two distinct solutions with a different set of parameter values for each 
cluster.  We argue from this for a new way to interpret computational parameters, 
namely εstr, εpfc and oext, and a new general framework to think about age-related changes 
in executive function, namely in terms of compensatory mechanisms. 
  
 163 
 
 Experiment 
7.2.1 Introduction 
Executive functions are an umbrella term for a large set of abilities that includes, for 
instance, forming novel goal representations and the ability to carry out goal-directed 
actions. Their definition is still controversial, especially in the light of the wide variation 
in performance between tasks, between individuals, between healthy and clinical 
population, and within clinical populations.  
 
Although there is consensus on specific cognitive vulnerability in aging, it is unclear 
how the pattern of loss of executive functions unfolds during the lifespan (Jurado & 
Rosselli, 2007) and an attempt to correlate these findings to brain structure has been 
compromised by methodological problems. Other approaches attempt to explain the 
deterioration in cognitive performance with aging with the decrease in concentration of 
neurotransmitters (mainly dopamine, but also acetylcholine and norepinephrine) in 
prefrontal areas that affects the elderly population (de Keiser et al., 1990), but then 
again without distinguishing between brain areas, and failing to take into account 
operations across diverse cognitive domains. Experimentally and clinically there are a 
number of ways to measure executive functions and the number of individual tests or 
batteries available is high. Although their ecological validity is often called into 
question, these tests still have a good predictive validity, at least in elderly population, 
in terms of the ability to live independently (Cahn-Weiner et al., 2000) or to develop 
mild dementia (Natahan et al., 2001). Nevertheless, the so-called 'task impurity' 
problem hinders the understanding of executive functions, which have multiple process-
behaviour relationships compared to low-level brain processing (e.g. early visual 
perception processes such as edge recognition) (Hughes & Graham, 2002). Non-
executive processes can easily encroach on executive processes, as domain general 
systems act and depend on at least a few domain specific processes at the same time. In 
aging research this problem becomes evident from the dissociation between classic 
executive tasks and everyday task that require extensive problem solving (Salthouse, 
2012). Older adults show impaired strategy selection when solving higher-order tasks. 
However, to complicate things further, healthy older adults tends to perform better in 
every-day problem solving, especially if they involve social reasoning (Crawford & 
Channon, 2002). It is unclear whether experience or other abilities are responsible for 
these dissociations. Broad constructs and huge variability in different experimental 
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paradigms make fields such as cognitive decline and executive functions fraught with 
difficult questions that have remained unanswered.  
 
The neural substrates of these domain-general operations are often traced to the 
prefrontal cortex (PFC), where lesions or functional disconnection tend to impair tasks 
across different cognitive modalities. Joint results from functional imaging and naturally 
occurring lesions suggest that different part of the PFC perform different operations on 
tasks (Shallice et al., 2008), but discriminating their specific functions has been proven 
challenging. This view of the PFC as a general supervisory device is not universally 
accepted, and the PFC is functionally described by some authors in terms of its lateral-
medial and dorsal-lateral gradient (Badre & D’Esposito, 2007).  
 
With regard to neurobiology, loss of neurons in the prefrontal cortex has been 
classically associated to aging, but also related to decreased concentration of 
neurotransmitters such as dopamine and norepinephrine in the same areas. Greenwood 
and colleagues (2000) argue that these physical changes in the frontal lobe alone are 
insufficient to bring about general cognitive decline, and reject the localisation of aging 
processes in the prefrontal cortex, for a network theory of cognitive aging. 
 
A potential solution to these problems consists in narrowing down the focus to 
individual executive tasks that are posited to require similar, but not identical, mental 
operations and representations. Therefore, here we direct our attention on a variation of 
the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST; Heaton, 1981) and a variation of the Brixton 
Task (BRX; Burgess & Shallice, 1997). There are several reasons for this choice. First, 
both tasks are thought to measure some level of executive functioning. Secondly, both 
tasks have been used in clinical populations such as frontal patients (Burgess & 
Shallice, 1997) and on healthy elderly participants (Bialek et al., 2006). Despite their 
apparent simplicity, both of them are considered tests of higher order cognition. Both 
tasks give us the opportunity to investigate the psychological construct of perseveration 
from two different points of view. In this chapter this specific concept will be further 
analysed computationally, to explore how the similarity and differences in performance 
in the two tasks can be explained within the framework of the extended schema theory, 
described in the previous chapters, and to demonstrate how a computational explanation 
can build a bridge between psychological and neural levels for these tasks. 
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As discussed in previous chapters, in the WCST subjects can commit two different 
kinds of errors, perseverative errors (PE) and set loss errors (SL). These two forms of 
error are mutually exclusive but not collectively exhaustive. That is to say that the same 
errors can be counted either as perseverative error or as a set loss error (but not both), or 
as another kind of non-perseverative errors, often counted when the subject attempts to 
find the correct rule. We argue that these two main types of error depend on partially 
separable cognitive processes, and that these cognitive processes can be, at least 
partially, although not exclusively, differentially localised to cortical and subcortical 
structures. A first necessary (but not sufficient) step to argue in support of this 
dissociation is to show that types of error are independent, at least in some populations 
or subsets of these populations. An aging population is ideal, because functional decline 
of cognitive control in the elderly covaries with the degree of overlap in task 
representation, in that even simple cognitive tasks stimuli and responses sets have 
representations in common, and older individual might be more susceptible to 
interference when changing task set (Mayr, 2001). Prior research has also found that in 
older populations there is an overall decline of proactive control (Paxton et al., 2007), 
defined as the ability to sustain goal-relevant information. Reactive control, that is the 
ability to mobilise resources once interference is detected, is instead thought to be 
spared by aging.   
 
With regards to perseverative errors, research seems to point to opposite conclusions. 
For instance, Heaton (1981) reports that individuals over 60 produce more perseverative 
errors than young controls. Conversely, Boone et al. (1990) reports that individuals 
older than 70 did not. Haaland (1987) found that perseveration appears only after the 
age of 80. These results are difficult to reconcile, but they possibly stem from 
aggregating results and neglecting individual compensatory mechanisms, at both 
neurobiological and psychological levels.  
 
In fact, while the relationship between aging and perserverative errors in WCST is now 
well documented (Rhodes, 2004), age-related perseveration, unlike the set loss error, is 
moderated by the number of year of education, as more educated patients tend to 
commit fewer perseverative errors. In other words, while SL errors are more likely to be 
a hallmark of aging, perseveration seems to be dependent on other factors and it is less 
clearly connected to the underlying neurobiology of the frontal cortex alone. Possibly, 
perseverative errors might arise from the inability to use feedback to update the new 
correct representation, and this might not be solely dependent on unspecified frontal 
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dysfunction. It is also possible that more educated people use more efficient strategies, 
or they have greater cognitive reserve, and hence less susceptible to the aging effects. 
 
In order to examine how performance in WCST and BRX declines or not with aging, 
we asked 25 younger people and 25 older people to complete a computerised version of 
a variation of the WCST and a variation of BRX whose procedure will be illustrated in 
the appropriate paragraph. In this experimental section we analyse only aggregate data 
and we look for between-groups differences in performance, such as performance errors 
and response times. 
 
We hypothesise that in WCST we will observe a significant difference in SL errors 
between the older and the younger group (with older participants making more SL 
errors) but, given the convenience sample, that there will be no significant difference in 
the number of perseverative errors. With regard to the BRX, we hypothesise an increase 
in non-perseverative errors in the older group compared to the younger group, which 
means that only the total error will be significantly greater for older participants. 
Furthermore, we hypothesise a positive correlation between PE in WCST and PRU in 
BRX.  
 
7.2.2 Methods 
Participants consisted of 25 young adults (9 men and 16 women) and 25 older adults (8 
men and 17 women). The age of young participants ranged from 19 to 53 years (M = 
27.1, SD = 9.1). The age of the older participants ranged from 62 to 84 years (M = 70.8, 
SD = 6.4). A chi-square test was performed and no relationship was found between 
gender and the being aged over 60, χ2 (1) = 0.089, p =.77.  Young participants were 
recruited mainly through the university database while the older ones were recruited via 
charities for the elderly such as Age UK and the University of the Third Age. 
Participants were required to be free of any neurological or psychiatric diagnosis, 
although these conditions were not formally assessed. The data was collected from a 
touch screen tablet, so that participants did not have to use any external device to 
respond to the stimuli.  
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7.2.3 Procedure and performance measurements 
All 50 participants completed these variation of WCST and BRX in random order. One 
elderly participant was excluded from the analysis of the BRX on account of a high 
number of errors, possibly due to misunderstanding the instructions. In order to 
minimise distractions, participants were encouraged to switch off their phone, and to try 
to focus on the task as much as they could. The study took place in an acoustically 
isolated booth.  If participants wore glasses they were asked to wear them. Also, 
participants were asked to avoid overthinking or rushing, and to complete the tasks at 
their normal pace.  
 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) 
A computerised variation of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Heaton, 1975) was 
administered to all participants. In this variation of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test 
(WCST) subjects were presented with a card at the bottom of the screen that changes at 
each trial, and they had to drag that card to below one of the four target cards above in 
order to match it according to a rule. There were only three possible rules to choose 
from: sort by colour, sort by shape, and sort by number. Once they had dragged the card 
into one of the four positions, they received a feedback both on screen and by voice on 
whether their choice was correct or incorrect according to the current sorting criterion. 
Once the card was released it was possible to see it only for a second, and then it 
disappeared. This is essentially, the most substantial variation on the version of the task 
that is usually employed in clinical practice, since usually the last card remains visible 
to the participant. Given the feedback, participants had to identify the rule and stick to 
it. The rule changed after 8 correct attempts, but participants were not given this piece 
of information. There were 64 cards in total to match. 
 
Responses were registered in order to compute performance errors. Here we focus on 
the most important for our analysis: the number of total errors (TE), the number of 
perseverative errors (PE), and the number of Set Loss errors (SL3). Perseverative errors 
were calculated as indicated in Heaton’s (1975) manual. Each response that would have 
been corrected in the previous set only was counted as a PE. It is possible to commit 
perseverative errors without having completed the first set, if the subject selects the 
incorrect rule unambiguously for more than three successive times and they persist on 
that rule. Set Loss errors were calculated as in Stuss et al. (2000). After three correct 
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and unambiguous4 responses in a set (hence the number 3 after SL), an error was 
counted as a set loss error. All errors after a set loss errors were not counted as such. 
Perseverative errors and set loss errors are mutually exclusive, but the total error set 
contains both perseverative and set loss errors. A performance variable called Learning 
to Learn was also calculated for participants who completed 4 or more categories (60% 
of the older and 84% of the younger subject). LTL is defined as the mean between the 
percentage change in errors between successive categories. In other words, LTL 
measures how the subject improves in solving the task. In this respect, our prediction is 
that subjects would not show any appreciable LTL in either population, as prior to the 
task participants have been carefully instructed about the three possible choices and had 
several practice trials when they were encouraged to ask questions regarding the rules of 
the task.   
 
Brixton Task (BRX) 
A variation of the Brixton Task (Burgess & Shallice, 1997) was also administered to all 
participants. In this computerised version, participants are presented with a set of nine 
circles arranged in a circular fashion. One of them is always filled in with a black 
colour. Subjects were asked to press lightly on the screen, on the position where they 
believed the next filled circle would be. Filled circle moved around following a series of 
five sequences rules, each comprising ten circles in succession. Responses were 
registered in order to compute performance errors. Overall response times and response 
times after a correct and incorrect response were measured, too. 
 
The number of Total Errors (TE) was calculated without any correction, so that it 
captured the highest number of possible total inaccuracies. Preceding Response Error 
(PRE) were counted whenever subjects click on the current circle (the previous target) 
instead of the expected one. This can be due to the failure of understanding instructions 
or the activation of the relevant schema linked to the stimulus. For these reasons PRE 
can be considered as ‘stimulus perseverating errors’. Whenever subjects select the 
previous response they commit perseverative response errors (PRSR). For these reasons 
they can be considered as ‘response perseverating errors’. However, PRSR can be PRE 
errors, too. Subjects commit Perseverative Rules (PRU) errors whenever they select the 
                                                 
4 An unambiguous response is counted if at least one of the previous correct responses 
has a single match with the rule. This decreases the probability to assign a set loss error 
when the subject has not internalised the rule. 
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response that would have been correct under the previously active rule. Since the 
subject is unaware of when the rule will change, a few PRU are inevitable whenever 
subject guess the previous rule correctly. Bizarre responses (BRE) were recorded 
whenever subjects tapped outside the circles. We strove to minimise the number of 
these responses by carefully instructing participants and by showing text on screen 
reminding participants to tap inside the circle whenever they tapped outside. It is 
however difficult to judge whenever these responses are due to distraction, inaccuracies 
(that we made sure to minimise by having big circles in the diagram), or inferring an 
unusual position for the next circle.  
 
7.2.4 Results 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) 
Table 7.1 shows descriptive statistics for the two groups of participants in the 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) 
 
 
Table 7.1 Performance errors in the WCST 
 
Categories 
Achieved 
Perseverative 
Errors (PE) 
Set Loss 
Errors 
(SL3) 
Total 
Errors 
(TE) 
Learning to 
Learn 
(LTL) 
Younger 
M = 6.2 
(SD = 1.9) 
M = 11.3 
(SD = 4.29) 
M = 0.64 
(SD = 1.00) 
M = 17.0 
(SD = 5.59) 
M = 4.5% 
(SD = 4.5%) 
Older 
M = 4.5 
(SD = 2.8) 
M = 13.3 
(SD = 6.40) 
M = 1.48 
(SD = 1.56) 
M = 20.9 
(SD = 8.97) 
M = 2.3% 
(SD = 4.0%) 
 
None of the performance variables analysed (Total Errors, Perseverative Errors, Set 
Loss Errors, Mean of Median Response Time) were normally distributed, as shown by 
running a Shapiro-Wilk test (p < .001) but running equivalent non-parametric tests 
yield very close results. All directional tests are two-tailed tests, unless otherwise 
specified. The Mean of Median Response Time (henceforth mean RT) was obtained 
calculating the median RT for each participant and then calculating the mean across 
subjects. Analysis of Learning To Learn (LTL) showed that it LTL ranges between -
3.9% and 12.5% and a single sample t-test compared with a mean of zero shows the 
difference to be significant t(35) = 4.94, p < .001. This showed that all subjects 
generally improved their performance during the task, albeit modestly (M = 3.6%, SD = 
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4.4%). However, an unpaired t-test between LTL in young and old subject showed no 
significant difference in the two groups, t(34) = 1.49, p = .14. 
 
Independent t-tests were conducted between performance variables. Comparing Total 
Error in Younger (M = 17, SD = 5.59) and Older (M = 20.9, SD = 8.97) subjects 
yielded a non-significant difference, t(48) = 1.81,  p = .076. Comparing Perseverative 
Errors in Young (M = 11.3, SD = 4.29) and Old (M = 13.3, SD = 6.40) subjects also 
yielded non-significant results, t(48) = 1.14, p = .259. Comparing Set Loss Errors in 
Young (M = .64, SD = 1.00) and Old (M = 1.48, SD = 1.56) subjects produced 
significant results, t(48) = 2.27, p =  0.028. Comparing Categories Achieved in Young 
(M = 6.2, SD = 1.9) and Old (M = 4.5, SD = 2.8) subjects also produced significant 
results, t(48) = -2.42, p =  .019. 
 
A two-way ANOVA was then conducted to examine the effect of age and feedback on 
mean response time. Main effects analysis showed that older subjects had significantly 
longer response times than younger (F(1,48) = 27.3, p < .001, partial η2= .36), and 
response time was significantly longer after an incorrect response than after a correct 
response (F(1,48) = 35.7, p < .001, partial η2= .43). A significant interaction between 
the effects of age and feedback was found, F(1,48) = 5.66, p = .021, partial  η2= .11. 
As can be seen from Fig. 7.1, which shows the difference between response time after a 
correct response and after an incorrect response in younger and older participants, the 
interaction reflects a greater slow down in responses of older participants following an 
incorrect response than in responses of younger participants following an incorrect 
response. 
 
With respect to the main effects, t-tests corrected for multiple comparisons (Bonferroni) 
indicate that response times of the younger participants were greater after an incorrect 
response (M = 4.36 , SD = 1.04) than a correct response (M = 3.36, SD = .57),  t(24) = 
5.77, p < .001; response times of the older participants were also significantly greater 
after an incorrect response (M = 6.64, SD = 2.56), than after a correct response  (M = 
4.68, SD = 1.25), t(24) = 4.47, p < .001. 
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Fig. 7.1 Wisconsing Card Sorting Test (WCST): Mean response time on trials following 
correct and incorrect responses for young and older participants (*** is p < .001). Error 
bars indicates standard deviation 
 
Brixton Task (BRX) 
Table 7.2 shows descriptive statistics for the two groups of participants in the Brixton 
Task (BRX). 
 
 
Table 7.2 Performance errors in the BRX 
 
Total 
Errors 
(TE) 
Perseverative  
Rules (PRU) 
Preceding 
Responses 
(PRE) 
Perseverative  
Responses 
(PRSR) 
Bizarre 
Responses 
(BRE) 
Younger 
M = 10.4 
(SD = 4.7) 
M = 4.2 
(SD = 1.4) 
M = 0.44 
(SD = 0.92) 
M = 1.36 
(SD = 1.04) 
M = 1.10  
(SD = 0.40) 
Older 
M = 13.8 
(SD = 7.0) 
M = 3.8 
(SD = 0.8) 
M = 0.17 
(SD = 0.64) 
M = 1.67 
(SD = 1.79) 
M = 0.92 
(SD = 0.65) 
 
None of the performance variables analysed (Total Errors, Perseverative Rules, 
Preceding Responses, Perseverative Responses, Bizarre Responses) were normally 
distributed, as shown by running a Shapiro-Wilk test (p < .001). Since running 
equivalent non-parametric tests yields very close results, we report parametric tests 
only. All directional tests are two-tailed tests, unless otherwise specified. 
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Independent t-tests were conducted between performance variables. Comparing Total 
Errors in Young (M = 10.4, SD = 4.7) and Old (M = 20.9, SD = 8.97) subjects shows 
that the observed difference is close to significance, t(47) = -1.988,  p = .053, with a 
medium effect size of d = -0.57.  
 
All the other comparisons show non-significant differences and inspection of 
distributions showed significant overlapping. Comparing Perseverative Rule Errors in 
Young (M = 4.2, SD = 1.4) and Old (M = 3.8, SD = 0.8) subjects shows that the 
observed difference is close to significance, t(48) = 1.14, p = .26. 95 
% CI [-4.86 1.34]. 
Fig. 7.2 shows the difference between response time after a correct response and after 
an incorrect response in young and elderly participants. A two-way ANOVA was 
conducted on this data to examine the effect of age and feedback. Main effects analysis 
showed that older subjects had significantly longer response times than younger 
(F(1,47) = 84.1, p < .001, partial η2= .61), and response time was significantly longer 
after an incorrect response (i.e., negative feedback) than after a correct response (i.e., 
positive feedback) (F(1,47) = 15.16, p < .001, partial η2 = .24). A significant 
interaction between the effects of age and feedback was also found (F (1,47) = 5.9, p = 
.019, partial η2= .043). 
 
 
Fig. 7.2 Brixton Task (BRX): Mean response time on trials following correct and 
incorrect responses for young and older participants (*** is p < .001). Error bars 
indicates standard deviations. 
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Wisconsin Card Sorting Test and Brixton Task 
Running a correlation between total errors in WCST and BRX revealed a moderate 
correlation between the two (r = .36, p = .011). A correlation between  perserverative 
errors in the BRX (PRE, PRSR, PRU) and perseveration in the WCST (PE) revealed a 
modest correlation between PRE and PRSR (r = .387, p = .006), between PRE and PE 
(r = .322, p = .024) and between PRSR and PE (r = .387, p = .006). No significant 
correlation was found between PRU and PE, as hypothesised. Correlation with total 
error were also observed. TE correlates well with PE, which is not surprising being PE a 
subset of TE (r = .384, p = .006). TE also correlates very well with PRSRE (r = .561, p 
< .001), but no other correlation was observed. 
 
In order to understand whether PE on the WCST can be better predicted by any other 
variable in the BRX we then ran a exploratory multiple regression analysis to 
complement the correlation analysis. The initial model that predicts Perseverative Errors 
for the WCST included all the perseverative scores for the BRX (PRE, PRU, PRSRE).  
 
When considered independently (as it can be directly obtained from the previous 
correlation analysis), PRE accounted for 10.4% of the variance in PE (r2 = .104, p = 
.024) and PRSR for 15% of the variance (r2 =  .15, p = .006), while PRU did not 
meaningfully predict PE (r2 =  .008, p = .547).  A multiple regression model with the 
first two variables did not perform better than the model with PRSR alone, since PRE 
did not have a significant contribution, t(48) =  1.4, p = .167. Therefore, PRSR alone 
appeared to explain a moderate amount of variance of PE. Using age as a covariate in 
this model did not appear to affect the outcome greatly (Δr2 =  .011).  
 
This conclusion is interesting because it goes counter the more intuitive hypothesis 
stated at the beginning, where PRU in BRX should be more predictive of PE in WCST 
and it reveals different mechanism of perseveration between the WCST and BRX task, 
irrespective of age.  
 
It is worth noticing that, in this case, a factor analysis would have been more 
appropriate to tease out common factor from the two tasks, but the sample size is 
inadequate (Comfrey & Lee, 1992) 
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Running a correlation analysis between the response time following positive or negative 
feedback in relation to the task revealed that response times after positive feedback were 
highly correlated in the two tasks (r = .46, p < .001), as were the response times after 
negative feedback, to a similar degree (r = .41, p = .003). 
 
The relationship between age, feedback, and task were investigated by running a 2x2x2 
ANOVA with feedback prior to the response (correct/incorrect) and task as the two 
within-subject factors, and age as the between-subjects factor, and response time as the 
outcome variable. The effect of feedback was significant and explained a large amount 
of variance (F(1,95) = 104.56, p < .001, η2= .50). The interaction between age and 
feedback was significant, too (F(1,47) = 9.40, p = .003, η2= .045). Regarding the 
between-subject factors, the effect of age was significant (F(1,95) = 37.7, p < .001, η2= 
.128), and so was the effect of task (F(1,95) = 157.58, p < .001, η2= .533) and the 
interaction between age and task (F(1,95) = 5.18, p < .025, η2= .018). All these 
statistics confirm the previous separate sets of analyses. The interaction between task 
and feedback type is not significant (F(1,47) = 0.162, p = .689), and this can be taken 
as weak evidence to suggest that the feedback processes used by the two tasks are 
shared. 
 
7.2.5 Discussion  
In the WCST the moderate correlation between set loss errors and age is consistent with 
the detrimental effect of aging in proactive control, conceptualised as the process in 
which information is sustained in working memory to bias attention towards goal-
relevant schemas (Braver, 2007). The absence of a significant effect of age on 
perserverative errors has been predicted, but prior research suggest that it can be 
understood in terms of the convenience sample adopted. Older people recruited through 
age charities are unlikely to constitute a representative sample of the elderly population 
in that they might be in fact more active and educated than average. However, our 
results show that the dissociation between these two error types holds, at least for a 
subset of healthy people. This is especially true if one bears in mind that the WCST task 
is made slightly more difficult by the disappearance of the cards one second after one is 
selected and placed below one of the piles. If this time was to be reduced to zero in a 
variant of this experiment, this could probably elicit a greater number of set loss errors. 
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Analysis of performance in the BRX reveals an almost significant difference in total 
errors between the two groups of participants. Merging all the errors in two classes of 
perseverative and non-perseverative errors and examining the difference in the two 
groups suggest that older participants might be less able to infer the rule itself rather 
than being unable to exert cognitive control on the task.  
 
Joint analysis of both BRX and WCST reveals a correlation between PRSR 
(perseveration of stimuli in the BRX) and PE (perseveration of response the WCST), 
instead of PRU (perseveration of rules in the BRX) and PE, as hypothesised. This 
results suggest that merging errors is not the best way to proceed when thinking about 
perseveration as a construct. Comparing these results with data broken down into all the 
errors shows that, if we wish to postulate a perseveration tendency that works across 
individuals, we need to think of it as acting at different levels of abstraction, and not as 
a general perseverative construct. Results could be accounted for by a perseverative 
traits across ages. In other words, while the Brixton Task sensorimotor schemas are 
affected by the stimulus to a greater extent, the WCST requires more top-down 
activation in order to produce accurate behavioural results. Perseverative behaviour 
would then affect processes higher in the hierarchy in the WCST, whereas in the BRX 
task lower processes would be more affected. The former interpretation appears to be 
more plausible, but it is harder to model as it requires different information processing 
layers that start from perceptual schemas up to strategy choice.  
 
Analysing response times in both tasks was also informative. Response time is not the 
same as reaction times, as the latter includes many more layers of cognitive operations 
to resemble distributions obtained by psychophysical tasks (Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998). 
As expected, response times are greater for older participants in both tasks, and the 
difference between response time after correct and incorrect responses are twice as large 
for older participants than younger participants, even though less so in the BRX. This 
might reflect a slower memory search, or a reduced update of the reward value for the 
incorrect rule. 
 
A potential limitation for this study is the lack of distinction between recognition and 
implementation of the rule and the generation of new rules in the BRX. Whereas in this 
variation of the WCST participants receive instructions regarding the three rules they 
will have to sort by and they have an opportunity to practice the task (albeit for only 20 
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trials) and to verbalise their rules, the Brixton Task was completed without any of these. 
In future work with the BRX it is therefore advisable to include a complete practice 
session to familiarise the subjects with the task. Asking participants to learn a greater 
number of possible rules beforehand and have text on screen that reminds subjects they 
have to tap the next circle in the sequence (e.g. 'Guess where the circle is going to be 
NEXT') might help in telling apart aspects of rule induction and cognitive control on 
those rules. 
 
 Simulation 
7.3.1 Introduction 
In the previous section we analysed the outcome of the experiment with younger and 
older individuals performing the WCST and the BRX task. Now, with the two models 
of the tasks outlined in the previous chapter we attempt to fit our sets of parameters to 
both categories of participants. Since prefrontal activity and amount of 
neurotransmitters in the frontal cortex diminish with age, we hypothesised that aging is 
generally best described by changes in the εctx parameter in both tasks.  
 
7.3.2 Model fitting 
Simulated annealing 
In the WCST fitting model to previous data was performed with a simplified version of 
a genetic algorithm. Since the simulation of Brixton Task is faster than the WCST and 
the parameter space we use is larger, Simulated Annealing (SA) is a suitable algorithm. 
More details on how the SA works and how it was generally employed to navigate the 
parameter space in this chapter can be found in the Appendix. 
 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) 
We proceeded to look for the suitable set of parameters for the Wisconsin Card Sorting 
Task. We run the SA as described with all the parameters in Table 7.3 as independent 
variables, including εstr and εctx. We modelled the cost function against the z value of the 
trimmed mean (10%) of TE (total errors), PE (perseverative errors), and SL (set loss 
errors) for all the 50 participants (25 young and 25 old) and 5 virtual subjects. Initial 
values were chosen following qualitative plots in the previous chapters.  
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Table 7.3 Initial and final set of parameter for the simulation of the WCST. Initial 
parameters were chosen between a set of reasonable values obtained in previous 
simulations. 
 
Parameter Meaning Initial Value Final Value 
oi 
External input to 
higher-order 
schemas. 
1 1.3378 
γ Discount factor 0 0.0947 
αsma 
Slope of the motor 
schemas transfer 
function 
10 5.8365 
wstim 
Input to lower 
schemas when 
stimulus is present 
0.45 0.3660 
wstim,base 
Input to lower 
schemas when 
stimulus is absent 
(baseline) 
0.30 0.2367 
wrule 
Weight from higher 
schemas to lower 
schemas 
0.85 1.2792 
εstr 
Learning parameter 
for striatal units 
0.5 0.1287 
εctx 
Learning parameter 
for cortical units 
0.25 0.3932 
 
The model fit adequate, as the cost function steadily declined after 100 iterations and 
stabilised at 0.4353, which means that all the dependent variables are at most 0.4353 
standard deviations from the means. Running 50 simulations with the final parameters 
produces acceptable results, although differences between the simulated and the 
experimental group are .45, .40, .95 standard deviations away from the experimental 
group mean for TE, PE, and SL, respectively (Fig. 7.3).  
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Fig. 7.3 Comparison between all 50 experimental (blue) and 50 simulated (yellow) 
participants with parameters indicated in Table 7.3. Error bars represent SD (G.O.F = 
129.52) 
 
Once we obtained the general set of parameters for all participants, we proceeded to run 
another search through the parameter space. This time we kept εstr and εctx as free 
parameters while all the other parameters were fixed (as in the final values of Table 
7.3). The target of dependent variables was set to fit younger and older participants 
separately, starting from the common set of parameters. In other words, the more 
general model parameters established from fitting the full dataset were fixed while those 
relevant to our hypotheses were allowed to vary in order to fit the two subgroups. 
 
Table 7.4 shows the values for younger and older participants, averaged across the best 
five sets of parameters, with the mean value of the cost function over the five best sets. 
The percentages represent the variation from the baseline values (εstr = 0.1287, εctx = 
0.3932).   
 
Table 7.4 Parameter values for εstr  and εctx young and old participants 
Parameter Older Mean Cost Younger Mean Cost 
εstr 0.1028 (-20.1%)  
0.40 
 
0.1129 (-12.2%)  
0.56 
 
 
εctx 
 
0.4531 (+15.2%) 
 
0.3042 (-22.6%) 
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Percentage change from the baseline values show that in both sets older subjects are 
simulated with a positive discrepancy of the εctx from the baseline value, which is not in 
line with our predictions. The overall fit is adequate, as indicated by the relatively low 
mean cost. Fig. 7.4 and Fig. 7.5 show how simulation and experimental data match for 
older and younger participants, respectively. 
 
 
Fig. 7.4 Comparison between 25 experimental (blue) and 25 simulated (yellow) older 
participants with parameters indicated in Table 7.4. Error bars represent SD (G.O.F = 
164.84) 
 
 
Fig. 7.5 Comparison between 25 experimental (blue) and 25 simulated (yellow) younger 
participants with parameters indicated in Table 7.4. Error bars represent SD (G.O.F = 
65.28) 
 
Results on Response Time are disappointing because the model does not capture any 
difference in correct and incorrect responses in older and younger participants. 
Response time within this simulation do not show an appreciable variance across 
simulations.  
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Brixton Task (BRX) 
We proceeded to look for the suitable set of parameters for the Brixton Task. Very 
similarly to what we did for the WCST, we run the SA as described earlier with all the 
parameters in Table 7.5 as independent variables. We model the cost function against 
the z-value of the trimmed mean (10%) of TE, PRE, PRU, and PRSRE for all the 50 
participants (25 young and 25 old) and 5 virtual subject. Variability was minimised by 
reducing all the noise parameters to 0.10. Table 7.5 shows the parameter values before 
and after SA.  
 
 
Table 7.5 Initial and final set of parameter for the simulation of the BRX. Initial 
parameters were chosen between a set of reasonable values obtained in previous 
simulations. 
Parameter Meaning Initial Value Final Value 
oi 
External input to 
higher-order 
schemas. 
0.9 0.7549 
γ Discount factor 0.05 0.0702 
αsma 
Slope of the motor 
schemas transfer 
function 
10 6.5253 
wstim 
Input to lower 
schemas when 
stimulus is present 
0.45 0.4876 
wstim,base 
Input to lower 
schemas when 
stimulus is absent 
(baseline) 
0.30 0.2196 
wrule 
Weight from higher 
schemas to lower 
schemas 
0.85 0.7835 
εstr 
Learning parameter 
for striatal units 
0.5 0.5985 
εctx 
Learning parameter 
for cortical units 
0.25 0. 2784 
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The model fit is very accurate, as the cost function steadily declined and stabilised at 
0.0981 after 100 iterations, which means that all the dependent variables are at most 
0.0981 standard deviations from the means (Fig. 7.6). 
 
 
Fig. 7.6 Comparison between all 49 experimental (blue) and 49 simulated (yellow) 
participants with parameters indicated in Table 7.5. Error bars represent SD (G.O.F = 
50.06) 
 
Once we obtain the general set of parameters for all participants we re-run a simulated 
annealing. This time we only keep εstr and εctx as free parameters while all the other 
parameters are fixed. The target of dependent variables is set to fit young and old 
participants separately. In summary, we first found a general model capable of 
simulating people of all ages and then we observed whether and how aging could be 
represented in terms of the theoretically defined εstr and εctx parameters. Table 7.6 shows 
the values for younger and older participants, averaged across the best five sets of 
parameters, with the mean value of the cost function over the five best sets. Importantly, 
these points are close enough in space and they do not constitute local minima. In 
brackets it is shown the percentage change to the baseline (εstr = 0.5985, εctx = 0.2784).  
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Table 7.6 Parameter values for εstr  and εctx young and old participants 
Parameter Old Mean Cost Young Mean Cost 
 
εstr 
0.4782 (-20.1%) 
0.40 
0.7038 (+17.6%) 
0.29 
 
εctx 
 
0.2550 (-8%) 
 
0.1985(-28.7%) 
 
The obtained fit is adequate, being the mean cost function smaller than 1. Percentage 
change from the baseline values show that in both sets older subjects are simulated with 
a larger discrepancy of the εstr from the baseline value, and εctx is smaller than the 
baseline for younger participants. Again, this is not in line with our predictions. 
Fig. 7.7 and Fig. 7.8 show how simulation and experimental data match for older and 
younger participants, respectively. 
 
Results on Response Time are disappointing because the model does not capture any 
difference in correct and incorrect responses in older and younger participants and the 
response time distribution do not show an appreciable variance across simulations.  
 
 
Fig. 7.7 Comparison between all 24 experimental (blue) and 24 simulated (yellow) 
older participants with parameters indicated in Table 7.6. Error bars represent SD 
(G.O.F = 50.06) 
 
 183 
 
Fig. 7.8 Comparison between all 25 experimental (blue) and 25 simulated (yellow) 
younger participants with parameters indicated in Table 7.6. Error bars represent SD 
(G.O.F = 50.06) 
 
7.3.3 Discussion 
When a model has eight free parameters, and even when these parameters are within a 
reasonable range of values, parameter space can become vast. Since the cost function 
we used is a three-dimensional vector and running one individual simulation takes up to 
two minutes, it is possible that the explored parameter space will be just a fraction of the 
existing one. In this scenario, because of time constraints, lack of computational power, 
or both, it is all but impossible to find the ‘best set of parameter’ that minimises the 
discrepancy between model and experimental data. When finding a value close to the 
global minimum, simulated annealing helped fit data to this value, and this technique 
has been shown to be particularly effective when models are complex and have local 
variability that produces many local minima in the cost function (Trosset, 2001). 
Deciding how small the cost function should become in order to accept results is also a 
difficult challenge, since quite small local minima can be found in different points of the 
parameter space. Also, running the simulation many times may produce different sets of 
parameters given different initial conditions, if there are several equally small minima. 
Biological systems behave in this fashion because of their complex internal structures 
(Poile & Safayeni, 2016), and this should encourage caution when interpreting findings. 
Despite these intrinsic limitations, the results we presented so far are encouraging, and 
suggest that the proposed model can fit the set of data for both tasks to a reasonable 
extent, provided that we model subgroups in the WCST, given that an excessive 
variability that does not yield an adequate model fit on aggregate data. Both 
computational models (WCST and BRX) have been built on the same theoretical 
framework (the extended schema theory) and this suggests the model has some sort of  
generalisability, at least for higher order cognitive tasks. A direct comparison of the 
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estimated values of the main parameters across tasks would be helpful to establish this 
more rigorously. This would require, however, a different reparametrisation within and 
across tasks, and this can be an interesting direction for future research. This point will 
be discussed further in the last chapter. There are two major limitations that need to be 
addressed.  
 
Firstly, while experimental results in the WCST display high variability, results from 
BRX do not. So, it is not surprising that the BRX model has a better fit with the whole 
data set. The major source of overall variability in BRX is in the Total Errors (TE). 
Nevertheless, the difference between TE in younger and older subjects in the BRX task 
borders on significance. As noted in the discussion on experimental results, this 
indicates that the computational and experimental paradigms might have a meaningful 
difference in that the former is exclusively concerned with the control aspect of the task, 
while the latter is also partially concerned with rule inference. In other words, either the 
BRX experimental paradigm needs to be adapted to be more focused on cognitive 
control or the computational model needs to be enriched with induction mechanisms.  
 
Secondly, the prediction regarding εctx are reversed, in both the WCST and the BRX. As 
for the WCST, although εctx generally varies across a smaller range compared to εstr, this 
parameter was expected to be higher in the older group, where members tend to commit 
more set loss errors. This was verified in the qualitative analysis outlined in the 
previous chapters, which show that set loss errors become particularly sensitive to εctx 
when εstr increases. There are several possible explanations for this puzzling finding. 
First, parameter εctx might not be a valid parameter, and may be unnecessary. This 
suggestion can be immediately discarded on the grounds that our previous simulations 
show that the variation of εstr and non-dynamic modulation of the slope of the schema 
threshold function alone are not capable of producing adequate results. Secondly, the 
parameter εctx might be suboptimally high for the older group. This is not plausible 
either, given that the qualitative results for the model show an increase in set loss error 
as εctx decreases and experimental data support the isolated presence of set loss error in 
the older subjects. Thirdly, parameter εctx could simply be a purely cognitive parameter 
and have a non-linear or even no relationship with prefrontal activity. This would be 
disappointing, in that it would not allow a direct comparison with neural data. A fourth 
possibility is that εctx does not represent the actual amount of neurotransmitter released 
but the activity of the prefrontal cortices, but instead reflecting task difficulties or 
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downstream activation due to alternative strategy selection. In the WCST, an example 
of this could be the vocalisation of a rule (anecdotally, older individuals often reported 
the use of this strategy after completing the session), while in the BRX a more contrived 
example of strategy use could be using multiple fingers to remember the previous 
positions.  
 
 Model Comparison and Neurocognitive Compensation 
7.4.1 Introduction 
In the previous sections we analysed the different performance of younger and older 
participants in the WCST and BRX tasks, and then we calculated sets of parameters that 
produce a good fit for this data from younger and older participants. Looking to 
question whether aging produces changes in executive task performance that are 
amenable to computational modelling, we notice that a significant number of older 
people perform the task very accurately, and the opposite is sometimes true for younger 
individuals. In this section we focus on how to evaluate different models built on 
different arrangements of groups and on the subsequent interpretation of the results. 
  
We clustered performance with unsupervised learning techniques using performance 
scores as features, similarly to what we did in the previous chapters, and we then fitted 
parameter sets to those new groups to see how this relates to the original groups split by 
age. Our results show that the best model fit is obtained when there are only two groups 
divided by performance. These two groups have a variable proportion of younger and 
older individuals, with a sizeable proportion of older individuals achieving excellent 
performance and a sizable proportion of younger individual achieving poor 
performance. Since results from the BRX task do not highlight any significant 
difference between younger and older individuals (although this small difference is still 
captured by the model), in this section we will focus exclusively on the WCST. 
 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) 
In the previous chapters we clustered data according to the three performance errors 
(TE, PE, SL), and we evaluated the number of clusters using the elbow function, that 
identifies the point where increasing the number of groups does not significantly 
decrease the average sum of square within the groups. This heuristic technique can be 
better formalised in the form of ‘gap values’ (see Fig. 7.9 for the application of this 
technique to determining cluster size for the WCST data). The gap value is calculating 
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by subtracting the observed within-cluster sum of square (the same value that appears in 
the elbow function y-axis) with an expected value under a null model (Tibshirani, 
Walther, & Hastie, 2001). With sk being the standard error calculated by bootstrapping 
the distribution of within-cluster sum of square, and gk being the actual gap statistics, a 
cluster size can be choosen for the minimum value of k that satisfies this inequality:  
 
𝑔𝑘 > 𝑔𝑘+1 − 𝑠𝑘 
 
 
Fig. 7.9 Gap Value Plot for the WCST with the variables TE, PE, and SL 
While a loose interpretation of the elbow function alone suggests that data points for 
WCST performance can be grouped into three clusters or less, the gap value plot 
suggests that participants’ performance naturally groups into exactly three clusters. 
 
In line with the loose interpretation, participants are then clustered in two and three 
group, and data are fitted to those groups using a different number of parameters. Each 
group of empirical data (see Table 7.7 for means and sample sizes) is generated by a 
model with a k number of parameters (Table 7.8). The first model, ALL, containing all 
datapoints, and Y&O containing the two groups split by age (younger and older) 
simulated with the two parameters εstr and εpfc have been already analysed in the 
previous sections. 2G.1 is a new model that fits two groups with the same two 
parameters, while 2G.2 is identical to 2G.1 but besides εstr and εpfc it features a further 
free parameter oext. The 3G model has an additional group, for a total of 3 groups and 3 
parameters, εstr , εpfc, oext.  
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Table 7.7 Group means and sample size for all the compared clusters (empirical data) 
Model 
Sample 
size 
TE PE SL 
ALL 50 19.0 12.2 1.1 
Y&O 
25 
 
Y: 17.0 
 
 
Y: 11.3 
 
 
Y: 0.64 
 
25 O: 20.9 O:13.3 
 
O: 1.48 
 
2G.1 
and 
2G.2 
14 
 
1: 29.4 
 
 
1: 19.6 
 
 
1: 2.36 
 
36 2: 14.9 2: 9.3 2: 0.56 
3G 
14 
 
1: 21.8 
 
 
1: 12.7 
 
 
1: 1.14 
 
27 
 
2: 13.1 
 
 
2: 8.7 
 
 
2: 0.59 
 
9 
 
3: 32.1 
 
 
3: 22.0 
 
 
3: 2.3 
 
 
 
The model fit is calculated with the Bayesian Index Criterion (BIC). A lower BIC 
indicates a better fit. The BIC is calculated as follows: 
 
𝐵𝐼𝐶 = 𝑛 + 𝑛 ∙ 𝑙𝑛(2𝜋) + 𝑛 ∙ 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑆𝑆𝑒
𝑛
) + (𝑘 + 1) ∙ 𝑙𝑛 (𝑛) 
 
where the sum of squares error is calculated in relation to the maximum of all the 
dependent variables (i) across groups (g), for the median value obtained from the model 
(m) and the median values obtained from the data (e): 
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𝑆𝑆𝑒 = ∑max
𝑔
(𝑚𝑖 − 𝑒𝑖)
2
𝑖
 
 
This ensures that the SSe is not dependent on the number of groups, and therefore the n 
in the BIC formula is always equal to 3 conditions, for the three dependent variables. 
 
The BIC is a useful index of model fitting, because it is not only sensitive to the 
discrepancy between the experimental and the simulated data, but also to the number of 
parameters used to fit the data. Essentially, the BIC evaluates the model fit and subtracts 
away a penalty which accounts for the model complexity. The BIC is also a function of 
the number of analysed conditions which are, in this case, the number of fitted 
dependent variables (3 in all the instances, here). This ensures that the model is not 
overfitting, and that the increase in the number of parameters and dependent variables is 
justified by a substantial decrease in the model-data discrepancy. Goodness of fit alone 
is insufficient to take into account these aspects and it can yield misleading results (Pitt 
& Myung, 2002).  
 
The confidence intervals (CI) and the BIC for all models and all groups within each 
model are shown in Table 7.8. These figures were calculated for each model over the 
difference between the medians of the experimental and simulated groups using a 
bootstrapping technique. A complete random sample with replacement was iteratively 
drawn from the experimental and the simulated dataset, for each of the three outcome 
variables (Total Errors, Perseverative Errors, and Set Loss Errors). The medians of each 
of these two datasets were then calculated and subtracted, and a very small amount of 
normal noise (with amplitude 0.01) was added. This procedure was repeated 200,000 
times. The noise was used to achieve a smoother bootstrap distribution and it did not 
affect the final result. In order to create a 95% bootstrap confidence interval for the 
difference of the true medians, the 2.5-percentile was subtracted from the 95.5-
percentile. A good fit is indicated if the obtained interval contains zero. 
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Table 7.8 Comparison of different models. The star (*) indicates those intervals that do 
not contain 0 and indicate a bad fit. 
 
Model G k SSe BIC CI 95% TE CI 95% PE CI 95% SL 
ALL 1 - - - [-5.00, 2.01] [-.01, 2.01] [.98, 2.01]* 
Y&O 2 2 43.7 19.2 
Y: [-2.00, 4.01] 
O: [-12.00, 3.02] 
Y: [1.01, 4.00]* 
O: [-4.00, 5.02] 
Y: [-.01, 2.02] 
O: [-.01, 2.01]  
2G.1 2 2 46.5 19.4 
1: [1.49, 10.01]* 
2: [-1.51, 1.49] 
1: [-4.99 7.00] 
2: [-2.01, 0.02] 
1: [-1.00, 2.48] 
2: [-2.01, -0.01] 
2G.2 2 3 82.0 22.4 
1: [3.48, 12.98]* 
2: [-1.51, 1.01] 
1: [-4.01, 8.51] 
2: [-2.01, 1.00] 
1: [-1.50, 2.51] 
2: [-2.02, -1.00] 
3G 3 3 94.0 22.0 
 
1: [-7.01, -1.50] 
 2: [-1.02, 1.01] 
3: [-12.00 5.00] 
 
 
1: [-3.00, 3.01] 
2: [-2.01, 0.99] 
3: [-11.02, 2.02] 
 
 
1: [-.98 2.00] 
2: [.99, 2.99]* 
3: [-3.98, 2.99] 
 
 
Compared to the groups obtained dividing by age (older and younger), dividing all 
participants in two groups by performance outcome with only two free parameters 
(model 2G.1) achieves a similarly good fit, as indicated by the BIC index shown in 
Table 7.8. In this model the first group (2G.1-1) is the one with the poorer performance 
(higher TE, PE and SL). It also has a greater proportion of older participants (0.72). The 
second group (2G.1-2) has better performance with a slightly greater proportion of 
younger participants (0.58).  
 
The other two models 2G.2 and 3G use 3 parameters (εstr, εpfc, oext) and split the data in 
two and three groups, respectively. Guidelines to deal with changes in BIC suggest that 
a change in three units is only marginally significant (Kaft & Raftery, 1995). Thus, 
models 2G.2 and 3G can be, in principle, considered almost as good fits as the previous 
ones.  
 
Fig. 7.10 shows a summary of the findings with diagram of the parameter space 
including only εstr and εpfc. Independent and uncorrected for multiple comparisons t-tests 
show that the difference in the mean PE in the two groups (2G.1-2 and Y) is the only 
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variable difference that achieve significance, t(59) = 2.45, p = .0173. While the 
difference in PE between group O and group 2G1.2 can be partially explained by the 
difference in εstr, we can still claim that a proportion of older participants (0.42) achieve 
a performance as accurate as the one of the younger adults, and this can be captured by 
a different sets of parameters.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7.10 The scatter plot shows the εstr, εpfc parameter space for the different 
models/groups described above. A bigger circle represent a better fit (smaller BIC). For 
the 2G.2 and 3G models, the value of the other parameter is not shown, but it is 
displayed in Table 7.9. 
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Table 7.9 Parameter sets (εstr, εctx, oext) for all the model compared 
 εstr εctx oext 
Y 0.1129 0.3042 1.338 
O 0.1028 0.4531 1.338 
2G.1-1 0.0181 0.4463 1.338 
2G.1-2 0.1981 0.2912 1.338 
2G.2-1 0.0494 0.1828 0.842 
2G.2-2 0.2011 0.2037 0.933 
3G-1 0.1385 0.0418 0.975 
3G-2 0.2713 0.9335 1.107 
3G-3 0.0077 0.1479 0.773 
 
 
7.4.2 Discussion 
In this work, comparing different models and introducing the BIC index has been 
proven helpful to evaluate whether clustering or adding parameters improve model fits. 
Results suggest that εstr and εctx alone are sufficient to produce adequate fits but adding 
parameter oext yields a modest (yet statistically significant) increase  in BIC. One might 
be tempted therefore to prefer the more parsimonious model (2G.1) over the one with an 
extra parameter (2G.2, 3G). However, if we consider 2G.1 and 2G.2 as two equally 
good models, we see that the parameter space has two different local minima, and the 
difference in εstr between the respective groups (2G1.1 – 2G2.1 and 2G1.2 – 2G2.2) is 
minimal. Instead, εctx and oext change substantially for each pair. In both the ‘worst’ 
(2G1.1 – 2G2.1) and ‘best’ (2G1.2 – 2G2.2) performance groups a decrease in oext 
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corresponds to a decrease in εctx, although this occurs to a greater extent in the worst 
performance group. 
 
What is the relationship between cognitive and neural processes and these two 
parameters? First and foremost, it is important to appreciate that, εctx and oext modulate 
extremely different operations in the model. The first modulates the slope of the transfer 
function dynamically, as a function of the activation of the schemas. The second is a 
static parameter that applies to all higher-order schemas equally. Hence, they cannot be 
functionally identical to each other. 
 
Additional simulations (not shown here) reveal the absence of any significant trend in 
TE and PE when varying oext, although U-shaped form in the mean values can be 
observed together with a general decrease in variability for SL for higher values of oext. 
Also, the model stops producing responses when the value of this parameter falls below 
a threshold. Importantly, these properties of oext do not seem to be stable across values 
of εstr and εctx. Ultimately, this suggests that, in this context, oext acts as a buffer for 
excessive mean and variability in set loss errors, probably because of the absence of a 
strong action from the striatal units. Since both 2G1.1 – 2G2.1 on one side and 2G1.2 – 
2G2.2 on the other can then be considered legitimate solutions for the system, it is 
possible to interpret these approximate solutions as different sets of neurophysiological 
states that map onto the same behavioural outcome. In other words, the same 
performance can be obtained by two different sets of values for εstr, εctx, and oext.  
 
The similarity with dynamical systems is striking in terms of appearance, but this is 
misleading. In a dynamical system one can compute equilibrium states that might or 
might not be stable. Here, parameters sets do not evolve through time towards a set of 
stable states. The solutions for the three parameters simply minimise the discrepancy 
between empirical and model data, and makes those parameter values valid model fits. 
The presence of multiple solutions is instead due to how εstr and εctx alter the activation 
function according to the current or prior activation values of those schemas. This 
feature is what makes the model ‘dynamic’. The implication for the relationship 
between empirical and computational modelling are analysed in the next section. 
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 General Discussion 
In the present chapter we reported the results of a study in which we tested twenty-five 
young adults and twenty-five adults over the age of 60 who completed a variation of the 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) and a variation of the Brixton Task (BRX) in the 
same session. We predicted that in the WCST we would observe an increase in Set Loss 
errors in older adults, without a significant change in Perseverative Errors. We also 
predicted that in both WCST and BRX we would observe an increase in response time 
in older participants, and this would be magnified after incorrect responses. All the 
analyses confirmed these predictions. Since the feedback in BRX is not explicit but 
must be inferred by the previous response and the overall time of completion are 
smaller than in the WCST, these result add weight to the hypothesis that older 
individuals process rewards more slowly regardless of the nature of the feedback (and 
by extension, this should be true for other executive tasks). This also provides support, 
albeit weak support, to the presence of a domain-general underlying mechanism in these 
two executive tasks.  
 
Another important hypothesis was that people committing more perseverative errors 
(PE) in the WCST would also commit more perseverative rules errors (PRE) in the 
BRX task. This hypothesis was not supported. Further analysis revealed that the concept 
of ‘perseveration’ (often conceptualised as ‘cognitive inflexibility’) is unlikely to be a 
unitary concept and can exist at different levels in the cognitive hierarchy, consistently 
with the theoretical work of Robbins et al. (2012). 
 
In the following paragraphs we used the models developed earlier in this work and we 
searched through the parameter space to find the best fitting models. We then performed 
a comparison among those models. Evaluation of model fits with the BIC index 
suggested that models with two or three parameters and two or three groups are equally 
good. If the assumption behind the model are correct and parameters represent 
neurophysiological states accurately, our results indicate that at least two different sets 
of physiological states can produce the same behavioural data. In the case of the aging 
brain this can be understood as a product of compensatory mechanisms. Our results are, 
for instance, partially compatible with the CRUNCH hypothesis, which posits that the 
engagement of neural circuits in cortical structures is higher for older adults when the 
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task load is lower, either because resources are not efficiently deployed, or alternatively 
because the input in the prefrontal cortex is degraded (perhaps because of 
neurotransmitter depletion) (Reuter-Lorenz & Cappell, 2008). Given that in our model 
fit with older adults we reinterpreted the εctx as a parameter reflecting task difficulty or 
downstream activation due to alternative strategy selection, the oext parameter may be 
conceived as a neural efficiency indicator. 
 
An important and quite puzzling limitation of this model is in the way it does not handle 
response time as expected. Prior work with a simple set of corticothalamic loops (see 
the third chapter) showed that response time are consistent with ex-Gaussian curves. 
Instead, here we see very little variation in response time distribution and, consequently 
we could not simulate the difference in response time across age groups and positive 
and negative feedback. A possible explanation has to do with the addition of external 
signals to the lower-order schemas from both the environment and the higher-order 
schemas. This may override the natural variation seen in the 'free' loops by pushing 
values towards the extremes. This limitation can be addressed by introducing a new 
fixed parameter that introduces variability in the area-threshold and it will be 
implemented in the next chapter. 
 
While the conclusion that can be drawn are generally limited by time taken to simulate 
all the processes and consequently to search a large parameter space (which in turn 
limits the number of groups that it is possible to simulate), it is possible to make a 
general point about this methodology, which can be applied to any model of higher-
order cognition. This method consists in creating a theoretically motivated model of a 
specific neuropsychological task using schemas that have an associated activation value 
and that represent an action or thought. These schemas are embedded in one or more 
feedback loops that biases them in a continuous fashion. This does not necessarily have 
to be limited to the basal ganglia, but depending on the questions the theoretical model 
is asking, different structures with different operations and learning curves can alter 
schemas’ activations. Two important candidates for this line of work are the cerebellar 
circuit (Ohyama et al., 2003) and the amygdala (Morén & Balkenius, 2000).  Parameters 
should reflect specific the computational operation in specific areas of the brain that 
previous research has shown to be plausible. Prior to parameter fitting, a hypothesis is 
made about differences, or correlations between groups. In this chapter we analysed the 
difference between younger and older participants, but any clinically defined group is 
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also suitable. After the fitting, one would proceed to cluster participants by 
performance. At this point, decisions over within-group variability and interpretability 
of results have to be made, bearing in mind this is a delicate trade-off. Model 
comparison provides then a method to eliminate bad fitting models, but also to discover 
different parametrisation of the same behavioural results. Assuming that the operation 
regulated by parameters are at least partially correct, computational models offer a 
valuable solution to the problem of underspecification of behavioural data. Neural data 
would not supersede behavioural data, but would help specify what adaptive cognitive 
processes give rise to a specific behavioural dataset. More concretely, our model 
predicts that there are (at least) two models that fit well the ‘poorer’ performance 
dataset and two other models that fit well the ‘better’ performance dataset, and there are 
little difference in the basal ganglia operation between the two in each dataset. 
Cognitive operations regulated by the other two parameters compensate for each other’s 
activity, more so in the ‘poorer performance’ case and aid the formulation of a theory of 
neurocognitive compensation. Neural data can then help differentiate between two 
identical behavioural sets using computationally defined operations as a proxy. While 
searching through a parameter space is a recognised technique in cognitive modelling 
(Stewart, 2005), here we outlined a novel application of this methodology to a 
theoretical model that incorporates neural operations and schema theory. In the next 
chapter we explore how the same paradigm can be applied to clinical population with 
frontostriatal disorders. 
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Wisconsin Card Sorting Test performance 
in ADHD traits: an experiment and a 
computational model of response times 
 
 Abstract 
Attention Deficit and Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) is a neuropsychiatric condition 
with a neurodevelopmental course, but it often persists in adulthood. Broadly speaking, 
it is thought to arise from a dysfunction of the frontostriatal circuits that regulate 
attention and self-control. Although it is conceptualised as a categorical disorder 
divided into three categories (inattentive, hyperactive, combined), ADHD traits are 
present in the general population. ADHD is diagnosed with subjective reports but, in 
research settings, examination of neuropsychological performance has provided 
valuable information regarding the etiological pathways that lead to ADHD symptoms. 
Within the context of this thesis, ADHD constitute an important paradigm because its 
aetiology is related to both frontal and striatal circuits, and it is unclear what localised 
operations could be at fault when ADHD symptoms arise. In the first part of this chapter 
we present an overview of neuropsychological frameworks employed by ADHD 
researchers. In the second part we present a study where 50 adults, of which 14 have a 
diagnosis of ADHD, perform a new variation of the WCST (WCSTt). In this variant, 
participants are asked to perform the WCST outlined in the previous chapter in one 
block, and to complete the same task within a time limit on another block. The time 
limit is based on the performance on the non-timed task, but how time limits are 
established is unknown to the subjects. Participants are also asked to complete a set of 
questionnaires that probe into their ADHD symptoms, depression and anxiety 
symptoms, and everyday memory performances. Results indicate that performance 
errors are not different between groups, but that the regulation of speed-accuracy trade-
off is impaired in some participants and associated with higher impulsivity traits. In the 
last part of the chapter we upgrade the WCST model presented in chapter 5 in order to 
characterise how the response time seen in participants is produced. Specifically, we 
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focus on characterising the construct of impulsivity in neurocomputational terms. We 
then discuss how our qualitative results fit in relation to the previously outlined theories 
and how theory-driven computational modelling can help understand the interaction 
among neuropsychological domains. 
 
 Neuropsychology of ADHD 
8.2.1 Introduction 
Attention Deficit and Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) is characterised by inattention, 
hyperactivity, and impulsivity. Although it is thought to be a neurodevelopmental 
disorder whose onset occurs in childhood, persistence of this condition in adulthood is 
documented. Prevalence is adulthood is difficult to quantify, on the account of the 
different diagnostic criteria used across different settings and the inaccuracy of 
retrospective diagnosis, that relies mainly on self-reports (Wender, Wolf, & 
Wasserstein, 2001). Approximately half of children with ADHD will experience 
symptoms in adulthood. It is thought that while hyperactive symptoms tend to subdue, 
inattentive symptoms still persist and dramatically affect patients’ lives. 
 
Psychiatric, educational, and neuropsychological literature on ADHD is extensive, but 
in terms of demographics it tends to disproportionately focus on childhood ADHD, 
because of the impact on educational attainment and the controversies surrounding 
diagnosis and drug treatments. Neuropsychological tests do not accurately distinguish 
between ADHD and non-ADHD diagnosed according to DSM-IV and DSM-V 
definitions and they are hence not recommended as a substitute of apposite 
neuropsychiatric inventories (Barkley, 2014). Subtype diagnoses are also uncorrelated 
with neuropsychological profiles, especially those that measure executive functioning 
(Geurts, 2005). Neuropsychological assessment can however be useful to evaluate the 
extent of other comorbidities (e.g. dyslexia, intellectual impairments, etc.), to draw a 
plan with strength and weakness, and to monitor psychosocial and pharmacological 
treatments. In research settings, neuropsychological tasks have been also proven useful 
to elucidate different cognitive endophenotypes (Sonuga-Barke, 2010). One of the most 
reliable paradigms in this respect is the Continuous Performance Test (CPT; Rosvold et 
al., 1956). The most common version of this test requires subjects to pay attention to a 
screen where individual numbers or letters are shown one after the other with a short 
inter-stimulus interval. Participants have to respond by pressing a button when a 
previously shown stimulus (e.g. the letter A) or sequence of stimuli (e.g. the letter A 
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followed by the number 5) appears. Performance scores obtained are the number of 
correct responses, omission errors (subject does not press when they should), and 
commission errors (subject presses the button when they should not). The first two 
measurements are thought to relate to attentional processes, while commission errors 
are believed to assess impulsivity (Sostek, Buchsbaum, & Rapoport, 1980). Effect size 
comparing ADHD children with controls obtained by this paradigm are the highest 
observed in meta-analysis for neuropsychological tests (up to 1.00) (Frazier, Demaree & 
Youngstrom, 2004).  
 
Below, we provide an overview of the most common neuropsychological frameworks 
that are used to frame research in ADHD.  
 
8.2.2 Executive Functioning  
The most studied deficit in ADHD is in Executive Functioning (Sonuga-Barke, 2002). 
The limited reliability of executive function assessments and the diverse comorbidities 
in adult population make this link difficult to study. Nigg et al. (2005) partially 
overcame these difficulties by running a confirmatory factor analysis on a wide range of 
executive function neuropsychological batteries performed by a sample of unmedicated 
(or tested after a minimum drug wash-out time of 24 hours) adults with ADHD for a 
total of 195 participants. They identified two subsets (EF and speed) and observed the 
relationship with inattention and impulsivity scores, as measured by DSM-IV structured 
interviews. Data suggested that EF impairments are related to symptoms of inattention 
and disorganisation, which were uniquely related to the EF factor. Participants with 
faster responses were also more likely to belong to the impulsive cluster, while those 
with slower responses were more likely to belong to the inattentive cluster.  
 
8.2.3 Reaction Time Studies 
Another important thread of inquiry in ADHD is reaction times. Adult and children with 
ADHD display a greater reaction time variability (RTV) compared to healthy age-
equivalent controls. RTV is primarily measured with the standard deviation of reaction 
times, and it is observed across a variety of tasks that require fast responses. RTV 
measurement of this type is very strongly correlated with the mean RTs, which suggests 
a more latent construct that measures intra-subject variability.  
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More sophisticated (but not always employed) measurements for RTV include fitting to 
an ex-Gaussian distribution, which merges normal and exponential distributions, and 
which is described by parameters μ, σ, and τ (Hervey et al., 2006). Parameters μ is the 
mean of the normal component, parameter σ is the equivalent of standard deviation of 
the normal component of the distribution, whereas τ accounts for the exponential part of 
the distribution and ultimately accounts for the skewness of reaction times. In children, 
reaction times seem to be affected by psychostimulants, but not by other kinds of 
pharmacological treatment (Kofler, et al., 2013). This provides some evidence for the 
exclusive role of prefrontal circuits in processing speed, but more evidence with 
difference measures of variation is required. Lastly, RTV is not specific to ADHD, but a 
cognitive feature across psychopathology.   
 
8.2.4 Reward Sensitivity 
An aspect that has received considerable attention during recent years in ADHD 
research is reward sensitivity. This construct is more difficult to measure when 
compared to reaction times, for a lack of clear operationalisation across tasks. Many 
theories at different levels of biological and behavioural detail have been outlined. As it 
often happens, all present a certain trade-off between the two levels. The Dopamine 
Transfer Hypothesis (DTD) offers a neurobiological explanation of ADHD deficits, 
positing that ADHD is produced by a dysfunction in the midbrain dopamine phasic 
signalling to the striatum and the prefrontal structures (Tripp & Wickens, 2008). 
Consequently, patients with ADHD fail to transfer dopaminergic neuron signals from 
the reward to the predictor, impairing learning of secondary reinforcers. This altered 
firing across developmental times impairs prediction of reward and leads to poorer 
behavioural control that manifests in either impulsivity or inattention, depending on 
contextual cues. Another similar neurobiological theory is the Dynamic Developmental 
Theory (DDT), that posits a lower level of tonic dopamine in the fronto-striatal circuit 
that is responsible for the loss of value of reinforcement following delays.  
 
The neurobiological evidence for these theories comes mainly from animal studies 
(Schultz et al., 1997) but functional neuroimaging in humans show that BOLD signals 
also correlate with prediction errors (Murray et al., 2008). Both theories explain how 
inattention and impulsivity emerges in childhood, but also how individuals with ADHD 
learn more slowly from rewards and therefore need a tighter reinforcement schedule to 
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optimise learning, and how learning new reinforcement contingencies is impaired, 
resulting in perseverative behaviours. 
 
While these theories elegantly combine the reinforcement learning computational 
paradigm with neurobiological data, the division of roles between basal ganglia and 
prefrontal cortex and the role of different neurotransmitters is not addressed, despite the 
fact that different medications used in ADHD target different neurotransmitters in 
different brain areas. 
 
8.2.5 Cognitive Energetics 
While reward sensitivity has close neurobiological correlates it is not necessarily 
directly mappable to cognitive tasks. On the other hand, executive function deficits 
seem too broad to adequately characterise ADHD and become difficult to model. 
Halfway through these two paradigms is the cognitive-energetic model (Sergeant et al., 
2003). This model incorporate a top-down evaluation mechanism that is responsive to 
rewards, a middle level consisting of effortful arousal and activation mechanisms, and a 
bottom-up level that comprises all the cognitive operations necessary to encode stimuli 
and act upon them. This paradigm attempts to break down the cognitive operations that 
might be affected in ADHD, without using the too generic ‘executive function’, and 
allowing neurotransmitter action to differentially affect evaluation and arousal/ 
activation mechanisms. Although the model appears to be underspecified it 
distinguishes between selective attention, error monitoring and performance adjustment. 
There is some evidence that selective attention may not be impaired in adults with 
ADHD (Salomone et al., 2016). 
 
 Experiment 
8.3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this study is two-fold. The first is to examine whether and to what extent 
a set of experimental predictions obtained from both child and adult experimental 
literature hold. Secondly, we want to examine our results against the computational 
model we built and described in the previous chapters, in order to evaluate whether our 
model is consistent with any of the theories of ADHD, or even suggest other ways to 
think about this disorder. This will occur in the computational part of this chapter 
(Section 8.4). Now, we present a study in which 50 participants recruited through the 
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SONA database and through ADHD charities perform a variation of the Wisconsin 
Card Sorting test (WCSTt) illustrated in detail in the Procedure section. The task is 
composed of two similar subtasks. The main goal is to compare performance on the two 
subtasks to study how ADHD traits affect the regulation of the speed-accuracy trade-off 
in this task. Research literature has examined speed-accuracy regulation in many types 
of processes, but it mostly focuses on ADHD diagnosis alone and on simple perceptual 
processes that require rapid responses. Very often, participants are chosen among young 
children, instead of young and older adults. Here, we focus instead on more deliberate 
processes (like those deployed in performing the WCST) and on an adult sample. 
 
Above we noted that the Continuous Performance Test (CTP) was one of the most 
reliable paradigms for investigating ADHD, with effect sizes in the order of 1.00. The 
standard Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, on the contrary, does not fare well in terms of 
predictive power, capturing an effect size of approximately 0.35 for perseverative 
errors. However, in the experiment reported here we employed the variation of WCST 
described in the previous chapters, where cards disappear briefly after they have been 
sorted below the right pile. In addition, in two blocks participants are asked to sort cards 
within a time frame. This variation on the main paradigm requires a somewhat greater 
challenge for the subject compared to the classic WCST, and it adds a speed-accuracy 
regulation component to it. Further details of the task are given in the procedure 
paragraph below. 
 
Throughout the experimental section we analyse ADHD traits, but we will occasionally 
show how statistics compare between those who have a diagnosis and those who do not. 
 
Hypotheses 
One experimental hypothesis is that the speed-accuracy trade-off regulation correlates 
with ADHD severity as measured by the Conners Adult ADHD Rating Scale (CAARS), 
and with difficulties in everyday life activities measured by the Attention-Related 
Cognitive Errors Scale (ARCES) and the Everyday Memory Failures Questionnaire 
(ARCES/EMFQ) score. Since the ability to adjust the speed-accuracy trade-off in 
children is altered even in perceptual tasks (Mulder et al., 2010), we expect to see 
problems in adjusting this trade-off in adults in decision-making tasks where there is a 
limited amount of time and not many explicit strategies that can be employed. There are 
three ways to examine speed-accuracy trade-off regulation in this context. The first one 
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is to count the number of missed responses in the timed part of the task (counted as 
MISS error). The second is to observe the properties of the distribution of the difference 
between the median response time in the untimed task and the median response time in 
the timed task (henceforth RTD). The median value of RTD may indicate that subjects 
either adapted very quickly to the timed task, or they were fast responders in the first 
place and they maintained their pace, and we predict that a lower RTD is associated with 
a higher CAARS scores. A further variable of interest is the RTD range (henceforth 
RTDR), calculated as the distance between the 5th-percentile and the 95th-percentile of 
the distribution obtained by bootstrapping the response time distributions for the 
untimed tasks and computing the difference of the median. The resulting index, RTDR, 
represents the variation of response time between the two types of tasks. We expect 
higher values of RTD associated with higher CAARS scores. These two indices are 
distribution-free alternatives to the use and calculation of ex-Gaussian parameters. We 
examine both approaches. 
 
Also, we hypothesise that the CAARS scores (especially the CAARS A subscale that 
measures Inattention and Memory Problems and the CAARS C subscale that measures 
Impulsivity) and the ARCES/EMFQ scores will correlate with the number of missed 
responses in the timed part of the task (MISS) and the difference between median 
response time (RTD). 
 
Another experimental hypothesis seeks to replicate findings of increased response 
variability in tasks that require fast reaction times observed in children (Buzy, Medoff, 
& Schweitzer, 2009) for tasks that require deliberate thought like the WCST. This is 
measured with the standard deviation (σ) parameter in the ex-Gaussian distribution.  
Also, we seek to examine whether ADHD traits and attentional lapses are correlated. 
Attentional lapses are instead measured by the exponential term of the ex-Gaussian 
distribution (τ), and they are also observed in the response time distribution for rapid 
tasks in children with ADHD (Hervey et al., 2016). 
 
A final experimental hypothesis has to do with how ADHD affects everyday life. 
Carriere, Cheyne, and Smilek (2008) show that memory lapses and general attentional 
failures in everyday life affect personal wellbeing negatively, as measured by the Beck's 
Depression Inventory (BDI-II).  We seek to see whether this pattern replicates with our 
general sample with both depression, anxiety and General Self-Efficacy (GSE) 
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measurements. In particular, self-efficacy has been shown to be negatively correlated 
with inattention and impulsivity in children (Gambin & Święcicka, 2015) and this might 
be expected in adults as well. 
 
8.3.2 Method 
Subjects 
The study included 21 females (ADHD = 8, non-ADHD = 13) and 29 males (ADHD = 
6, non-ADHD = 23) between the ages of 22 and 65 (ADHD: M = 38.6, SD = 12.9; Non-
ADHD: M = 35.7, SD = 11.0). Subjects had between 11 and 30 years of education 
(ADHD: M = 17.7, SD = 5.4; non-ADHD: M = 17.6, SD = 2.6). Demographics are 
reported in Table 8.1. Participants were recruited through the local university database 
and through various ADHD charities in London. 
 
Table 8.1 Participants' Age and Years of Education (YOE) 
 
Age YOE 
ADHD No Yes No Yes 
Valid 
  
36 
 
14 
 
33 
 
13 
 
Missing 
  
0 
 
0 
 
3 
 
1 
 
Mean 
  
35.72 
 
38.57 
 
17.58 
 
17.69 
 
Std. Deviation 
  
10.97 
 
12.87 
 
2.598 
 
5.453 
 
 
 
The majority of participants with ADHD took Methylphenidate-based medications. 
Frequencies are shown in Table 8.2. 
 
Table 8.2 Medications 
Medication Frequency   Percentage 
Unmedicated 
 
2 
 
4.0 
  
Methylphenidate 
 
7 
 
14.0 
  
Methamphetamines 
 
4 
 
8.0 
  
Mirtazapine 
 
1 
 
2.0 
  
Non-ADHD 
 
36 
 
72.0 
  
 
Finally, Table 8.3 shows the frequency of males and females with and without and 
ADHD diagnosis. A Bayesian Poisson Test shows that there is a credible independence 
of the attributes, BF = 1.41 (using a prior concentration λ = 1). 
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Table 8.3 Gender and ADHD Diagnosis contingency table 
 
ADHD  Diagnosis 
 
Gender No Yes Total 
Female 
 
13 
 
8 
 
21 
 
Male 
 
23 
 
6 
 
29 
 
Total 
 
36 
 
14 
 
50 
 
 
All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
 
Procedure and Measures 
 
Participants completed the WCST and then a series of questionnaires as described 
below. The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of Birkbeck's Department of 
Psychological Sciences (approval #171863).  
 
The WCST Task 
Before the beginning of the session participants were briefed on the task instructions 
and then they had a complete practice trial with fewer cards. During the practice trial 
they were allowed to ask questions to the researcher. A good understanding of the rules 
was reported by all participants after the practice trial. The researcher then left the room 
and participants completed the whole task. We described the classic version of WCST 
elsewhere, but the differences between the current task and the version that is normally 
administered in clinical settings (Heaton, 1975) are outlined. In the variation used in this 
study, the task is computerised, and the selected card is shown for only 1000 ms and 
then it disappears from the screen (unlike the original WCST where the card last card 
placed below one of the four piles is in sight until another card is placed above it). This 
ensures that participants cannot make use of cues when sorting other than the stimulus 
card presented at the bottom of the screen.  
 
The version presented to this cohort has four blocks. In the first and third block the 
screen background is green, and subjects can complete the task in their own time. In the 
second and fourth block the screen background turns red and subjects have to complete 
the each card sort in the allotted time. If they fail to sort a card in the given time, a voice 
and text on screen signal a ‘miss’, the program moves on to the following card and a 
MISS error is counted. The allotted time was set to the median of the time taken by the 
individual subject to sort each card in the first block, but this is unknown to participants, 
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who were told to perform the task at a ‘normal’ pace, without rushing or overthinking, 
when they see the green screen. If this time was less than 1 second and more than 10 
seconds, the allotted time was fixed to 1 second and 10 seconds, respectively. 
Participants could adjust their speed by looking at the countdown digits displayed 
between the stimulus card and the four decks. The digits were displayed only in the 
timed blocks, showing the number of seconds left before a missed trial. Each block 
includes 48 card for a total of 192 cards, 96 in the timed task and 96 in the timed task. 
 
Similarly to the WCST outlined in the previous chapter, a perseverative error (PE) was 
counted when a subject persisted sorting cards with the same rule despite negative 
feedback. A set loss (SL) errors was counted whenever the subject changed sorting rule 
despite immediately prior positive feedback after three unambiguous responses. The 
number of total errors (TE) is equivalent to the number of total negative feedbacks 
received by the subject. Response time, response time difference (RTD), and response 
time difference range (RTDR) were calculated as outlined below. All variables were 
calculated for both the two timed (T) and two untimed (UT) parts and values were 
averaged within those blocks (blocks 1 and 3 for the untimed part, blocks 2 and 4 for 
the timed part).  
 
Conners Adult ADHD Rating Scales (CAARS) 
After completing the WCST task, the researcher was called back into the room and 
asked participants to fill in seven questionnaires. The first was the Conners Adult 
ADHD Rating Scales (CAARS), that measure the presence of ADHD as well as its 
severity and impact on daily life for adults over 18 years old. The version used in this 
study is the self-reported long one which has 66 questions that are rated from 0 to 3. 
Since the CAARS can quantify symptoms across different domains it is possible to 
distinguish between the subtypes of ADHD (inattentive, impulsive, combined). There 
are 8 subscales in total: Domains are Inattention/Memory Problems (CAARS-A 
subscale), Hyperactivity/Restlessness (CAARS-B subscale), Impulsivity/Emotional 
Lability (CAARS-C subscale), and Problems with Self-concept (CAARS-D subscale). 
CAARS-E and CAARS-F subscales provide the scoring according to the DSM-IV 
Inattentive and Hyperactive subtypes, respectively. CAARS-G is the total score simply 
calculated by adding CAARS-E and CAARS-F scores. Finally, CAARS-G is a general 
ADHD index.  
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Internal consistency, measured with Cronbach's alpha, ranges from .86 to .92 and the 
median test-retest reliability has been evaluated as .89. The CAARS has been also 
validated against a semi-structured interview developed by Barkley (1990).  
 
Participants were instructed to answer the questions in this questionnaire thinking of 
themselves when medicated with the medication they have been prescribed and taken 
during the last week, including the day of the of the test.  
 
Beck’s Anxiety Inventory (BAI) and Beck’s Depression Inventory (BDI) 
The second questionnaire was the Beck’s Anxiety Inventory (BAI). This consists of 21 
questions probing anxiety symptoms from the day of the study back to one week before. 
The third questionnaire was the Beck’s Depression Inventory (BDI). This consists of 21 
questions probing depression symptoms from the day of the study back to one week 
before. Although both scales seem to be valid and reliable it is likely that self-report 
measures are not able to differentiate between anxiety and depression and they tend to 
load onto a more general ‘mood’ factor (Fydrich, Dowdall, & Chambless, 1992).  
 
The Wender Utah Rating Scale (WURS) 
The Wender Utah Rating Scale (WURS; Wender, 1998) contains 61 questions rated 
from 0 to 4, but only 25 of them are relevant to ADHD behaviour and we administered 
only those. Given that ADHD is believed to have only childhood onset, this scale is 
useful for a retrospective evaluation of childhood symptoms. Although self-reported 
retrospective diagnoses alone are by their very nature less reliable this helps confirm 
any likely ADHD diagnosis, and can possibly mitigate the false positive rate of 13% 
attributed to the CAARS scale and possibly exacerbated by self-reporting (Erhardt et 
al., 1999). 
 
Attention-Related Cognitive Errors Scale (ARCES) and the Everyday Memory Failures 
Questionnaire (EMFQ) 
Two other questionnaires that probe into daily life activities in the past month were 
included: the Attention-Related Cognitive Errors Scale (ARCES) and the Everyday 
Memory Failures Questionnaire (EMFQ), with 12 and 15 questions, respectively, rated 
from 1 to 5. To our knowledge, there is no research on how the ARCES relates to the 
classic WCST. This is probably because of the different foundation of this executive 
task.  ARCES has been instead associated with errors in the Sustained Attention to 
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Response Task (SART). This neuropsychological task requires participants to withhold 
their response to stimuli that are presented infrequently on a screen and to respond to 
frequent stimuli by pressing a button. The purpose of the task is to lead subjects to 
habituate and to distract them from the less frequent stimuli (Robertson et al., 1997, p. 
747). The correlation between SART and ARCES is quite modest (around .3) but 
robust, since it holds across diverse clinical and non-clinical populations (Smilek, 
Carriere, & Cheyne, 2010), and this indicates that the ARCES questionnaire may detect 
some underlying aspects of sustained attention. The WCST is not generally considered 
to involve sustained attention, so these questionnaires were mainly included because of 
their adequate ecological validity, in order to explore the relationship between real-life 
challenges faced by individuals with ADHD and specific neuropsychological 
constructs.  
 
GSE 
The General Self-Efficacy (GSE) scale is a 10-item scale that probes into the beliefs of 
personal competence and accomplishing things that are relevant to individuals, with a 
score ranging from 1 to 4. The scale has excellent internal reliability (.76 - .90) and it 
appears to measure a cross-cultural construct (Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 2010). In the 
literature a good amount of work on self-efficacy and ADHD can be found, but there is 
scarcity of studies that examine the relationship between self-efficacy and 
neuropsychological abilities in ADHD, hence the choice to include the scale in the set 
of questionnaires.  
 
Demographics 
Lastly, sociodemographic information was acquired via a questionnaire consisting of 
years of education and highest level of qualification obtained, employment status (Y/N), 
Salary, ADHD diagnosis and medications taken (with dosage). 
 
8.3.3 Results 
Data analysis  
Because of the nature of the data that we collected we analysed the data mainly with 
Bayesian correlational analyses, using non-parametric statistics such as the Kendall’s 
tau. Since this methodology moves away from the methods we have employed so far in 
this thesis, an explanation for the reader is warranted. The choice of this kind of analysis 
allows us to operate now in a distribution-free environment, and to evaluate the strength 
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of evidence for the alternative hypothesis relative to the null hypothesis, rather than 
relying on a dichotomous result (null hypothesis significance testing, NHST).  
Methodologically, Bayesian statistics differ from the more commonly used frequentist 
statistics because the final output is essentially a distribution of the parameter in 
question.  
 
Thus, instead of calculating statistical significance as in the frequentist fashion, a Bayes 
Factor (BF) will be reported both numerically and in terms of interpretation according 
to Jeffreys’ descriptions (1961). The Bayes Factor is effectively the ratio between the 
likelihoods of observing the given data under the alternative hypothesis and the null 
hypothesis. Sometimes this ratio is inverted and indicated with BF01 but here we 
reported the BF10 simply as BF. In other words, the reported value will be the one that 
compares the odds in favour of the alternative hypothesis. The higher the value of the 
BF, the more confident we can be regarding the truth of the alternative hypothesis.  For 
instance, a BF of 20 indicates that the data are 20 times more likely to occur in a model 
where the alternative hypothesis is true than in the null model. A BF smaller than 1 
indicates that the null hypothesis is instead more likely to be supported. Since BF are 
essentially ratios of probabilities, two identical BF represent the same amount of 
evidence for the alternative hypothesis, irrespective of sample size. A relationship 
between p-values and BF does exist, but is strongly contingent on sample size, number 
of parameters, and it is usually computable for the minimum BF (Held & Ott, 2018). 
For this reason, we will not report any p values in this section. Ultimately, this 
framework allow us to compare the strength of evidence among different hypotheses 
rather than focusing on binary decisions on whether a correlation or a difference is 
present or not. 
 
The BF is calculated by using the JSZ algorithm (Jarosz & Wiley, 2014) which is quite 
conservative and works better for smaller samples. Unless otherwise specified, the prior 
for the null hypothesis is always a uniform distribution. A directional prediction that 
excludes half of the prior probability distribution will be used only if there is prior work 
that justifies this choice. This will be indicated by stating that the correlation is 
consistent/inconsistent with prior work or one the hypotheses outlined earlier in this 
section (e.g. Depression and Anxiety are known to be positively correlated in clinical 
samples; Beck et al., 1988). Otherwise, the directionality of the prior will be explicitly 
stated at the beginning of a section. Essentially, the prior incorporate pre-existing 
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knowledge only with respect to the directionality of the correlation. Therefore, the prior 
for the null hypothesis is a uniform distribution ranging between the negative and 
positive side of the parameter’s domain if no directionality is specified, or in the 
negative or positive side if directionality is specified. This makes all ranges of 
parameters equally likely, within their domain. 
 
To indicate correlations between variable we will report non-parametric Kendall’s tau 
instead of the more common non-parametric Spearman's rho and the parametric 
Pearson's correlation coefficient. Kendall’s tau is computed in the following manner. 
First, the two datasets are ranked. Data from one of the sets are then sorted in ascending 
order. One by one, concordant and discordant number of ranks are calculated for each 
data point in the second dataset. Concordant ranks are the number of values underneath 
the data point that are greater than each data point. Discordant ranks are the number of 
values underneath the data point that are lower than each data point.  Concordant ranks 
are then added together and so are the discordant ranks. The Kendall’s tau is the ratio of 
the difference between these two values and their sum. Kendall’s tau (τb) and the better 
known Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (ρs) both evaluate statistical associations 
based on the ranks of the data, but Kendall’s Tau is usually more accurate with smaller 
sample size. More importantly, it is also much less sensitive to isolated differences in 
ranking because, unlike the Spearman’s coefficient, it does not rely on rank differences 
(Gibbons, 1993). This is understandable given that the Spearman's coefficient is 
computed by calculating differences between ranks while the Kendall's tau is not. This 
property can turn out to be useful when considering the heterogeneity in our sample and 
in ADHD research in general (Mostert, 2015). Kendall’s tau symbol will be indicated as 
τb in order to avoid confusion with the τ parameter of the ex-Gaussian distribution. 
 
As for testing the difference between two means we proceed using a non-parametric 
statistic for the reason outlined earlier. The prior is always chosen as a Cauchy 
distribution centred on 0 and with γ = 2. With this prior, a Bayesian t-test computes a 
posterior parameter distribution where the point estimate (the median) is very close to 
the Cohen's d. We instead compute the more conservative Mann-Whitney test and the 
calculated posterior parameter is the effect size δ. We then report the median of the 
posterior distribution, indicated with δm. 
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In all the above mentioned tests, robustness is regularly checked. For a result to be 
robust we expect the BF to vary in a small range when the prior variance ranges within 
a large range. Robustness checks will be mentioned only if the result is deemed to be 
not robust enough. Credible intervals will be also always reported at 95% level as CI. 
 
CAARS scales and ADHD construct 
The first four CAARS subscales measure domains such Inattention/Memory Problems, 
Impulsivity/Emotional Lability, Hyperactivity/ Restlessness, and Problems with Self-
concepts. Unlike the other four subscales these domain are not themselves diagnostic 
and they are scored relatively independently. Our sample has a high inter-item 
correlation, r = .78, and a very high internal consistency, Cronbach's α = .933, 95% CI 
[.87, .95]5 , which is consistent with the population values. Although throughout the 
chapter we are interested primarily in ADHD traits, the difference in all the CAARS 
subscores between those who had  a diagnosis of ADHD, including the medicated 
subjects and those who were not, was always very strong, BF > 34. The lowest median 
of the posterior effect size among the subscales is for the CAARS B subscale 
(Impulsivity), δm = 1.03, while the highest value is recorded for the CAARS D subscale 
(Problems with self concept), δm = 1.69. 
 
ADHD scores all correlate very well with the WURS retrospective diagnostic 
questionnaire, with τb ≥ .488 for all the CAARS scores, with BFs that exceed 1000, in 
accord with Ward (1993). 
 
Correlates with Memory Questionnaires 
The ARCES and EMFQ questionnaires are very similar, although the EMFQ focuses 
more on everyday activities and ARCES is more associated with forgetfulness. Their 
correlation across the whole sample is very high, τb = .724, and with a BF > 1000, CI 
[.495, .844], which indicates decisive support for the alternative hypothesis. Equally, all 
the CAARS questionnaires are moderately to very highly correlated with ARCES and 
EMFQ scores, with τb ≥ .404, and BF ≥ 1000, which indicates decisive evidence for the 
alternative hypothesis.  
 
 
 
                                                 
5 This is a confidence interval, not a credible interval. 
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Depression, Anxiety and General Self-Efficacy Scale 
Ten BDI questionnaires were not collected due to experimenter error, but the correlation 
between BAI and BDI scales in our sample is still consistent with the well-known 
correlation between BAI and BDI in clinical samples (Beck et al., 1988), τb = .599, and 
there is decisive support for the alternative hypothesis, BF > 1000, CI [.37, .78]. Muris 
(2002) reports that Self-Efficacy measurements correlated with both depression and 
anxiety in general adolescent population, but in our adult sample this does not appear to 
be true, as BAI and GSE and BDI and GSE display a very weak correlation and there is 
no support for the alternative hypothesis, BF << 1. 
 
There is a difference in depression (BDI) scores between ADHD and non-ADHD 
subjects, δm = 1.76, and decisive support for the alternative hypothesis, BF > 1000.  
However, with regard to anxiety (BAI) and general self-efficacy scores (GSE) there is 
no support for the alternative hypothesis, BF < 1. 
 
Correlates of Speed-Accuracy measurements  
Priors for the parameters across this section are uniform distributions between 0 and +1, 
because we assume a positive relationship between CAARS scores and speed-accuracy 
regulation measures. Prior research that supports this is highlighted in the discussion. 
Pair correlations between all the CAARS scale and the number of missed responses 
(MISS) in the timed part of the task were run. Participants with a higher score in the 
Impulsivity/Emotional Lability (CAARS C) subscale committed a higher number of 
errors, τb = .274, and with a BF = 12.2, CI [.08, .44], which indicated a moderate 
correlation and strong support for the alternative hypothesis. Importantly, this is in 
contrast with our initial hypothesis, where we expected the Inattention/Memory 
Problems (CAARS A) subscale to measure the number of missed responses more 
accurately. In fact, the CAARS A correlates only weakly with the MISS scores, τb = 
.178, and with only anecdotal support for the alternative hypothesis, BF = 1.2, CI [.02, 
.36]. Thus, despite the large correlations between all the CAARS scales, the Impulsivity 
subscales seem to yield by far the best correlation with the MISS error score.  
 
The data suggest that CAARS C and the difference in median response time between 
timed and untimed task (RTD) are unlikely to be correlated, as τb = .117, and BF = .43 
CI [.01, .31], which indicated very weak support for the alternative hypothesis. 
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However, if we consider the response time range between timed and untimed responses 
(RTDR) instead of the RTD, we find a mild correlation between RTDR and the CAARS C 
scores, τb = .237, with moderate support for the alternative hypothesis, BF = 4.5, CI 
[.05, .40]. Missed response errors and RTDR are weakly negatively correlated, τb = -
.116, and there is, in this case, strong support for the null hypothesis, BF < 1.  
 
In addition, ARCES/EMFQ do not seem to be convincingly correlated with any of the 
measures of speed-accuracy trade-off (MISS, RTD, RTDR), τb ≤ .153, BF ≤ 1.2 
 
In summary, impulsivity traits in adults modulate the speed-accuracy regulation in two 
ways. First, by increasing the number of missed responses in the timed task and, to a 
lesser extent, by increasing the variability in difference of responses between the two 
tasks. Importantly, all the other questionnaires, including the CAARS A that measures 
inattention, do not correlate with these two objective measures as strongly as the 
CAARS C does. Table 8.4 summarises these results. 
 
Table 8.4 CAARS Inattention and Impulsivity scores and measures  
of speed-accuracy regulation 
 
95% Credible interval 
   
τb BF L U 
CAARS Inattention 
 
- 
 
MISS 
 
.178 
 
1.2 
 
0.024 
 
0.359 
 
CAARS Impulsivity 
 
- 
 
MISS 
 
.274 
 
12.2 
 
0.082 
 
0.449 
 
CAARS Inattention 
 
- 
 
RTD 
 
.112 
 
0.4 
 
0.010 
 
0.303 
 
CAARS Impulsivity 
 
- 
 
RTD 
 
.117 
 
0.4 
 
0.010 
 
0.305 
 
CAARS Inattention 
 
- 
 
RTDR 
 
.205 
 
2.1 
 
0.036 
 
0.383 
 
CAARS Impulsivity 
 
- 
 
RTDR 
 
.237 
 
4.5 
 
0.054 
 
0.413 
 
 
Figure 8.1 and 8.2 show the correlation plots for the CAARS Impulsivity scores and the 
number of missed responses (MISS) and the response time difference range (RTDR), 
respectively. 
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Fig. 8.1 CAARS Impulsivity scores and missed responses in the timed part (MISS) 
linear relationship plot. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals (computed by 
bootstrapping) 
 
 
Fig. 8.2 CAARS Impulsivity scores and response time difference range (RTDR), linear 
relationship plot. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence interval (computed by 
bootstrapping) 
 
Fitting ex-Gaussian parameters 
In chapter 3 we made use of the Exponential Gaussian distribution, also known as ex-
Gaussian, to fit data from simulated reaction times. The distribution is described by 
three parameters, the mean μ, the standard deviation σ, and τ, commonly associated to 
the shape of the tail. In this experimental section, fits with real data have also been 
evaluated with a MATLAB™ function as outlined in Lacouture and Cousineau (2008), 
using an ordinary maximum likelihood method (MLE). For more details on the fitting 
process refer to chapter 3. Unlike the simpler processes simulated in chapter 3, real data 
from participants performing the WCST in both untimed and timed conditions 
presented several challenges. We had to make sure that the ex-Gaussian distribution was 
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an effective way to summarise the response time distributions. Cursory inspection 
showed that the majority of distribution in the untimed task resemble an ex-Gaussian. 
The timed task distribution had a much more heterogeneous profile. Then, we 
calculated the best fit for a variety of distributions6 and picked the distribution with the 
lowest negative log-likelihood value. The value of the negative log-likelihood of this 
distribution was then compared to the one of the ex-Gaussian for all participants, by 
simply subtracting the latter from the former. The bigger the value, the better the fit of 
the ex-Gaussian distribution compared to the others. The resulting values for the 
untimed task show that that ex-Gaussian can be used with caution, median = -.44, IQR 
= 2.75. Attempting to fit the distributions in the timed part of the task proved to be 
more challenging, because no clear pattern emerged, even using a wide range of 
different distributions. This suggests that, in general, the best fitting distribution is 
comparable with the ex-Gaussian, but the advantage to have a psychologically 
interpretable distribution can be exploited for the untimed task only. 
In summary, the ex-Gaussian becomes useful to describe the distribution of responses 
whenever subject are not pressurised to answer, while the two response time 
measurement RTD and RTDR are two valuable distribution-free indices to assess speed-
accuracy adjustment and its variability. As drawback, these two measures cannot be 
directly compared to other research on perceptual or cognitive tasks. 
 
Correlates of ex-Gaussian parameters 
Looking at the correlations between the CAARS scores and the ex-Gaussian parameters 
for the untimed task (μu, σu, τu) shows mostly very weak correlations, with very weak 
support for the null hypothesis, with two exceptions. CAARS A (Inattention) 
moderately correlates with the τu, as τb = .235, and BF = 2.1, CI [.038, .403], which 
indicates anecdotal-to-moderate support for the alternative hypothesis. CAARS C 
(Impulsivity) more strongly correlates with the τu, as τb = .312, and BF = 19.5, CI [.12, 
.49], which indicates strong support for the alternative hypothesis. Again, the 
Impulsivity score seems to be a better predictor of neuropsychological performance than 
the Inattention score, for just the tail parameter of the ex-Gaussian.  
 
 
 
                                                 
6 The distributions fitted are Beta, Birnbaum-Saunders, Exponential, Extreme Value, Gamma, 
Generalised Extreme Value, Generalised Pareto, Inverse Gaussian, Logistic, Log-logistic, Log-normal, 
Nakagami, Normal, Rayleigh, Rician, Weibull 
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Performance errors 
Priors for the parameter across this sections are between -1 and +1, because there were 
no hypotheses made. Across all participants, Total Errors between timed and untimed 
tasks are moderately correlated, τb = .415, with decisive support for the alternative 
hypothesis, BF > 100, CI [.21, .59]. Perseverative Errors between timed and untimed 
conditions are also moderately correlated, τb = .411, again with decisive support for the 
alternative hypothesis, BF > 100, CI [.21, .58]. Conversely, Set Loss errors are weakly 
correlated, τb = .170 across conditions, and there is essentially no support for the 
alternative hypothesis, BF < 1. The correlations between Perseverative Errors and Set 
Loss errors in the untimed and in the timed task are also negligible, τb < .01 and with no 
support for the alternative hypothesis, BF < 1.  
 
Running a Mann-Whitney test to observe whether any of the performance errors were 
related to an ADHD diagnosis showed negligible differences between groups with 
almost no support for the alternative hypothesis, BF < 1. 
 
In summary, perseverative and set loss errors are dissociated. This is in line with what 
we would expect to see in the general population given the findings in the previous 
chapters. However, there is no convincing evidence regarding differences in 
performance measures between the ADHD and the non-ADHD group.  
 
8.3.4 Discussion 
 
Summary 
In this study we asked 50 participants, 14 of whom with an ADHD diagnosis, to 
perform two blocks of the WCST in two different conditions: timed and untimed. The 
time limit for the timed condition was computed based on individual subject 
performance on the timed condition, and this was unknown to the subjects. We posited 
that this simple paradigm allowed us to measure how participants regulate their speed-
accuracy trade-off in a type of executive task that sits between pure perceptual tasks and 
the long deliberative decision-making processes required to take important decisions.  
 
Analysing performance variables such as the number of errors committed reaffirms that 
perseveration and set loss errors are dissociable, as we observed in the previous 
experiment. Whereas children seem to display an increased number of perseverative 
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errors on the WCST even when correcting for IQ and Age, results on adults are mixed 
and they fail to converge (Woods et al., 2002). It is possible that, in adults, 
perseveration is sometimes observed because of confounding comorbid conditions. The 
absence of group differences in this type of errors in our sample is in line with this 
hypothesis. 
 
In terms of consequences of inattention and impulsivity in life, our sample does not 
seem to reflect what has been found in the literature regarding measures of 
forgetfulness, depression, and general self-efficacy (Carriere et al., 2008; Gambin & 
Święcicka, 2015). While there is an important association between all the combinations 
between ARCEQ/EMFQ and BDI/BAI, this does not seem to transfer to the GSE 
questionnaires, contrary to what we expected to see. This may be due to the joint effect 
of medication and the convenience sample. Forgetfulness in everyday life activities may 
trigger or worsen mood problems, but this would not necessary translate to a 
diminishing self-belief in the ability to succeed in life. 
 
Speed-Accuracy trade-off regulation 
Now we turn to the most important set of hypotheses that we examined. We 
hypothesised that ADHD traits (especially Inattention), as measured by the CAARS, 
would be correlated with the ability to regulate the speed-accuracy trade-off in the two 
different WCST subtasks. Results show that inattention (as measured by the CAARS A 
subscale) plays a much smaller part in affecting performance indices than Impulsivity 
does. Effects are moderate in magnitude for the correlation between the number of 
missed cards and Impulsivity scores and, albeit with less strength of evidence, there is a 
similar pattern for the RTDR, the range of the timed-untimed difference distribution.  
This is somewhat consistent with what Vallesi et al. (2013) found, for instance, in drug-
naive children performing a task where they had to regulate their speed-accuracy trade-
off. They asked participants to perform a simple binary decision-making task in the 
absence of instruction (baseline condition), after being instructed to ‘try to be as fast as 
they could’ (speed condition), and after being instructed to ‘try to avoid errors’ 
(accuracy conditions).  Hyperactivity/Impulsivity scores in the Conners’ (Teachers) 
scale were negatively correlated with accuracy in both types of switch trial (accuracy to 
speed, speed to accuracy) in ADHD children, whereas the same switching deficit was 
not associated with the Inattention scale. While hyperactivity and impulsivity were not 
differentiated, it is nonetheless possible to appreciate the dissociation between the 
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combined construct and inattention symptoms. Similarly, Mulder et al. (2010) report 
that ADHD impulsivity symptoms, but not inattention ones, predict parameters 
generated by a drift diffusion model fitted over the data from a perceptual task similar to 
the random-dot motion task. Taken together, this suggest that findings from prior 
research in children may generalise to adults with ADHD completing a more 
demanding task. 
 
Analysis of ex-Gaussian fits shows that responses for the timed part of the task exhibit a 
large heterogeneity, as there seems to be no distribution that fit this data coherently. 
These results may be disappointing, but it probably suggest that many cognitive 
processes are in play and were not factored in when designing the experiment. For 
instance, it is possible that giving participants the opportunity to see the countdown 
timer on screen might have affected their decision time in a way that is highly 
individualised and represent another layer of complexity in cognitive control. These 
nuances in the experimental design could be potentially addressed in future versions of 
the study. Also, an alternative procedure to fit truncated data using an ex-Gaussian 
could be used (Ulrich & Miller, 1994). Alternatively, we showed that distribution-free 
measures such as the RTD and the RTDR can be useful tools in assessing speed-accuracy 
trade-offs in higher-order cognitive tasks. Conversely, an ex-Gaussian curve can 
comfortably fit responses in the untimed part of the task. Correlational analysis reveals 
that there is a very reliable correlation between the tail parameter (τu) and the 
Impulsivity scores: higher impulsivity scores correspond to a thicker tail on the 
response time distribution for the untimed part.  
 
Interpreting these sets of results can be challenging, as it requires a mechanistic 
understanding of impulsivity, and the research on the exact nature of this construct is 
still in its infancy. Impulsivity does not have, in fact, a uniform definition across 
studies, but recent progress shows that it can be broken down into different constituents. 
Two of the most studied are rapid-response impulsivity and reward-delay impulsivity 
(Evenden, 1999). The first one is operationalised with speed-accuracy trade-off 
measurements, which can be timed or untimed. The second one is defined as pattern of 
choice that favours small reward in the immediate future over larger rewards in the far 
future. Both types of impulsivity have been associated with ADHD in children (Scheres 
et al., 2010). 
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Other frameworks employed to analysed impulsivity are the UPPS model (Whiteside 
and Lynam, 2001) which identifies four dimensions of impulsivity in a multifactorial 
model: urgency (U), lack of premeditation (P), lack of perseverance (P), sensation 
seeking (S). Although the model is strongly tied with personality research, 
neuropsychology and, more recently, neuroscience, have weighed in on the topic. Lack 
of perseverance is the dimension that seems most relevant to our work and it is defined 
as the ability to remain focused on a task. Neuropsychologically, this would be 
characterised by the inability to resist interference from irrelevant thoughts. In this 
framework the similarity with the inattention construct is evident. However, none of the 
proposed definitions provides a fully satisfactory explanation of these findings. A 
plausible solution consists in considering that the construct of impulsivity in the daily 
life of adults is produced by a quick initial accumulation of evidence before corrective 
mechanisms intervene in response to the evaluation of evidence. This may explain the 
increased number of missed responses and the increased variability. The inattentional 
mechanism could be driven by similar processes, and/or by information decay. 
 
Effects of ADHD drugs 
In this study we did not address the potential confound of these drugs in detail, due to 
the limited number of participants with ADHD in our sample and the different types of 
drugs used, but we did rather focus on the correlates between reported symptoms and 
neuropsychological performances. The effects of medications on neuropsychological 
task performance in adults is still largely unclear. There is some evidence that sustained 
attention might be enhanced by stimulant medication but, most importantly, set-shifting 
and cognitive flexibility may be even impaired in the form of perseveration behaviour 
(see Advokat, 2010 for a review).  
 
 Simulations 
8.4.1 Introduction 
We saw that inattention and impulsivity appear to be conflated in the 
neuropsychological literature, and in particular in studies of ADHD. We now examine 
whether our model can shed a light on the nature of impulsivity, through a set of 
simulations without necessarily performing quantitative fits. 
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8.4.2 Model description 
As we observed in previous chapters, the model reproduces performance errors well, 
but one of its major shortcomings was the lack of variability in response times. While 
the model of three simple corticostriatal channels described in chapter 3 clearly 
produced a distribution of response times that could be related to the ex-Gaussian 
distribution, the model of the two complete tasks (WCST and BRX) described in 
chapter 7 did not. We speculated that this was due to the additional signals coming from 
both the environment (external stimuli) and the top-down signal (rules). 
 
In order to increase variability among response times we introduce an additional 
parameter to the model of WCST. Thus, the area-threshold θA is no longer fixed to a 
value (previously 5000), but becomes a random variable described by a normal 
distribution with mean of 5000 and standard deviation σθ : 
   
θ𝐴 ~ 𝒩(5000, σθ)  
 
For all the simulations reported in this section the total number of trials is increased 
from 64 to 192 so as to improve curve fitting reliability. Fig. 8.3 shows an instance of a 
response time distribution obtained with this technique. The use of this technique is 
motivated by the use of a collapsing threshold in Drift Diffusion Models (Ditterich, 
2006), that model an increase in urgency as the subject needs to collect increasingly less 
evidence as time passes. Similarly, the state of urgency changes from response to 
response, but its mean remains fixed.  
 
 
Fig. 8.3 Histogram of the time distribution from a task.  
The solid red line is a fitted ex-Gaussian. 
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In order to simulate time limits in response we set a time limit at Tlim = 480 time units. 
Whenever the simulation exceeds this time, a missed response (MISS) is counted and 
all values are then reset to zero. Barring these two changes, the rest of the WCST model 
is essentially unaltered. In the untimed task, this limit is fixed to infinity and therefore 
missed responses do not occur. 
 
8.4.3 Simulation in the untimed task 
Analysis of behaviour in the simulated untimed task σθ does not seem to have any effect 
on any performance errors and importantly it does not affect any parameter of the ex-
Gaussian. The change in parameter oext also does not affect the mean parameter (μ) of 
the ex-Gaussian and has a modest effect on both σ and τ (Fig. 8.4).  
 
 
Fig. 8.4  Plot of the ex-Gaussian parameters σ and τ against oext. Values are max-
normalised, in order to show the percentage change. Each value of the independent 
variable is averaged across 5 trials. 
 
Analysis of εstr is more informative. The change in εstr has the same effect on 
performance variables that was shown in chapter 5. As εstr increases, perseverative 
errors decrease (more flexible control) but set loss errors increase (less stable control), 
though they can be modulated by εctx. The ex-Gaussian standard deviation σ is modestly 
affected by εstr, but τ has a clear linear characteristic (Fig. 8.5). 
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Fig. 8.5 Plot of the ex-Gaussian parameters σ and τ against εstr, Values are max-
normalised, in order to show the percentage change. Each value of the independent 
variable is averaged across 5 trials 
 
This single result is important because εstr mimics what has been observed for in 
individuals with higher impulsivity scores for the tail parameter of the ex-Gaussian (τu) 
in the untimed trials. 
 
8.4.4 Simulation in the timed task 
Now we turn to the analysis of the timed version of the task. As we said, we set a time 
limit for an answer (Tlim = 480), and if the model has not computed an answer by that 
time, a missed response is counted. It is important to stress that when pressurised, a 
subject might increase their overall attentional focus, and this could be reflected in the 
model by an increase in oext.  
 
Before each simulation, a trial of one task is simulated with no time limits, and RTDR is 
calculated by using that single distribution as a reference. In order to understand 
whether any parameter mimics the effect of impulsivity in real subjects, the alteration of 
this putative parameter has to produce a change in both missed responses and RTDR in 
the same direction. Alternatively, different parameters can produce these differences. 
Equally, the difference in performance errors must remain unaltered. First we analysed 
how the threshold variability σθ affects performance.  
 
The change in σθ does not seem to have any effect on performance variables (not 
shown) and this speaks to the possibility of implementing variability in response times 
and changes in performance in the model without affecting each other. There is also 
very little effect on the variables that are correlated with impulsivity (MISS and RTDR) 
(Fig 8.6 and Fig. 8.7). In other words, the only role that σθ has is to generate a range of 
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different response times. This is an attribute we were looking for when we introduced 
this parameter, as we wanted to introduce a new property in the system without 
affecting performances in any of the subtasks. 
 
 
 
Fig. 8.6 Plot of the number of missed responses (MISS) against σθ. Values are max-
normalised, in order to show the percentage change. Each value of the independent 
variable is averaged across 5 trials 
 
 
 
Fig. 8.7 Plot of RTDR against σθ. Values are max-normalised, in order to show the 
percentage change. Each value of the independent variable is averaged across 5 trials 
 
Alteration of oext, which is the constant signal fed to the higher-order units, has an effect 
on performance similar to what we observed in chapter 5, with a general increase in 
non-perseverative and set loss errors, but the changes occur only after a substantial drop 
in oext. In this timed performance model, decreasing oext increases the number of missed 
responses linearly (Fig. 8.8) and the RTDR follows an inverted U-shaped function only 
for low values of εpfc, but is otherwise insensitive to oext manipulation (Fig. 8.9). RTD 
also decreases steadily with oext (Fig. 8.10), and its values are all negative. This is not 
visible because the curve is normalised so as the reader can appreciate the significant 
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percentage change compared to the other variables, but this essentially indicates that the 
median response becomes increasingly faster than responses in the untimed model.  
Also, εpfc appears to lessen the impact of the dropping values of oext. 
 
 
Fig. 8.8 Plot of missed responses (MISS) against oext. Values are max-normalised, in 
order to show the percentage change. Each value of the independent variable is 
averaged across 5 trials. 
 
 
Fig. 8.9 Plot of RTDR against oext. Values are max-normalised, in order to show the 
percentage change. Each value of the independent variable is averaged across 5 trials. 
 
 
Fig. 8.10 Plot of RTD against oext. Values are max normalised. Values below 1 are in 
this case negative, that is to say that the median RT in the timed task becomes 
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increasingly greater than the untimed task. Each value of the independent variable is 
averaged across 5 trials 
 
The most interesting profile is seen with εstr. In the untimed task this parameter was tied 
to the impulsivity scores seen in the empirical data more than any other parameter, since 
a higher value would yield a thicker tail of responses (with no time limits). We can see 
that a linear relationship between the number of missed responses and εstr also exists 
(Fig. 8.11). A modest change in RTDR occurs after εstr exceeds 0.5 (Fig. 8.12). This 
speaks to an important, albeit not unique, role of the basal ganglia in the genesis of 
impulsive traits, as values are also modestly affected by εpfc, which appears to lessen the 
impact of εstr, as was previously shown with oext. When εstr exceeds 0.5 a decrease in 
RTD is also seen (Fig. 8.13). Since RTD values become then all negative (again, this is 
not visible because the curve is normalised) this indicates that the model tends to 
increase in speed, at the expense of lower accuracy (i.e., increased MISS responses). 
 
 
 
Fig. 8.11 Plot of missed responses (MISS) against εstr. Values are max-normalised, in 
order to show the percentage change and averaged across 5 trials. 
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Fig. 8.12 Plot of RTDR against εstr. Values are max-normalised in order to show the 
percentage change and averaged across 5 trials. 
 
 
Fig. 8.13 Plot of RTDR against εstr. Values are max-normalised. Values below 1 are in 
this case negative, that is to say that the median RT in the timed task becomes 
increasingly greater than the untimed task. Values are averaged across 5 trials. 
 
8.4.5 Discussion 
Behaviour in the untimed task is generally well predicted by εstr, the basal ganglia 
learning rate. Increasing this parameter makes the ex-Gaussian tail thicker by increasing 
τu, without an important change in the standard deviation. However, modest changes 
also occur with changes in oext, the constant input to all the higher-order units. 
Importantly, both εstr and oext have an effect on performance values, although the model 
has a ‘offset system’ that counteracts oext so that a drop in this parameter begins having 
a gradual effect on performance only after falling below a threshold (approximately 
0.8).   
 
Behaviour in the timed task also shows that both εstr and oext have a similar effect, 
although going in opposite directions, on the variables that we observed to be correlated 
with impulsivity traits, namely the number of missed responses (MISS) and the range of 
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the distribution of the difference between timed and untimed responses (RTDR). We also 
see that both parameters have an important effect on the response time difference 
(RTD). Increasing the learning parameter εstr cause faster median responses compared to 
the untimed model. This is not observed in our experimental sample. 
  
Changes in εstr has the same effect on performance variables that it is expected to have 
by the analysis in chapter 5. More precisely, as εstr increases, perseverative errors 
decrease (indicating more flexible control) but set loss error increase (implying less 
stable control), and these changes can be modulated by εctx. Recalling that in our sample 
there is no correlation between ADHD impulsive traits and performance errors such as 
SL, we can see how attributing impulsivity traits to alterations of εstr alone, and therefore 
to basal ganglia activity, cannot be correct. We described how to tie existing 
neuropsychological models with our results in the general discussion. 
 
 General Discussion 
We have presented a study with 50 individuals, 14 of whom had an ADHD diagnosis, 
where subjects have to perform a version of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test in a timed 
and an untimed setting. They have therefore to adjust their speed-accuracy trade-off. 
One of the main finding was that impulsivity correlates with the both the number of 
missed responses in the timed part and the variation in the distribution time across timed 
and untimed conditions. In the computational model of the same task (Section 8.4), we 
tried to explain how these changes in the outcome variables could occur. The model is 
identical to the one we presented in the previous chapter, but with the addition of a 
moving threshold to produce an ex-Gaussian distribution in the response times, similar 
to the observation in the experimental group. 
 
We conclude that there are two parameters, εstr and oext, that have a major effect in both 
the timed and untimed version of the WCST (WCSTt). This is not to say that εpfc (the 
learning parameter related to the entropic states of the cortical higher-order units) and σθ 
(the newly introduced parameter that regulates the standard deviation in the dynamic 
decision threshold) have no role in the generation of ‘impulsive-like’ performance in 
terms of response times, but it is minimal compared to the other two parameters.  
 
Both the basal ganglia learning rate εstr and the external signal oext have similar effects 
of the number of missed responses and on the RTD but only εstr has a more consistent 
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association with RTDR. In our sample, RTD does not seem to correlate with symptoms of 
impulsivity whereas RTDR and missed responses do. If we now look at how already 
established theories of impulsivity in ADHD tie in with our findings, we see that the 
role of εstr can somewhat be more associated with reward-delay impulsivity. Although 
reward is not directly involved because it is a fixed parameter by design, the learning 
rate εstr amplifies the effect of reward in biasing the higher-order schemas. One 
experimental prediction that validates this theory would be that an excessive level of 
dopamine in the striatum without normalising prefrontal circuits produces these kind of 
impulsive symptoms in healthy and individuals with ADHD (van Schouwenburg et al., 
2010). The role oext seems instead to be associated with a rapid-response type of 
impulsivity, and more directly relatable to prefrontal function.  
 
The two parameters model also ties well with some aspect of the Type 1/2 model (Dual-
process model) of impulsivity described by Nigg (2001). What is regulated by Type 1 
processes is automatic, stimulus-driven and rapid. This process would be activated, for 
instance, when behaviour is disrupted in response to an internal or external salient event 
such as an unexpected sound or an anxiety-provoking thought. This is generally thought 
to be linked with subcortical network activity. In our model εstr seems to be again be 
indirectly associated with this process, since it amplifies the effect of reward (in this 
case novelty) and disrupts the system working memory by weakening or deactivating 
higher-order schemas. Type 2 processes are instead characterised by effortful cognition 
and would be associated with oext. Notice that the Type 1/2 model, unlike that reward-
delay/rapid-response model, is hierarchical, in that Type 2 cognition controls Type 1 
processes. 
 
In summary, there is some level of congruency between our model and other strands of 
research. In this preliminary analysis the model has shown a capacity to simulate 
variability in response times and to produce qualitative results that provide a different 
framework to think about impulsivity in ADHD.  Given that in our sample we do not 
see any correlation between performance errors such as perseverative and set loss errors 
and any measure of ADHD behaviour, at a group or individual level, each set of 
performance must be generated by a combination of variation in εstr and oext, possibly 
adjusted by εpfc and σθ, albeit to a lesser extent. In practice, the next step for the 
development of the model is to go from a qualitative analysis to more precise model fits 
and model comparisons, along the lines of what we did in the previous chapter. This is 
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made more challenging because of the necessity to introduce a reasonable 
transformation between simulated and empirical response times, and slightly more 
computationally onerous because of the use of 192 cards (4 blocks of 48)  instead of the 
original 64. Once a quantitative analysis is complete, specific predictions on 
neurophysiological states can be done. If predictions are accurate, the computational 
model provide a useful bridge between psychological and neurophysiological data.  
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General Discussion and Conclusion 
 
 Summary of findings 
In the first chapter we overviewed the neurobiology of the frontostriatal loops in the 
brain, focusing on the basal ganglia nuclei. Several neurocomputational models of the 
basal ganglia and tasks based on the posited function of the nuclei were overviewed, 
too.  
 
In the second chapter we reported a reimplementation of the model of the basal ganglia 
developed by Gurney et al. (2001a,b), with a some variations, and we explored how the 
values of key parameters affect the channel output that would drive disinhibition. We 
concluded that the most important parameters that mimic dopamine presence in the 
basal ganglia are the threshold (βstr) and the slope (αstr) of the saturation function in the 
striatum. Several other parameters with neurobiological meaning turned out to be less 
important or simply redundant in explaining disinhibition behaviour.  
 
In the third chapter we embedded the basal ganglia units in a corticothalamic loop by 
adding a cortical unit and a thalamic unit in a feedback loop that contains the basal 
ganglia. We studied how parameters’ values affect the qualitative shape of the output 
given different types of inputs, and showed how reaction times and exploration of other 
states are produced by manipulating αstr and βstr.  
 
In the fourth chapter we presented an implementation of the extended schema theory 
that essentially uses two different corticothalamic loops to simulate the Wisconsin Card 
Sorting Test (WCST). The model has a rudimentary mechanism to handle external 
feedback, but it still produces results compatible with neurologically healthy controls 
and, when βstr is manipulated, with Parkinson’s disease patient’s performance. In the 
case of healthy young individuals, aggregate data are simulated with a good fit, but the 
inter-correlation between performance errors reveal major differences between the 
model’s behaviour and that of the controls. We showed that these discrepancies can be 
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lessened by clustering participants into five groups, and simulated each group 
performance with different sets of parameter values.  
 
In the fifth chapter we undertook a major structure change in the model of the WCST by 
introducing two neurobiologically motivated learning parameters, εstr and εpfc, that act 
on the threshold of the striatal units and on the gain of the cortical units, respectively. 
Within this model, the change in βstr is no longer identical for all schemas, but varies 
depending on the previous value of an individual schema (i.e., it is history-dependent). 
Conversely, εpfc scales the effect of entropy and it is contingent only on the current state 
of the cortical units.  
 
The sixth chapter introduced a variation of the Brixton (BRX) Task, using the same 
computational paradigm. Qualitative studies of parameters ensured that the model 
produced empirically sound results. 
 
In the seventh chapter we presented a study with 25 individuals over 60 and 25 younger 
individuals performing the WCST and the BRX tasks. Aging produces cognitive 
changes in the performance of executive tasks, in addition to biological changes in 
neurotransmitter distribution in the brain, and computational modelling can potentially 
tease out how biological changes affect cortical and striatal processes differentially. In 
the experimental part, we showed that there is a dissociation between perseveration and 
set loss in the older population in the WCST and we showed that results for the BRX 
borders significance for just one dependent variable across age groups. In the 
computational part we took the models of the two tasks previously developed and, using 
a simulated annealing technique, we successfully fitted the data with the two main 
learning rate parameters. We then proceeded to cluster data into several groups for the 
WCST and fitting data with more parameters. Group comparisons revealed that two 
different sets of parameters simulate the same data set. It can be speculated that older 
participants compensate for weaker cortical modulation, corresponding to greater εctx, 
by increasing oext, corresponding to increasing attentional focus, which is consistent 
with findings in the cognitive neuroscience of aging. Here, the critical idea is that the 
same behavioural results can be realised by different sets of computational parameters 
which, in turn, can correspond to neural states.  
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In the eighth chapter we presented another empirical study. In this case 50 participants, 
14 of whom had a diagnosis of ADHD, performed a variation of the WCST where 
subjects were asked to perform the same task under time pressure. If in the seventh 
chapter we validated the model against performance error data producing quantitative 
model fits, in this chapter we examined qualitative parameter behaviour to seek to 
explain the bases of impulsivity within our own computational framework. The most 
important experimental results revealed that impulsivity scores are associated with the 
number of missed cards in the timed part of the task and, to a lesser extent, subjects with 
higher impulsivity scores also show a higher variability in the response time distribution 
across the timed and untimed subtasks. ADHD is believed to arise from a dysfunction in 
the frontostriatal circuits and computational modelling can help generating theories of 
ADHD that distinguish between frontal and striatal contribution to the regulation of the 
speed-accuracy trade-off. We concluded that both striatal and frontal processes are 
responsible for this specific type of impulsive behaviour, and this is compatible with the 
interaction between Type1 and Type2 processes in impulsive behaviour (Nigg et al., 
2001).  
 
 Research Questions 
9.2.1 A neurobiological schema theory 
The main research question explored in this thesis was whether it is possible to merge a 
schema-based activation model with the functionality of the basal ganglia as a device 
that resolves competition between schemas. For this purpose, we adopted a bottom-up 
approach to the basal ganglia units and a top-down approach to two higher-order 
neuropsychological tasks – the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) and the Brixton 
Task (BRX).  
 
The bottom-up approach is based on the work by Gurney et al. (2001). This assigns a 
role to the basal ganglia nuclei as a whole, as a device that implement an optimal 
algorithm for action selection, and each of the nuclei implement part of this algorithm. 
The top-down approach is instead based on the computational implementations of the 
schema-based theory by Cooper and Shallice (2000), in the form of the Contention 
Scheduling. The underlying cognitive theory is based on studies of disordered 
behaviours, such as Action Disorganisation Syndrome, Ideational Apraxia and, most 
importantly for the current work, Parkinson’s Disease. Results indicate that it is possible 
to combine these two approaches successfully. Although the objectives of this work are 
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modest, the model represent a step towards a more neurobiological schema theory. At 
this point, the only two main types of units that can be mapped into brain areas are the 
cortical schemas and the basal ganglia units with an anterior and a posterior subdivision 
for each set, but the model is structured to accommodate any expansion. 
 
9.2.2 The role of dopamine 
One ancillary research question was related to the role of dopamine in striatal and 
cortical circuits within the context of our models. Manipulation of saturation curves in 
the basal ganglia model (chapter 2), in the corticothalamic loops (chapter 3), in the 
model of WCST (chapter 4), and within the upgraded model of WCST with learning 
capabilities (chapter 5), suggest the existence of a few general principles. First, altering 
the threshold uniformly across units affect performance errors similarly to what is 
observed in Parkinson’s disease. However, this manipulation alone is not capable of 
reproducing correlations across errors. Introducing a learning parameter that alters the 
threshold of the basal ganglia units according to external feedback (εstr) improves model 
fitting. Quantitative fits of the simulation of older and younger participants (chapter 7) 
completing the WCST show that the learning parameter εstr  is again consistent with an 
expression of dopaminergic activity in the striatum, while the role of εctx as the 
expression of dopamine in the cortex does not fit this interpretation. In other words, we 
have two ways to express the effect of dopamine in the model, one with εstr, and the 
other with the baseline values of βstr. The value and sign of reward affect this baseline. 
There is evidence to believe that these roughly correspond to phasic and tonic 
dopamine, respectively, but this assumption is difficult to validate experimentally. In 
the chapter 8 we showed that the simulations ascribe a specific behaviour to εstr. If the 
model’s prediction are accurate, any dopaminergic agents affecting only the striatum in 
healthy control should have different effect on both performance errors and response 
time than the traditional dopaminergic drugs with a broader binding profile. This can in 
principle be verified experimentally. 
 
9.2.3 The role of dynamical controllers 
The explored models feature what can be described as a dynamic controller, or even a 
dynamic schema, as opposed as to a static one. This is realised with a mechanism that 
alters the gain of the cortical schemas as a function of a learning parameter (εctx) and the 
entropy of the activations. The entropy is simply calculated treating the cortical 
schemas’ activations as a random variable whose normalised activation values represent 
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probability of selection.  This type of controller is dynamic because the change in 
saturation function depends on its activation values that change across time and 
changing the saturation function, in turn, affects these values. This allows the system to 
remain stable or to destabilise whenever certain states in the parameter space are visited. 
More generally, a dynamic schema would manipulate the activation function of another 
schema that feed back into it. The operations of a dynamical controller could possibly 
fit within the supervisory attentional system (SAS) formulated by Shallice (2002). This 
system is in place to modulate non-routine situations, where an appropriate schema is 
not available, or complex sequencing behaviour is required to reach a goal, among other 
things. It seems in fact particularly difficult for the nervous system to be able to switch 
between “overall modes of behaviour” (Kilmer, McCulloch, & Blum, 1969) via schema 
cooperation and competition without a central executive.  
 
The operations of the supervisory system are not conceived in terms of schemas, but 
dynamical schemas may fit some of the necessary features. This would blur the 
difference between systems that have only representations (e.g. Contention Scheduling) 
and systems that apply computations over those representation (e.g. Supervisory 
Attentional System). Competition among dynamical controllers could happen similarly 
to the more static schemas, guided by the basal ganglia operation, and the neural 
localisation in the prefrontal cortex would be more appropriate.  
 
All of these extremely speculative hypotheses deserve to be examined more rigorously 
in the future. 
 
 Limitation and future research 
We have successfully begun to answer our research questions, but much work is left to 
do. We first examine the intrinsic limitations of the model, that is, those limitations that 
exist “by design”, and then address what can be done to improve and expand the scope 
of the model by virtue of the model’s successful achievements. 
 
The major intrinsic limitation is that the model requires a hard-wired schemas. Schemas 
can be defined essentially as cognitive structure that serve to organise experience when 
agents interact with their environment, but the way atomic meaning (meaning that 
cannot be further broken down into meaningful units) is organised can vary greatly, and 
biological plausibility can complicate the problem even further. Take for example the 
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problem of the Arbib’s “rana computatrix”, as a model of approach and avoidance in the 
frog (Arbib, 2003). The system consists in a set of two perceptual schemas (small and 
large moving object) and motor schemas (snap and avoid) (Fig.9.1a). This system is 
suitable for analysing behaviour and understanding how a cognitive system produces 
accurate responses and reaction times. 
 
 
 
Fig. 9.1 Approach-Avoidance behaviour model in schema-theory (a) purely cognitive, 
(b) biologically plausible, consistent with neural lesions  
 
However, lesion studies in the frog show that lesions in the pretectal area (just anterior 
to the superior colliculi) cause the frog to approach all animals without differentiating. 
Therefore, the set of schemas is biologically sound only if the two perceptual schemas 
are assigned to an “all moving objects” schema, and the “large moving objects” schema 
has additional inhibitory control over the approaching motor schema (Fig. 9.1b). In 
general, if a system is purely cognitive then one would only pay attention to the 
behavioural output, for example in terms of accuracy or reaction times. If, however, 
there is even a minimal degree of neural differentiation in the processes, it is difficult to 
understand how schemas should be organised. Here, in our work on the WCST we 
assigned to the higher-order units three meaningful rules (sort by colour, sort by shape, 
and sort by number). In the BRX we assigned sequential rules to the higher-order units 
(clockwise, anticlockwise, two-by-two clockwise, alternate). Each of those have a basal 
ganglia set of units. Even if we accept that that is the right way to assign content to 
schemas, some individuals may employ different strategies, especially when they 
become more aware of their mistakes. There are potential solutions available. The most 
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obvious is to establish systematic mutual feedback between theory and neuroimaging 
work. While this is already happening in many research centres, there is still widespread 
scepticism around the ability of computational modelling to affect the way experimental 
science works (Stafford, 2012). 
 
A less ambitious but probably useful idea is that participants should be encouraged to 
explain what part of the task they found more difficult at the end of the study, and what 
strategies they used when faced with these difficulties. Although the majority of mental 
processes cannot be probed by just asking participants, experimenters have perhaps 
forgotten that in higher-order cognition many subjects can explain why they do what 
they do. While this does not constitute scientific inquiry per se (we cannot be sure 
whether such reflections are not post hoc rationalisations), this qualitative investigations 
can often help the experimenter to design better studies, especially when the cognitive 
tasks require some deliberative processes. 
 
Besides these intrinsic limitations that require more time, effort, and collaboration to be 
overcome, there are many avenues for improvement that can be explored in a relatively 
shorter time. From a methodological point of view, several improvements can be made. 
Simultaneous use of continuous and discrete functions in the implementation may 
require unnecessary computational resources. Hence, a reasonable discretisation of all 
the functions in the system should be a goal for future models. Also, future 
implementation should make use of more rigorous free parameter limits, ideally from 0 
to 1 or -1 to +1 whenever necessary (e.g. rewards), and dependent variable limits (e.g. 
proportions instead of raw scores). This would limit the flexibility of the model to fit a 
greater range of datasets and would also facilitate the evaluation of precise flexibility 
metrics such as the Model Flexibility Analysis (Veksler, Myers, & Gluck, 2015). 
 
Computational modelling of higher-order neuropsychological tasks within the 
developed framework can and should be extended to other tasks, and reparametrisation 
should be used to set primary parameters to fixed or constant values, so that direct 
comparisons can be made across tasks. Neuropsychological tasks in healthy and 
diseased individuals are the ideal type of tasks to model, on account of the abundance of 
available literature. The Continuous Performance Task (CPT), the Sustained Attention 
to Response Task (SART), the Trail Making Task (TMT), and many others are all 
suitable for these purposes.  
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The model has ample room for extension with brain structures like the amygdala, 
cerebellum, and anterior cingulate, with each of them implementing different algorithms 
and cognitive functions at different timescales. The cerebellum is an ideal candidate as 
an additional module, because of the recent reappraisal of its role in higher-order 
cognition (Bellebaum & Daum, 2007). Take Hart et al.’s (2012) meta-analysis, for 
instance. Their work on neuroimaging studies on children with ADHD points to the 
involvement of cerebellar circuits in timing performance. A legitimate hypothesis would 
be that cerebellar circuits affect mostly the timing aspect of a series of tasks while 
leaving accuracy somewhat unaffected. In our WCST model the standard deviation of 
the dynamic threshold seems to have this property. If a cerebellar circuit could affect 
this parameter given its internal structure (Purkinje’s cells, mossy fibres, climbing 
fibres, etc.), this would count as a successful attempt at integrating cerebellar functions 
and schemas, similar to what has been achieved in this thesis with the basal ganglia. 
 
Finally, as we briefly pointed out earlier, another whole area of future research involves 
the relationship between dynamical schemas and supervisory control (Shallice, 2002). 
Here the question is how and when a dynamic schema might manipulate the activation 
function of another conceptually lower-level schema that feds back into it. 
 
 Conclusion 
We began with the goal of “understanding, at a neural level, the mechanisms involved 
in human action selection”. Action was conceptualised in schema-based terms, with 
selection involving choice among schemas. While some questions remain, the series of 
models developed throughout chapters 2 to 5, their application to two widely used 
executive function tasks in chapters 5 and 6, and the empirical work aimed at applying 
the model to understand aging effects and effects of ADHD in chapters 7 and 8, support 
a view of human action selection as reliant upon a hierarchical set of static and dynamic 
schemas that are neurally located in the cortical area and whose activation is centrally 
manipulated by subcortical structures such as the basal ganglia. 
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Appendix 
 
  Simulations Details 
All the simulation code was run on Matlab 2018a, using Simulink, Curve Fitting 
Toolbox, Neural Network Toolbox, and Econometrics Toolbox. 
 
Simulation code and data are available at https://github.com/AndreaCaso/thesis. 
 
  Optimisations Details 
 
11.2.1 Genetic Algorithm (Chapter 4) 
In paragraph 4.3.4 we used a simplified Genetic Algorithm to fit our model. GA is a 
simple tool to solve optimisation problems (Whitley, 1994). The algorithm employed 
here consists of only two iterations to identify the best set of parameters. In the first run 
we vary 9 parameters (w'cog,w'env, αstr, αsma,αpfc, αstr, αstn, αgpi, αgpe) by simply randomising 
their value within a reasonable range of values (previous qualitative analysis turns out to 
be relevant) and observe how the total fitness changes. We then choose the best three 
values for the total fitness and, keeping the old parameters fixed, we vary four other 
parameters (wcog, wenv, βthal, bl). The set of parameters with the highest value of total 
fitness is the best one and it fits the empirical data better than the others. The total 
fitness value is calculated as the reciprocal of the product between the mean value and 
the standard deviation of the z values. In this way, when all z values are similar and/or 
approach zero, the total fitness value is the highest. Not including the standard deviation 
of the z values changes a few value but does not change the final choice for the best 
sets. This indicates a good degree of convergence. 
 
11.2.2 Neural Network for model fitting (Chapter 5) 
In Chapter 4 the simulated clusters are produced with a genetic algorithm by varying a 
large number of parameters. In Chapter 5, in order to fit the right set for each of the 
three clusters, a function that maps εstr and εpfc to the three dependent variables TE, PE, 
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and SL3 is constructed. For this purpose, we built a simple feedforward neural network 
with two 50-units hidden layers each and we fed it with all the data from the simulation 
run in the paragraph with three groups. With a goal of an MSE (mean squared error) 
lower than 0.05, the network showed a good mapping of the function without 
overfitting. The training-testing set ratio was fixed to 70/30. 
 
This result is interesting on its own, because it shows that the mapping between 
parameters and errors does not behave erratically but rather, a mathematically complex 
but continuous function can be somewhat descriptive of this relationship. The fit to each 
cluster was then calculated for a large selection of εstr and εpfc. The fitness value was 
calculated as the mean over the three performance errors of the difference between the 
simulated and the empirical data mean divided by the standard deviation of the 
empirical cluster (basically a simplel z-value). The model was then run a hundred times 
with the best sets of εstr and εpfc for each of the three cluster. This procedure is 
computationally quicker and more efficient than running a genetic algorithm over a 
larger number of parameters.  
 
11.2.3 Simulated Annealing (Chapter 7) 
In chapter 7 all the model fitting was performed using the Simulated Annealing (SA) 
technique, because of the high number of initial parameters and the likely presence of 
local minima in the parameter space. The name comes from the annealing technique in 
metallurgy, where a metal is heated and then slowly cooled so as to decrease the defect 
of the resulting micro-structure of the metal. The aim of SA is to approximate a global 
minimum of a function called the cost function. Here, we used a slight variant of the 
general SA, in that that the parameter update was a function of the previous set of 
parameters. Before running the algorithm, a set of parameters θ0 was initialised to a set 
of values that had been shown to work previously without producing any degenerate 
result (see Table 7.3). After each trial (t), the set of parameters was then updated 
according to the following function:  
 
𝜃𝑡+1 = (1 + 𝜉)𝜃𝑡  
 
where ξ is a random vector from a uniform distribution ranging between -v and +v, 
where v is set to 0.1, and the multiplication is component by component: 
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𝜉𝑖 ~ 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚(−𝑣,+𝑣) 
 
In practice, because v is set to 0.1, each parameters initially varies at most by ±10% of 
the immediately preceding value. The model was then run for the values of the 
parameter vector and results recorded.  A cost function (φ) was then calculated as the 
absolute distance between the produced output (η) and the target output (η0). Since there 
were more output variables, the cost function was a vector, too. 
 
𝜑 = |𝜂 − 𝜂𝑜|  
 
The norm of the cost function vector is equivalent to an ordinary sum of squared error 
function across conditions. A variation of the delta function between trials was then 
computed as the difference between the norms of the cost function between two 
consecutive trials: 
 
Δ𝜑 = ||𝜑𝑡|| − ||𝜑𝑡−1|| 
 
If this difference is less than 0, that means that the cost has decreased, and therefore the 
algorithm is moving towards a better solution. If this difference is more than 0, that 
means the cost function has increased and it is overall a worst fit. Crucially, the 
algorithm accepted this solution θt+1 with a probability proportional to the cost 
difference and a parameter called temperature (T): 
 
{
θ𝑡+1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 < 𝑒−Δ𝜑/𝑇
𝑡
θ𝑡, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
 
Temperature is not a static parameter but can be decreased exponentially or linearly. 
Exponential ‘cooling’ was chosen for all the simulations (Kirkpatrick, 1983): 
 
𝑇𝑡 = 𝑇𝑜𝜏−𝑡 
 
where τ was fixed to 1.5 and the initial temperature is T0 was set in a more liberal 
fashion.  
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At the beginning of the process the algorithm is more likely to accept a poor solution, 
with a higher temperature. As the temperature decreases, the algorithm settles. 
Simulated Annealing leverages this apparent setback in order to escape from local 
minima and explore other minima, generally smaller than the previous ones.  
